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fix(channels): make channel connect flow deterministic (#3582)
* fix(channels): make channel connect flow deterministic * make format * fix(channels): apply connect-code before allowed_users on telegram and wechat The bind-bootstrap reorder shipped for slack/dingtalk only. Telegram and WeChat still gate _check_user/allowed_users before connect-code dispatch, so a newly allowlisted-but-unbound user is silently rejected when binding via the browser deep-link / connect-code flow — the same deadlock the PR fixes. - telegram: consume the /start deep-link token before the allowed_users gate. - wechat: handle the /connect code before the allowed_users gate, and defer inbound file extraction + context-token tracking past the gate so blocked senders no longer trigger CDN downloads or token bookkeeping. Adds regression tests for both adapters mirroring the slack/dingtalk coverage. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(channels): enforce single-active-owner invariant at the DB layer _revoke_other_active_owners did a SELECT-then-UPDATE in app code with no row lock or constraint covering active rows. Under READ COMMITTED, two concurrent connect-code consumes for the same (provider, external_account_id, workspace_id) from different owners could each observe "no other active owner" and both commit a connected row, leaving find_connection_by_external_identity nondeterministic. - Add a partial unique index on (provider, external_account_id, workspace_id) WHERE status != 'revoked' (portable to SQLite >= 3.8.0 and PostgreSQL) so the database guarantees at most one non-revoked row per external identity. - Reorder upsert_connection to revoke other owners' active rows before the new connected row is flushed (so the index is satisfied at commit), wrapped in a bounded rollback-and-retry loop. A losing concurrent writer now retries against the now-visible state instead of committing a duplicate. Adds DB-constraint, revoked-slot-reuse, and concurrent-upsert regression tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(channels): harden connect-status polling primitive pollChannelConnectionUntilResolved was a free-floating recursive setTimeout started from onSuccess with no cancellation, no per-provider dedup, a redundant second endpoint per tick, and an unbounded loop on a non-finite expires_in. - Extract a framework-agnostic, cancellable poller (connect-poll.ts) that polls only listChannelConnections() and invalidates the providers query once when the bind resolves, instead of fetching both endpoints every tick. - Guard expires_in with a finite check + default window so undefined/NaN can no longer produce a poll loop that runs until the page closes. - Track one active poll handle per provider in useConnectChannelProvider via a ref Map: a new connect cancels the prior poll for that provider, and a useEffect cleanup cancels all polls on unmount. Adds unit tests for resolve-and-stop, cancellation, and non-finite-expiry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(channels): stop leaking blocked-sender content in DingTalk INFO log; document bind semantics Moving the allowed_users gate past _extract_text meant the parsed-message INFO log (text=%r, first 100 chars) fired for senders that allowed_users would have rejected, defeating the filter's noise/privacy role. Move that log to after the allowed_users gate so blocked senders' message text never reaches INFO logs. Also document the two operator-relevant semantic changes in backend/CLAUDE.md: connect-code dispatch runs before allowed_users (so allowed_users is no longer a bind-time defense; the model relies on code confidentiality + 600s TTL + one-time consumption), and the single-active-owner-per-external-identity transfer semantics now backed by the partial unique index. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(channels): note connect-code-vs-allowlist and ownership transfer in operator guide Mirror the backend/CLAUDE.md notes in the operator-facing IM_CHANNEL_CONNECTIONS.md: connect codes are consumed before allowed_users (so a not-yet-allowlisted user can still complete a first bind, and allowed_users is not a bind-time defense), and an external identity has at most one active owner with last-bind-wins transfer enforced at the DB layer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(channels): lift connect-code dispatch into Channel base class Each adapter duplicated the ordering-sensitive boilerplate of extracting a /connect code and guarding on the connection repo before its allowed_users gate. The duplication is what let telegram/wechat drift and keep the gate ahead of the bind. Centralize it: - Move `_connection_repo` onto Channel.__init__ (removing 7 duplicate assignments). - Add Channel._pending_connect_code(text), which guards on the repo and extracts the code, documenting that adapters MUST consult it before authorization so a browser-initiated bind can bootstrap a not-yet-authorized identity. - Route slack, discord, feishu, dingtalk, wechat, and wecom through the helper. This also fixes a latent inconsistency where slack dispatched a bind even when no connection repo was configured. Pure refactor — the full channel suite stays green; adds a direct unit test for the base helper's contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * make format * fix(channels): redact DingTalk parsed-message INFO log content Log text_len instead of the first 100 chars of message text, so message content never reaches INFO logs (the after-gate move already keeps blocked senders out entirely). This takes over the redaction from #3584 so only this PR touches dingtalk.py, letting the two PRs merge in any order conflict-free. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Nan Gao
@@ -88,6 +88,119 @@ class TestChannelConnectionRepository:
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assert second["external_account_name"] == "Alice Telegram"
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assert len(await repo.list_connections("alice")) == 1
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_upsert_connection_transfers_external_identity_between_owners(self, repo):
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await repo.upsert_connection(
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owner_user_id="alice",
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provider="slack",
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external_account_id="U-shared",
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workspace_id="T1",
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status="connected",
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)
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bob = await repo.upsert_connection(
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owner_user_id="bob",
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provider="slack",
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external_account_id="U-shared",
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workspace_id="T1",
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status="connected",
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)
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alice_rows = await repo.list_connections("alice")
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resolved = await repo.find_connection_by_external_identity(
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provider="slack",
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external_account_id="U-shared",
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workspace_id="T1",
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)
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assert alice_rows[0]["status"] == "revoked"
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assert bob["status"] == "connected"
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assert resolved is not None
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assert resolved["owner_user_id"] == "bob"
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assert resolved["id"] == bob["id"]
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_active_identity_unique_index_rejects_second_connected_owner(self, repo):
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# The single-active-owner invariant must be enforced by the database, not
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# only by the app-level revoke step (which can race under READ COMMITTED).
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from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
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await repo.upsert_connection(
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owner_user_id="alice",
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provider="slack",
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external_account_id="U-shared",
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workspace_id="T1",
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status="connected",
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)
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with pytest.raises(IntegrityError):
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async with repo.session_factory() as session:
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session.add(
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ChannelConnectionRow(
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id="manual-duplicate-active",
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owner_user_id="bob",
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provider="slack",
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external_account_id="U-shared",
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workspace_id="T1",
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status="connected",
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)
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)
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await session.commit()
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_active_identity_unique_index_allows_revoked_rows(self, repo):
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# A revoked row must not occupy the active-identity slot, so a fresh
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# connected bind for the same identity is allowed afterwards.
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first = await repo.upsert_connection(
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owner_user_id="alice",
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provider="slack",
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external_account_id="U-shared",
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workspace_id="T1",
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status="connected",
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)
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await repo.disconnect_connection(connection_id=first["id"], owner_user_id="alice")
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second = await repo.upsert_connection(
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owner_user_id="bob",
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provider="slack",
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external_account_id="U-shared",
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workspace_id="T1",
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status="connected",
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)
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assert second["status"] == "connected"
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_concurrent_upserts_keep_single_active_owner(self, repo):
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import asyncio
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async def connect(owner: str):
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return await repo.upsert_connection(
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owner_user_id=owner,
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provider="slack",
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external_account_id="U-shared",
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workspace_id="T1",
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status="connected",
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)
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await asyncio.gather(connect("alice"), connect("bob"))
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async with repo.session_factory() as session:
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connected = (
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(
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await session.execute(
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select(ChannelConnectionRow).where(
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ChannelConnectionRow.provider == "slack",
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ChannelConnectionRow.external_account_id == "U-shared",
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ChannelConnectionRow.workspace_id == "T1",
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ChannelConnectionRow.status == "connected",
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)
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)
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)
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.scalars()
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.all()
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)
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assert len(connected) == 1
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_credentials_are_encrypted_at_rest_and_decrypted_by_repository(self, repo):
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connection = await repo.upsert_connection(
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