Files
deer-flow/backend/tests/test_auth.py
T
DanielWalnut aa015462a7 feat(im): Add user-owned IM channel connections (#3487)
* Add user-owned IM channel connections

* Fix dev startup and channel connect popup

* Use async channel connect flow

* Harden dev service daemon startup

* Support local IM channel connections

* Align IM connections with local channels

* Fix safe user id digest algorithm

* Address Copilot IM channel feedback

* Address IM channel review comments

* Support all integrated IM channel connections

* Format additional channel connection tests

* Keep unavailable channel connect buttons clickable

* Fix IM channel provider icons

* Add runtime setup for enabled IM channels

* Guard global shortcut key handling

* Keep configured IM channels editable

* Avoid password autofill for channel secrets

* Make channel threads visible to connection owners

* Persist IM runtime config locally

* Allow disconnecting runtime IM channels

* Route no-auth channel sessions to local user

* Use default user for auth-disabled local mode

* Show IM channel source on threads

* Prefill IM channel runtime config

* Reflect IM channel runtime health

* Ignore Feishu message read events

* Ignore Feishu non-content message events

* Let setup wizard enable IM channels

* Fix frontend formatting after merge

* Stabilize backend tests without local config

* Isolate channel runtime config tests

* Address channel connection review comments

* Use sha256 user buckets with legacy migration

* Ensure runtime IM channels are ready after restart

* Persist disconnected IM channel state

* Address channel connection review comments

* Address channel connection review findings

Frontend connect flow:
- Open the runtime-config dialog only when a provider still needs
  credentials; configured providers go straight to the connect flow, so
  the binding-code/deep-link path is reachable from the UI again.
- After saving credentials, continue into the connect flow when a user
  binding is still required (multi-user mode) instead of stopping at a
  "Connected" toast.
- Extract shared provider-state helpers to core/channels/provider-state
  and add unit + e2e coverage for the direct-connect and
  configure-then-connect paths.

Provider status semantics:
- Report connection_status from the user's newest connection row;
  with no binding it is not_connected, except in auth-disabled local
  mode where a configured running channel is effectively connected.

Concurrency and event-loop correctness:
- Offload ChannelRuntimeConfigStore construction and writes, channel
  service construction, and Slack connection replies to threads; add a
  tests/blocking_io/ anchor for the runtime-config handlers.
- Consume binding codes with a conditional UPDATE so a code can only be
  used once under concurrent workers; retry upsert_connection as an
  update when a concurrent insert wins the unique constraint.
- Serialize ensure_channel_ready per channel so concurrent provider
  polls cannot double-start a channel worker.

Config and migration hardening:
- Stop mutating the get_app_config()-cached Telegram provider config;
  the runtime store now owns the UI-entered bot username.
- Register channel_connections in STARTUP_ONLY_FIELDS with the
  standardized startup-only Field description.
- Match the legacy unsafe-id bucket by recomputing its exact SHA-1 name
  so another user's same-prefix bucket can never be migrated.
- Remove the unused Telegram process_webhook_update path and document
  src/core/channels in the frontend docs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address PR review comments on authz scoping and channel runtime

Security (review feedback from ShenAC-SAC):
- Scope internal-token callers to the connection owner carried in
  X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id instead of bypassing owner checks outright,
  in both require_permission(owner_check=True) and the stateless run
  endpoints. Internal callers keep access to their own and
  shared/legacy threads, and may claim a default-owned channel thread
  for its real owner, but a leaked internal token no longer grants
  cross-user thread access.
- Require admin privileges for POST/DELETE /api/channels/{provider}/
  runtime-config: runtime credentials and channel workers are
  instance-wide shared state (same model as the MCP config API).
  Read-only provider listing stays available to all users.

Performance (review feedback from willem-bd):
- Skip the redundant thread channel-metadata PATCH after the first
  successful backfill per thread.
- Reuse the per-connection Slack WebClient until its token changes
  instead of constructing one per outbound message.
- Reconcile channel readiness for all providers concurrently in
  GET /api/channels/providers.

Also resolve the code-quality unused-import flag in the blocking-io
anchor by pre-importing the channel service via importlib.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix prettier formatting in provider-state test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Reconcile UI runtime channel config with config reload on restart

Main now reloads a channel's config.yaml entry on restart_channel()
(#3514, issue #3497). Adapt the user-owned connection flow to coexist:

- configure_channel() restarts with reload_config=False — the caller
  just supplied the authoritative config (browser-entered credentials
  that are never written to config.yaml), so a file reload must not
  clobber it with the stale on-disk entry.
- _load_channel_config() re-applies the UI runtime-store overlay used
  at startup, so an operator-triggered restart keeps browser-entered
  credentials for channels without a config.yaml entry and does not
  resurrect a channel disconnected from the UI.
- Offload the reload's disk IO (config.yaml + runtime store) with
  asyncio.to_thread, matching the blocking-IO policy on this branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 15:24:58 +08:00

820 lines
29 KiB
Python

"""Tests for authentication module: JWT, password hashing, AuthContext, and authz decorators."""
from datetime import timedelta
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
from uuid import uuid4
import bcrypt
import pytest
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app.gateway.auth import create_access_token, decode_token, hash_password, verify_password
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
from app.gateway.auth.password import needs_rehash
from app.gateway.authz import (
AuthContext,
Permissions,
get_auth_context,
require_auth,
require_permission,
)
# ── Password Hashing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_hash_password_and_verify():
"""Hashing and verification round-trip."""
password = "s3cr3tP@ssw0rd!"
hashed = hash_password(password)
assert hashed != password
assert hashed.startswith("$dfv2$")
assert verify_password(password, hashed) is True
assert verify_password("wrongpassword", hashed) is False
def test_hash_password_different_each_time():
"""bcrypt generates unique salts, so same password has different hashes."""
password = "testpassword"
h1 = hash_password(password)
h2 = hash_password(password)
assert h1 != h2 # Different salts
# But both verify correctly
assert verify_password(password, h1) is True
assert verify_password(password, h2) is True
def test_verify_password_rejects_empty():
"""Empty password should not verify."""
hashed = hash_password("nonempty")
assert verify_password("", hashed) is False
def test_hash_produces_v2_prefix():
"""hash_password output starts with $dfv2$."""
hashed = hash_password("anypassword123")
assert hashed.startswith("$dfv2$")
def test_verify_v1_prefixed_hash():
"""verify_password handles $dfv1$ prefixed hashes (plain bcrypt)."""
password = "legacyP@ssw0rd"
raw_bcrypt = bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode("utf-8"), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode("utf-8")
v1_hash = f"$dfv1${raw_bcrypt}"
assert verify_password(password, v1_hash) is True
assert verify_password("wrong", v1_hash) is False
def test_verify_bare_bcrypt_hash():
"""verify_password handles bare bcrypt hashes (no prefix) as v1."""
password = "oldstyleP@ss"
raw_bcrypt = bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode("utf-8"), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode("utf-8")
assert verify_password(password, raw_bcrypt) is True
assert verify_password("wrong", raw_bcrypt) is False
def test_needs_rehash_returns_false_for_v2():
"""v2 hashes do not need rehashing."""
hashed = hash_password("something")
assert needs_rehash(hashed) is False
def test_needs_rehash_returns_true_for_v1():
"""v1-prefixed hashes need rehashing."""
raw = bcrypt.hashpw(b"pw", bcrypt.gensalt()).decode("utf-8")
assert needs_rehash(f"$dfv1${raw}") is True
def test_needs_rehash_returns_true_for_bare_bcrypt():
"""Bare bcrypt hashes (no prefix) need rehashing."""
raw = bcrypt.hashpw(b"pw", bcrypt.gensalt()).decode("utf-8")
assert needs_rehash(raw) is True
# ── JWT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_create_and_decode_token():
"""JWT creation and decoding round-trip."""
user_id = str(uuid4())
# Set a valid JWT secret for this test
import os
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
token = create_access_token(user_id)
assert isinstance(token, str)
payload = decode_token(token)
assert payload is not None
assert payload.sub == user_id
def test_decode_token_expired():
"""Expired token returns TokenError.EXPIRED."""
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
user_id = str(uuid4())
# Create token that expires immediately
token = create_access_token(user_id, expires_delta=timedelta(seconds=-1))
payload = decode_token(token)
assert payload == TokenError.EXPIRED
def test_decode_token_invalid():
"""Invalid token returns TokenError."""
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
assert isinstance(decode_token("not.a.valid.token"), TokenError)
assert isinstance(decode_token(""), TokenError)
assert isinstance(decode_token("completely-wrong"), TokenError)
def test_create_token_custom_expiry():
"""Custom expiry is respected."""
user_id = str(uuid4())
token = create_access_token(user_id, expires_delta=timedelta(hours=1))
payload = decode_token(token)
assert payload is not None
assert payload.sub == user_id
# ── AuthContext ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_auth_context_unauthenticated():
"""AuthContext with no user."""
ctx = AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
assert ctx.is_authenticated is False
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is False
def test_auth_context_authenticated_no_perms():
"""AuthContext with user but no permissions."""
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[])
assert ctx.is_authenticated is True
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is False
def test_auth_context_has_permission():
"""AuthContext permission checking."""
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
perms = [Permissions.THREADS_READ, Permissions.THREADS_WRITE]
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=perms)
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "read") is True
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "write") is True
assert ctx.has_permission("threads", "delete") is False
assert ctx.has_permission("runs", "read") is False
def test_auth_context_require_user_raises():
"""require_user raises 401 when not authenticated."""
ctx = AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
ctx.require_user()
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
def test_auth_context_require_user_returns_user():
"""require_user returns user when authenticated."""
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[])
returned = ctx.require_user()
assert returned == user
# ── get_auth_context helper ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_get_auth_context_not_set():
"""get_auth_context returns None when auth not set on request."""
mock_request = MagicMock()
# Make getattr return None (simulating attribute not set)
mock_request.state = MagicMock()
del mock_request.state.auth
assert get_auth_context(mock_request) is None
def test_get_auth_context_set():
"""get_auth_context returns the AuthContext from request."""
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
ctx = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[Permissions.THREADS_READ])
mock_request = MagicMock()
mock_request.state.auth = ctx
assert get_auth_context(mock_request) == ctx
# ── require_auth decorator ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_require_auth_sets_auth_context():
"""require_auth rejects unauthenticated requests with 401."""
from fastapi import Request
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/test")
@require_auth
async def endpoint(request: Request):
ctx = get_auth_context(request)
return {"authenticated": ctx.is_authenticated}
with TestClient(app) as client:
# No cookie → 401 (require_auth independently enforces authentication)
response = client.get("/test")
assert response.status_code == 401
def test_require_auth_requires_request_param():
"""require_auth raises ValueError if request parameter is missing."""
import asyncio
@require_auth
async def bad_endpoint(): # Missing `request` parameter
pass
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="require_auth decorator requires 'request' parameter"):
asyncio.run(bad_endpoint())
# ── require_permission decorator ─────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_require_permission_requires_auth():
"""require_permission raises 401 when not authenticated."""
from fastapi import Request
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/test")
@require_permission("threads", "read")
async def endpoint(request: Request):
return {"ok": True}
with TestClient(app) as client:
response = client.get("/test")
assert response.status_code == 401
assert "Authentication required" in response.json()["detail"]
def test_require_permission_denies_wrong_permission():
"""User without required permission gets 403."""
from fastapi import Request
app = FastAPI()
user = User(id=uuid4(), email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
@app.get("/test")
@require_permission("threads", "delete")
async def endpoint(request: Request):
return {"ok": True}
mock_auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[Permissions.THREADS_READ])
with patch("app.gateway.authz._authenticate", return_value=mock_auth):
with TestClient(app) as client:
response = client.get("/test")
assert response.status_code == 403
assert "Permission denied" in response.json()["detail"]
def _make_internal_owner_check_app():
"""App with an owner_check route and a thread owned by ``alice``."""
import asyncio
from fastapi import Request
from langgraph.store.memory import InMemoryStore
from deerflow.persistence.thread_meta.memory import MemoryThreadMetaStore
app = FastAPI()
thread_store = MemoryThreadMetaStore(InMemoryStore())
asyncio.run(thread_store.create("alice-thread", user_id="alice"))
app.state.thread_store = thread_store
@app.get("/threads/{thread_id}")
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
async def endpoint(thread_id: str, request: Request):
return {"ok": True}
return app
def _internal_auth_context() -> AuthContext:
from types import SimpleNamespace
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE
user = SimpleNamespace(id="default", system_role=INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE)
return AuthContext(user=user, permissions=[Permissions.THREADS_READ])
def test_require_permission_internal_role_scoped_by_owner_header():
"""An internal caller acting for the thread owner passes the owner check."""
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME
app = _make_internal_owner_check_app()
with patch("app.gateway.authz._authenticate", return_value=_internal_auth_context()):
with TestClient(app) as client:
response = client.get(
"/threads/alice-thread",
headers={INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME: "alice"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
def test_require_permission_internal_role_denied_for_other_owner():
"""The internal token must not grant access to another user's thread."""
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME
app = _make_internal_owner_check_app()
with patch("app.gateway.authz._authenticate", return_value=_internal_auth_context()):
with TestClient(app) as client:
response = client.get(
"/threads/alice-thread",
headers={INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME: "mallory"},
)
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_require_permission_internal_role_without_header_is_scoped_to_internal_user():
"""With no owner header, internal callers are scoped like before the bypass."""
app = _make_internal_owner_check_app()
with patch("app.gateway.authz._authenticate", return_value=_internal_auth_context()):
with TestClient(app) as client:
response = client.get("/threads/alice-thread")
assert response.status_code == 404
# ── Weak JWT secret warning ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# ── User Model Fields ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_user_model_has_needs_setup_default_false():
"""New users default to needs_setup=False."""
user = User(email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
assert user.needs_setup is False
def test_user_model_has_token_version_default_zero():
"""New users default to token_version=0."""
user = User(email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash")
assert user.token_version == 0
def test_user_model_needs_setup_true():
"""Auto-created admin has needs_setup=True."""
user = User(email="admin@example.com", password_hash="hash", needs_setup=True)
assert user.needs_setup is True
def test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields():
"""needs_setup and token_version survive create → read round-trip.
Uses the shared persistence engine (same one threads_meta, runs,
run_events, and feedback use). The old separate .deer-flow/users.db
file is gone.
"""
import asyncio
import tempfile
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
async def _run() -> None:
from deerflow.persistence.engine import (
close_engine,
get_session_factory,
init_engine,
)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
url = f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{tmpdir}/scratch.db"
await init_engine("sqlite", url=url, sqlite_dir=tmpdir)
try:
repo = SQLiteUserRepository(get_session_factory())
user = User(
email="setup@test.com",
password_hash="fakehash",
system_role="admin",
needs_setup=True,
token_version=3,
)
created = await repo.create_user(user)
assert created.needs_setup is True
assert created.token_version == 3
fetched = await repo.get_user_by_email("setup@test.com")
assert fetched is not None
assert fetched.needs_setup is True
assert fetched.token_version == 3
fetched.needs_setup = False
fetched.token_version = 4
await repo.update_user(fetched)
refetched = await repo.get_user_by_id(str(fetched.id))
assert refetched is not None
assert refetched.needs_setup is False
assert refetched.token_version == 4
finally:
await close_engine()
asyncio.run(_run())
def test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted(tmp_path):
"""Concurrent-delete during update_user must hard-fail, not silently no-op.
Earlier the SQLite repo returned the input unchanged when the row was
missing, making a phantom success path that admin password reset
callers (`reset_admin`, `_ensure_admin_user`) would happily log as
'password reset'. The new contract: raise ``UserNotFoundError`` so
a vanished row never looks like a successful update.
"""
import asyncio
import tempfile
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import UserNotFoundError
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
async def _run() -> None:
from deerflow.persistence.engine import (
close_engine,
get_session_factory,
init_engine,
)
from deerflow.persistence.user.model import UserRow
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
url = f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{d}/scratch.db"
await init_engine("sqlite", url=url, sqlite_dir=d)
try:
sf = get_session_factory()
repo = SQLiteUserRepository(sf)
user = User(
email="ghost@test.com",
password_hash="fakehash",
system_role="user",
)
created = await repo.create_user(user)
# Simulate "row vanished underneath us" by deleting the row
# via the raw ORM session, then attempt to update.
async with sf() as session:
row = await session.get(UserRow, str(created.id))
assert row is not None
await session.delete(row)
await session.commit()
created.needs_setup = True
with pytest.raises(UserNotFoundError):
await repo.update_user(created)
finally:
await close_engine()
asyncio.run(_run())
# ── Token Versioning ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_jwt_encodes_ver():
"""JWT payload includes ver field."""
import os
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
token = create_access_token(str(uuid4()), token_version=3)
payload = decode_token(token)
assert not isinstance(payload, TokenError)
assert payload.ver == 3
def test_jwt_default_ver_zero():
"""JWT ver defaults to 0."""
import os
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
token = create_access_token(str(uuid4()))
payload = decode_token(token)
assert not isinstance(payload, TokenError)
assert payload.ver == 0
def test_token_version_mismatch_rejects():
"""Token with stale ver is rejected by get_current_user_from_request."""
import asyncio
import os
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-testing-minimum-32-chars"
user_id = str(uuid4())
token = create_access_token(user_id, token_version=0)
mock_user = User(id=user_id, email="test@example.com", password_hash="hash", token_version=1)
mock_request = MagicMock()
mock_request.cookies = {"access_token": token}
with patch("app.gateway.deps.get_local_provider") as mock_provider_fn:
mock_provider = MagicMock()
mock_provider.get_user = AsyncMock(return_value=mock_user)
mock_provider_fn.return_value = mock_provider
from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
asyncio.run(get_current_user_from_request(mock_request))
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
assert "revoked" in str(exc_info.value.detail).lower()
# ── change-password extension ──────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_change_password_request_accepts_new_email():
"""ChangePasswordRequest model accepts optional new_email."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
req = ChangePasswordRequest(
current_password="old",
new_password="newpassword",
new_email="new@example.com",
)
assert req.new_email == "new@example.com"
def test_change_password_request_new_email_optional():
"""ChangePasswordRequest model works without new_email."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
req = ChangePasswordRequest(current_password="old", new_password="newpassword")
assert req.new_email is None
def test_login_response_includes_needs_setup():
"""LoginResponse includes needs_setup field."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import LoginResponse
resp = LoginResponse(expires_in=3600, needs_setup=True)
assert resp.needs_setup is True
resp2 = LoginResponse(expires_in=3600)
assert resp2.needs_setup is False
# ── Rate Limiting ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_rate_limiter_allows_under_limit():
"""Requests under the limit are allowed."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts
_login_attempts.clear()
_check_rate_limit("192.168.1.1") # Should not raise
def test_rate_limiter_blocks_after_max_failures():
"""IP is blocked after 5 consecutive failures."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts, _record_login_failure
_login_attempts.clear()
ip = "10.0.0.1"
for _ in range(5):
_record_login_failure(ip)
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
_check_rate_limit(ip)
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 429
def test_rate_limiter_resets_on_success():
"""Successful login clears the failure counter."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _check_rate_limit, _login_attempts, _record_login_failure, _record_login_success
_login_attempts.clear()
ip = "10.0.0.2"
for _ in range(4):
_record_login_failure(ip)
_record_login_success(ip)
_check_rate_limit(ip) # Should not raise
# ── Client IP extraction ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_get_client_ip_direct_connection_no_proxy(monkeypatch):
"""Direct mode (no AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES): use TCP peer regardless of X-Real-IP."""
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "203.0.113.42"
req.headers = {}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42"
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_ignored_when_no_trusted_proxy(monkeypatch):
"""X-Real-IP is silently ignored if AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES is unset.
This closes the bypass where any client could rotate X-Real-IP per
request to dodge per-IP rate limits in dev / direct mode.
"""
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "127.0.0.1"
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "127.0.0.1"
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_honored_from_trusted_proxy(monkeypatch):
"""X-Real-IP is honored when the TCP peer matches AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "10.5.6.7" # in trusted CIDR
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42"
def test_get_client_ip_x_real_ip_rejected_from_untrusted_peer(monkeypatch):
"""X-Real-IP is rejected when the TCP peer is NOT in the trusted list."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "8.8.8.8" # NOT in trusted CIDR
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"} # client trying to spoof
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "8.8.8.8"
def test_get_client_ip_xff_never_honored(monkeypatch):
"""X-Forwarded-For is never used; only X-Real-IP from a trusted peer."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "10.0.0.0/8")
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "10.0.0.1"
req.headers = {"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.5"} # no x-real-ip
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "10.0.0.1"
def test_get_client_ip_invalid_trusted_proxy_entry_skipped(monkeypatch, caplog):
"""Garbage entries in AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES are warned and skipped."""
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "not-an-ip,10.0.0.0/8")
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client.host = "10.5.6.7"
req.headers = {"x-real-ip": "203.0.113.42"}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "203.0.113.42" # valid entry still works
def test_get_client_ip_no_client_returns_unknown(monkeypatch):
"""No request.client → 'unknown' marker (no crash)."""
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", raising=False)
from app.gateway.routers.auth import _get_client_ip
req = MagicMock()
req.client = None
req.headers = {}
assert _get_client_ip(req) == "unknown"
# ── Common-password blocklist ────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_register_rejects_literal_password():
"""Pydantic validator rejects 'password' as a registration password."""
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
with pytest.raises(ValidationError) as exc:
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="password")
assert "too common" in str(exc.value)
def test_register_rejects_common_password_case_insensitive():
"""Case variants of common passwords are also rejected."""
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
for variant in ["PASSWORD", "Password1", "qwerty123", "letmein1"]:
with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password=variant)
def test_register_accepts_strong_password():
"""A non-blocklisted password of length >=8 is accepted."""
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
req = RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="Tr0ub4dor&3-Horse")
assert req.password == "Tr0ub4dor&3-Horse"
def test_change_password_rejects_common_password():
"""The same blocklist applies to change-password."""
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.gateway.routers.auth import ChangePasswordRequest
with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
ChangePasswordRequest(current_password="anything", new_password="iloveyou")
def test_password_blocklist_keeps_short_passwords_for_length_check():
"""Short passwords still fail the min_length check (not the blocklist)."""
from pydantic import ValidationError
from app.gateway.routers.auth import RegisterRequest
with pytest.raises(ValidationError) as exc:
RegisterRequest(email="x@example.com", password="abc")
# the length check should fire, not the blocklist
assert "at least 8 characters" in str(exc.value)
# ── Weak JWT secret warning ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_missing_jwt_secret_generates_ephemeral(monkeypatch, caplog):
"""get_auth_config() auto-generates an ephemeral secret when AUTH_JWT_SECRET is unset."""
import logging
import app.gateway.auth.config as config_module
config_module._auth_config = None
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_JWT_SECRET", raising=False)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
config = config_module.get_auth_config()
assert config.jwt_secret # non-empty ephemeral secret
assert any("AUTH_JWT_SECRET" in msg for msg in caplog.messages)
# Cleanup
config_module._auth_config = None
# ── Auto-rehash on login ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_authenticate_auto_rehashes_legacy_hash():
"""authenticate() upgrades a bare bcrypt hash to v2 on successful login."""
import asyncio
from app.gateway.auth.local_provider import LocalAuthProvider
password = "rehashTest123"
user = User(
id=uuid4(),
email="rehash@test.com",
password_hash=bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode("utf-8"), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode("utf-8"),
)
mock_repo = MagicMock()
mock_repo.get_user_by_email = AsyncMock(return_value=user)
mock_repo.update_user = AsyncMock(return_value=user)
provider = LocalAuthProvider(mock_repo)
result = asyncio.run(provider.authenticate({"email": "rehash@test.com", "password": password}))
assert result is not None
assert result.password_hash.startswith("$dfv2$")
mock_repo.update_user.assert_called_once()
def test_authenticate_skips_rehash_for_v2_hash():
"""authenticate() does NOT rehash when the stored hash is already v2."""
import asyncio
from app.gateway.auth.local_provider import LocalAuthProvider
password = "alreadyv2Pass!"
user = User(
id=uuid4(),
email="v2@test.com",
password_hash=hash_password(password),
)
mock_repo = MagicMock()
mock_repo.get_user_by_email = AsyncMock(return_value=user)
mock_repo.update_user = AsyncMock(return_value=user)
provider = LocalAuthProvider(mock_repo)
result = asyncio.run(provider.authenticate({"email": "v2@test.com", "password": password}))
assert result is not None
mock_repo.update_user.assert_not_called()