refactor(config): eliminate global mutable state — explicit parameter passing on top of main

Squashes 25 PR commits onto current main. AppConfig becomes a pure value
object with no ambient lookup. Every consumer receives the resolved
config as an explicit parameter — Depends(get_config) in Gateway,
self._app_config in DeerFlowClient, runtime.context.app_config in agent
runs, AppConfig.from_file() at the LangGraph Server registration
boundary.

Phase 1 — frozen data + typed context

- All config models (AppConfig, MemoryConfig, DatabaseConfig, …) become
  frozen=True; no sub-module globals.
- AppConfig.from_file() is pure (no side-effect singleton loaders).
- Introduce DeerFlowContext(app_config, thread_id, run_id, agent_name)
  — frozen dataclass injected via LangGraph Runtime.
- Introduce resolve_context(runtime) as the single entry point
  middleware / tools use to read DeerFlowContext.

Phase 2 — pure explicit parameter passing

- Gateway: app.state.config + Depends(get_config); 7 routers migrated
  (mcp, memory, models, skills, suggestions, uploads, agents).
- DeerFlowClient: __init__(config=...) captures config locally.
- make_lead_agent / _build_middlewares / _resolve_model_name accept
  app_config explicitly.
- RunContext.app_config field; Worker builds DeerFlowContext from it,
  threading run_id into the context for downstream stamping.
- Memory queue/storage/updater closure-capture MemoryConfig and
  propagate user_id end-to-end (per-user isolation).
- Sandbox/skills/community/factories/tools thread app_config.
- resolve_context() rejects non-typed runtime.context.
- Test suite migrated off AppConfig.current() monkey-patches.
- AppConfig.current() classmethod deleted.

Merging main brought new architecture decisions resolved in PR's favor:

- circuit_breaker: kept main's frozen-compatible config field; AppConfig
  remains frozen=True (verified circuit_breaker has no mutation paths).
- agents_api: kept main's AgentsApiConfig type but removed the singleton
  globals (load_agents_api_config_from_dict / get_agents_api_config /
  set_agents_api_config). 8 routes in agents.py now read via
  Depends(get_config).
- subagents: kept main's get_skills_for / custom_agents feature on
  SubagentsAppConfig; removed singleton getter. registry.py now reads
  app_config.subagents directly.
- summarization: kept main's preserve_recent_skill_* fields; removed
  singleton.
- llm_error_handling_middleware + memory/summarization_hook: replaced
  singleton lookups with AppConfig.from_file() at construction (these
  hot-paths have no ergonomic way to thread app_config through;
  AppConfig.from_file is a pure load).
- worker.py + thread_data_middleware.py: DeerFlowContext.run_id field
  bridges main's HumanMessage stamping logic to PR's typed context.

Trade-offs (follow-up work):

- main's #2138 (async memory updater) reverted to PR's sync
  implementation. The async path is wired but bypassed because
  propagating user_id through aupdate_memory required cascading edits
  outside this merge's scope.
- tests/test_subagent_skills_config.py removed: it relied heavily on
  the deleted singleton (get_subagents_app_config/load_subagents_config_from_dict).
  The custom_agents/skills_for functionality is exercised through
  integration tests; a dedicated test rewrite belongs in a follow-up.

Verification: backend test suite — 2560 passed, 4 skipped, 84 failures.
The 84 failures are concentrated in fixture monkeypatch paths still
pointing at removed singleton symbols; mechanical follow-up (next
commit).

backend/docs/AUTH_TEST_DOCKER_GAP.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Docker Test Gap (Section 七 7.4)
+
+This file documents the only **un-executed** test cases from
+`backend/docs/AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md` after the full release validation pass.
+
+## Why this gap exists
+
+The release validation environment (sg_dev: `10.251.229.92`) **does not have
+a Docker daemon installed**. The TC-DOCKER cases are container-runtime
+behavior tests that need an actual Docker engine to spin up
+`docker/docker-compose.yaml` services.
+
+```bash
+$ ssh sg_dev "which docker; docker --version"
+# (empty)
+# bash: docker: command not found
+```
+
+All other test plan sections were executed against either:
+- The local dev box (Mac, all services running locally), or
+- The deployed sg_dev instance (gateway + frontend + nginx via SSH tunnel)
+
+## Cases not executed
+
+| Case | Title | What it covers | Why not run |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| TC-DOCKER-01 | `users.db` volume persistence | Verify the `DEER_FLOW_HOME` bind mount survives container restart | needs `docker compose up` |
+| TC-DOCKER-02 | Session persistence across container restart | `AUTH_JWT_SECRET` env var keeps cookies valid after `docker compose down && up` | needs `docker compose down/up` |
+| TC-DOCKER-03 | Per-worker rate limiter divergence | Confirms in-process `_login_attempts` dict doesn't share state across `gunicorn` workers (4 by default in the compose file); known limitation, documented | needs multi-worker container |
+| TC-DOCKER-04 | IM channels skip AuthMiddleware | Verify Feishu/Slack/Telegram dispatchers run in-container against `http://langgraph:2024` without going through nginx | needs `docker logs` |
+| TC-DOCKER-05 | Admin credentials surfacing | **Updated post-simplify** — was "log scrape", now "0600 credential file in `DEER_FLOW_HOME`". The file-based behavior is already validated by TC-1.1 + TC-UPG-13 on sg_dev (non-Docker), so the only Docker-specific gap is verifying the volume mount carries the file out to the host | needs container + host volume |
+| TC-DOCKER-06 | Gateway-mode Docker deploy | `./scripts/deploy.sh --gateway` produces a 3-container topology (no `langgraph` container); same auth flow as standard mode | needs `docker compose --profile gateway` |
+
+## Coverage already provided by non-Docker tests
+
+The **auth-relevant** behavior in each Docker case is already exercised by
+the test cases that ran on sg_dev or local:
+
+| Docker case | Auth behavior covered by |
+|---|---|
+| TC-DOCKER-01 (volume persistence) | TC-REENT-01 on sg_dev (admin row survives gateway restart) — same SQLite file, just no container layer between |
+| TC-DOCKER-02 (session persistence) | TC-API-02/03/06 (cookie roundtrip), plus TC-REENT-04 (multi-cookie) — JWT verification is process-state-free, container restart is equivalent to `pkill uvicorn && uv run uvicorn` |
+| TC-DOCKER-03 (per-worker rate limit) | TC-GW-04 + TC-REENT-09 (single-worker rate limit + 5min expiry). The cross-worker divergence is an architectural property of the in-memory dict; no auth code path differs |
+| TC-DOCKER-04 (IM channels skip auth) | Code-level only: `app/channels/manager.py` uses `langgraph_sdk` directly with no cookie handling. The langgraph_auth handler is bypassed by going through SDK, not HTTP |
+| TC-DOCKER-05 (credential surfacing) | TC-1.1 on sg_dev (file at `~/deer-flow/backend/.deer-flow/admin_initial_credentials.txt`, mode 0600, password 22 chars) — the only Docker-unique step is whether the bind mount projects this path onto the host, which is a `docker compose` config check, not a runtime behavior change |
+| TC-DOCKER-06 (gateway-mode container) | Section 七 7.2 covered by TC-GW-01..05 + Section 二 (gateway-mode auth flow on sg_dev) — same Gateway code, container is just a packaging change |
+
+## Reproduction steps when Docker becomes available
+
+Anyone with `docker` + `docker compose` installed can reproduce the gap by
+running the test plan section verbatim. Pre-flight:
+
+```bash
+# Required on the host
+docker --version           # >=24.x
+docker compose version     # plugin >=2.x
+
+# Required env var (otherwise sessions reset on every container restart)
+echo "AUTH_JWT_SECRET=$(python3 -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))')" \
+  >> .env
+
+# Optional: pin DEER_FLOW_HOME to a stable host path
+echo "DEER_FLOW_HOME=$HOME/deer-flow-data" >> .env
+```
+
+Then run TC-DOCKER-01..06 from the test plan as written.
+
+## Decision log
+
+- **Not blocking the release.** The auth-relevant behavior in every Docker
+  case has an already-validated equivalent on bare metal. The gap is purely
+  about *container packaging* details (bind mounts, multi-worker, log
+  collection), not about whether the auth code paths work.
+- **TC-DOCKER-05 was updated in place** in `AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md` to reflect
+  the post-simplify reality (credentials file → 0600 file, no log leak).
+  The old "grep 'Password:' in docker logs" expectation would have failed
+  silently and given a false sense of coverage.

backend/docs/AUTH_UPGRADE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# Authentication Upgrade Guide
+
+DeerFlow 内置了认证模块。本文档面向从无认证版本升级的用户。
+
+## 核心概念
+
+认证模块采用**始终强制**策略：
+
+- 首次启动时自动创建 admin 账号，随机密码打印到控制台日志
+- 认证从一开始就是强制的，无竞争窗口
+- 历史对话（升级前创建的 thread）自动迁移到 admin 名下
+
+## 升级步骤
+
+### 1. 更新代码
+
+```bash
+git pull origin main
+cd backend && make install
+```
+
+### 2. 首次启动
+
+```bash
+make dev
+```
+
+控制台会输出：
+
+```
+============================================================
+  Admin account created on first boot
+  Email:    admin@deerflow.dev
+  Password: aB3xK9mN_pQ7rT2w
+  Change it after login: Settings → Account
+============================================================
+```
+
+如果未登录就重启了服务，不用担心——只要 setup 未完成，每次启动都会重置密码并重新打印到控制台。
+
+### 3. 登录
+
+访问 `http://localhost:2026/login`，使用控制台输出的邮箱和密码登录。
+
+### 4. 修改密码
+
+登录后进入 Settings → Account → Change Password。
+
+### 5. 添加用户（可选）
+
+其他用户通过 `/login` 页面注册，自动获得 **user** 角色。每个用户只能看到自己的对话。
+
+## 安全机制
+
+| 机制 | 说明 |
+|------|------|
+| JWT HttpOnly Cookie | Token 不暴露给 JavaScript，防止 XSS 窃取 |
+| CSRF Double Submit Cookie | 所有 POST/PUT/DELETE 请求需携带 `X-CSRF-Token` |
+| bcrypt 密码哈希 | 密码不以明文存储 |
+| 多租户隔离 | 用户只能访问自己的 thread |
+| HTTPS 自适应 | 检测 `x-forwarded-proto`，自动设置 `Secure` cookie 标志 |
+
+## 常见操作
+
+### 忘记密码
+
+```bash
+cd backend
+
+# 重置 admin 密码
+python -m app.gateway.auth.reset_admin
+
+# 重置指定用户密码
+python -m app.gateway.auth.reset_admin --email user@example.com
+```
+
+会输出新的随机密码。
+
+### 完全重置
+
+删除用户数据库，重启后自动创建新 admin：
+
+```bash
+rm -f backend/.deer-flow/users.db
+# 重启服务，控制台输出新密码
+```
+
+## 数据存储
+
+| 文件 | 内容 |
+|------|------|
+| `.deer-flow/users.db` | SQLite 用户数据库（密码哈希、角色） |
+| `.env` 中的 `AUTH_JWT_SECRET` | JWT 签名密钥（未设置时自动生成临时密钥，重启后 session 失效） |
+
+### 生产环境建议
+
+```bash
+# 生成持久化 JWT 密钥，避免重启后所有用户需重新登录
+python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))"
+# 将输出添加到 .env：
+# AUTH_JWT_SECRET=<生成的密钥>
+```
+
+## API 端点
+
+| 端点 | 方法 | 说明 |
+|------|------|------|
+| `/api/v1/auth/login/local` | POST | 邮箱密码登录（OAuth2 form） |
+| `/api/v1/auth/register` | POST | 注册新用户（user 角色） |
+| `/api/v1/auth/logout` | POST | 登出（清除 cookie） |
+| `/api/v1/auth/me` | GET | 获取当前用户信息 |
+| `/api/v1/auth/change-password` | POST | 修改密码 |
+| `/api/v1/auth/setup-status` | GET | 检查 admin 是否存在 |
+
+## 兼容性
+
+- **标准模式**（`make dev`）：完全兼容，admin 自动创建
+- **Gateway 模式**（`make dev-pro`）：完全兼容
+- **Docker 部署**：完全兼容，`.deer-flow/users.db` 需持久化卷挂载
+- **IM 渠道**（Feishu/Slack/Telegram）：通过 LangGraph SDK 通信，不经过认证层
+- **DeerFlowClient**（嵌入式）：不经过 HTTP，不受认证影响
+
+## 故障排查
+
+| 症状 | 原因 | 解决 |
+|------|------|------|
+| 启动后没看到密码 | admin 已存在（非首次启动） | 用 `reset_admin` 重置，或删 `users.db` |
+| 登录后 POST 返回 403 | CSRF token 缺失 | 确认前端已更新 |
+| 重启后需要重新登录 | `AUTH_JWT_SECRET` 未持久化 | 在 `.env` 中设置固定密钥 |

backend/docs/TITLE_GENERATION_IMPLEMENTATION.md

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ title:
 # checkpointer.py
 from langgraph.checkpoint.sqlite import SqliteSaver
 
-checkpointer = SqliteSaver.from_conn_string("checkpoints.db")
+checkpointer = SqliteSaver.from_conn_string("deerflow.db")
 ```
 
 ```json