fix(channels): add operational guardrails (#3584)

* fix(channels): add operational guardrails

* make format

* fix(channels): converge with #3582 to avoid merge-order conflicts

Drop this PR's DingTalk INFO-log redaction and hand it to #3582, which
already restructures that handler and will redact the same log there. This
PR no longer touches dingtalk.py, so the two PRs can merge to main in any
order without a conflict.

For WeChat, drop the contested thread_ts priority reorder (review #3) and
keep only what inbound dedupe needs: a server-stable message_id in the
inbound metadata (message_id/msg_id, no client_id per review #6). This is a
single added line inside the metadata dict, a region #3582 never touches, so
it auto-merges regardless of order.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(channels): address three correctness review findings

1. Connect-code cap was racy (willem #1): _create_state ran delete-expired,
   count, and insert as three separate transactions, so concurrent connect
   POSTs from one owner could each see count < cap and all insert past it. Add
   ChannelConnectionRepository.create_oauth_state_within_cap which does
   delete+count+insert in a single transaction serialized per (owner,
   provider) — Postgres via pg_advisory_xact_lock, SQLite via the write lock
   the leading DELETE takes — and have the router use it.

2. Inbound dedupe key fell back to "" workspace (willem #3): two workspaces
   delivering without team/guild/aibotid would collapse to the same key and
   dedupe each other's messages. _inbound_dedupe_key now fails closed
   (returns None) when no workspace identifier is present.

3. Dedupe key was recorded on receipt and never released on failure
   (ShenAC #1): a transient error (DB blip, Gateway 503) left the key in place
   for the full TTL, so a provider redelivery of the same message_id — exactly
   the retry dedupe should absorb — was silently dropped. _handle_message now
   releases the key in the unexpected-exception branch so redelivery can
   recover, while keeping record-on-receipt so retries during handling are
   still deduped.

Tests: repo cap enforcement incl. concurrent-issuance non-leak; dedupe
fail-closed; dedupe key release-on-failure redelivery recovery.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(channels): address cleanup/efficiency and test review findings

Efficiency / cleanup:
- Dedupe key set drops client-generated ids (client_msg_id, client_id);
  keep only server-stable event_id/message_id/msg_id, which a provider's own
  redelivery preserves (ShenAC #6). Every provider already emits message_id.
- TTL/overflow pruning of _recent_inbound_events is now O(k): switch to an
  OrderedDict and popitem(last=False) from the front instead of scanning all
  4096 entries on every inbound (willem #4).
- Log "received inbound" only after the dedupe check so a provider retrying N
  times no longer logs N accepts; document that manager dedupe covers the
  agent run/final answer, not provider ack side-effects (willem #5, ShenAC #2).
- Slack drops the redundant `team_id or event.get("team")` fallback the caller
  already resolved (willem #6).
- create_oauth_state_within_cap prunes only this owner/provider's expired codes
  instead of a global DELETE on every connect POST; global cleanup still runs
  on consume_oauth_state (willem #7).

Tests:
- Dedupe test uses tmp_path instead of a leaked mkdtemp, uses distinct objects
  per publish, and adds a negative control: a different message_id is still
  processed, catching over-dedupe regressions (willem #8, ShenAC #4).
- Slack HTTP-mode rejection test supplies app_token so the missing-token early
  return can't mask the guard, giving the state assertions teeth (ShenAC #3).
- count_oauth_states test pins that the active row survives, not just the count
  (ShenAC #5).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* make format

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Nan Gao
2026-06-18 04:09:46 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 97dd9ecf73
commit 8c0830aea1
12 changed files with 468 additions and 51 deletions
@@ -246,6 +246,77 @@ class TestChannelConnectionRepository:
states = (await session.execute(select(ChannelOAuthStateRow))).scalars().all()
assert [state.state_hash for state in states] == [repo.hash_state("active-state")]
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_count_oauth_states_active_only_and_delete_expired(self, repo):
now = datetime.now(UTC)
await repo.create_oauth_state(
owner_user_id="alice",
provider="slack",
state="expired-state",
expires_at=now - timedelta(minutes=1),
)
await repo.create_oauth_state(
owner_user_id="alice",
provider="slack",
state="active-state",
expires_at=now + timedelta(minutes=5),
)
assert await repo.count_oauth_states(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", active_only=True, now=now) == 1
assert await repo.delete_expired_oauth_states(now=now) == 1
assert await repo.count_oauth_states(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack") == 1
# Pin that the surviving row is the active one (an inverted expiry
# predicate would delete the active row, still return 1, and pass above).
async with repo.session_factory() as session:
survivors = (await session.execute(select(ChannelOAuthStateRow))).scalars().all()
assert [row.state_hash for row in survivors] == [repo.hash_state("active-state")]
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_create_oauth_state_within_cap_enforces_pending_cap(self, repo):
now = datetime.now(UTC)
expires = now + timedelta(minutes=5)
for i in range(3):
inserted = await repo.create_oauth_state_within_cap(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", state=f"code-{i}", expires_at=expires, max_pending=3, now=now)
assert inserted is True
# Cap reached: the next issuance is rejected and nothing is inserted.
assert await repo.create_oauth_state_within_cap(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", state="code-over", expires_at=expires, max_pending=3, now=now) is False
assert await repo.count_oauth_states(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", active_only=True, now=now) == 3
# Expired rows are pruned and free up capacity; a different owner is unaffected.
assert await repo.create_oauth_state_within_cap(owner_user_id="bob", provider="slack", state="bob-1", expires_at=expires, max_pending=3, now=now) is True
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_create_oauth_state_within_cap_ignores_expired_rows(self, repo):
now = datetime.now(UTC)
# Three already-expired rows must not count against the cap.
for i in range(3):
await repo.create_oauth_state(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", state=f"old-{i}", expires_at=now - timedelta(minutes=1))
inserted = await repo.create_oauth_state_within_cap(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", state="fresh", expires_at=now + timedelta(minutes=5), max_pending=3, now=now)
assert inserted is True
assert await repo.count_oauth_states(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", active_only=True, now=now) == 1
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_create_oauth_state_within_cap_does_not_leak_under_concurrency(self, repo):
"""Concurrent issuance for one owner cannot push past the cap (willem #1)."""
import anyio
now = datetime.now(UTC)
expires = now + timedelta(minutes=5)
results: list[bool] = []
async def issue(state: str) -> None:
results.append(await repo.create_oauth_state_within_cap(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", state=state, expires_at=expires, max_pending=3, now=now))
async with anyio.create_task_group() as tg:
for i in range(8):
tg.start_soon(issue, f"code-{i}")
assert sum(1 for ok in results if ok) == 3
assert await repo.count_oauth_states(owner_user_id="alice", provider="slack", active_only=True, now=now) == 3
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_consume_oauth_state_is_one_time_even_under_concurrent_consumers(self, repo):
import anyio