* fix(security): do not bind-mount host CLI auth dirs by default The Compose stack bind-mounted the entire ~/.claude and ~/.codex dirs (read-only) into the root gateway container in every configuration -- exposing not just credentials but full conversation history, per-project session data, and global CLI config. The default OpenAI-compatible model providers and the local sandbox never use them. Move the mounts to an opt-in docker/docker-compose.cli-auth.yaml overlay. Document env-token paths (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, CODEX_AUTH_PATH) in .env.example -- the Gateway credential loader reads env first, so most setups need no mount at all. Document the exposure and per-mode options in SECURITY.md. Reported by @greatmengqi. * docs: clarify ACP adapter auth and add Claude single-file credential option - ACP adapters authenticate independently (many take an env API key like ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and need no mount); the cli-auth overlay is only for adapters that read the full CLI config dir. Avoids steering users toward mounting the whole dir for ACP when env auth usually suffices. - Add CLAUDE_CODE_CREDENTIALS_PATH (single .credentials.json) as a Claude one-file option, matching codex CODEX_AUTH_PATH and the README. * docs: cite claude-code-acp env auth and CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR in ACP guidance Replace the generic 'some adapters' wording with the verified behavior of the common claude-code-acp adapter (env ANTHROPIC_API_KEY startup + CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR), so the 'no ~/.claude mount needed for ACP' guidance is backed by a concrete adapter.
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Security Policy
Supported Versions
As deer-flow doesn't provide an official release yet, please use the latest version for the security updates. Currently, we have two branches to maintain:
- main branch for deer-flow 2.x
- main-1.x branch for deer-flow 1.x
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please go to https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow/security to report the vulnerability you find.
CLI Credential Mounts (Claude Code / Codex)
DeerFlow can reuse your Claude Code / Codex CLI subscription login as a model
provider (ClaudeChatModel, the Codex provider) or for ACP agents that run the
CLI in-container. The Compose stack used to bind-mount the entire ~/.claude
and ~/.codex directories (read-only) into the gateway container in every
configuration — exposing not just credentials but full conversation history,
per-project session data, and global CLI config. A gateway compromise (prompt
injection, tool/MCP misuse, RCE) would leak all of it.
These directories are no longer mounted by default. Supply CLI credentials with the least exposure that fits your setup:
| Need | How | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Claude model provider | env CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN / ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN (via .env), or CLAUDE_CODE_CREDENTIALS_PATH → a single mounted .credentials.json |
none / one file |
| Codex model provider | env CODEX_AUTH_PATH pointing at a single mounted auth.json |
one file |
| ACP agent | the adapter's own auth — many ACP adapters take an env API key (e.g. ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / OPENAI_API_KEY) and need no mount; use the opt-in docker/docker-compose.cli-auth.yaml overlay only if your adapter reads the full CLI config dir |
none / full dir |
The Gateway credential loader checks environment variables before the
default credential files, so the env-token paths need no bind mount at all. ACP
adapters authenticate independently of DeerFlow via their own documented env —
for example the common claude-code-acp adapter starts as
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=… claude-code-acp and honors CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR to redirect
its config directory, so it needs no ~/.claude mount at all. Prefer the
adapter's documented env auth, and reach for the
docker-compose.cli-auth.yaml overlay only as a fallback for an adapter that
genuinely reads the full CLI config directory.