Files
deer-flow/backend/app/gateway/authz.py
T
DanielWalnut aa015462a7 feat(im): Add user-owned IM channel connections (#3487)
* Add user-owned IM channel connections

* Fix dev startup and channel connect popup

* Use async channel connect flow

* Harden dev service daemon startup

* Support local IM channel connections

* Align IM connections with local channels

* Fix safe user id digest algorithm

* Address Copilot IM channel feedback

* Address IM channel review comments

* Support all integrated IM channel connections

* Format additional channel connection tests

* Keep unavailable channel connect buttons clickable

* Fix IM channel provider icons

* Add runtime setup for enabled IM channels

* Guard global shortcut key handling

* Keep configured IM channels editable

* Avoid password autofill for channel secrets

* Make channel threads visible to connection owners

* Persist IM runtime config locally

* Allow disconnecting runtime IM channels

* Route no-auth channel sessions to local user

* Use default user for auth-disabled local mode

* Show IM channel source on threads

* Prefill IM channel runtime config

* Reflect IM channel runtime health

* Ignore Feishu message read events

* Ignore Feishu non-content message events

* Let setup wizard enable IM channels

* Fix frontend formatting after merge

* Stabilize backend tests without local config

* Isolate channel runtime config tests

* Address channel connection review comments

* Use sha256 user buckets with legacy migration

* Ensure runtime IM channels are ready after restart

* Persist disconnected IM channel state

* Address channel connection review comments

* Address channel connection review findings

Frontend connect flow:
- Open the runtime-config dialog only when a provider still needs
  credentials; configured providers go straight to the connect flow, so
  the binding-code/deep-link path is reachable from the UI again.
- After saving credentials, continue into the connect flow when a user
  binding is still required (multi-user mode) instead of stopping at a
  "Connected" toast.
- Extract shared provider-state helpers to core/channels/provider-state
  and add unit + e2e coverage for the direct-connect and
  configure-then-connect paths.

Provider status semantics:
- Report connection_status from the user's newest connection row;
  with no binding it is not_connected, except in auth-disabled local
  mode where a configured running channel is effectively connected.

Concurrency and event-loop correctness:
- Offload ChannelRuntimeConfigStore construction and writes, channel
  service construction, and Slack connection replies to threads; add a
  tests/blocking_io/ anchor for the runtime-config handlers.
- Consume binding codes with a conditional UPDATE so a code can only be
  used once under concurrent workers; retry upsert_connection as an
  update when a concurrent insert wins the unique constraint.
- Serialize ensure_channel_ready per channel so concurrent provider
  polls cannot double-start a channel worker.

Config and migration hardening:
- Stop mutating the get_app_config()-cached Telegram provider config;
  the runtime store now owns the UI-entered bot username.
- Register channel_connections in STARTUP_ONLY_FIELDS with the
  standardized startup-only Field description.
- Match the legacy unsafe-id bucket by recomputing its exact SHA-1 name
  so another user's same-prefix bucket can never be migrated.
- Remove the unused Telegram process_webhook_update path and document
  src/core/channels in the frontend docs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address PR review comments on authz scoping and channel runtime

Security (review feedback from ShenAC-SAC):
- Scope internal-token callers to the connection owner carried in
  X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id instead of bypassing owner checks outright,
  in both require_permission(owner_check=True) and the stateless run
  endpoints. Internal callers keep access to their own and
  shared/legacy threads, and may claim a default-owned channel thread
  for its real owner, but a leaked internal token no longer grants
  cross-user thread access.
- Require admin privileges for POST/DELETE /api/channels/{provider}/
  runtime-config: runtime credentials and channel workers are
  instance-wide shared state (same model as the MCP config API).
  Read-only provider listing stays available to all users.

Performance (review feedback from willem-bd):
- Skip the redundant thread channel-metadata PATCH after the first
  successful backfill per thread.
- Reuse the per-connection Slack WebClient until its token changes
  instead of constructing one per outbound message.
- Reconcile channel readiness for all providers concurrently in
  GET /api/channels/providers.

Also resolve the code-quality unused-import flag in the blocking-io
anchor by pre-importing the channel service via importlib.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix prettier formatting in provider-state test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Reconcile UI runtime channel config with config reload on restart

Main now reloads a channel's config.yaml entry on restart_channel()
(#3514, issue #3497). Adapt the user-owned connection flow to coexist:

- configure_channel() restarts with reload_config=False — the caller
  just supplied the authoritative config (browser-entered credentials
  that are never written to config.yaml), so a file reload must not
  clobber it with the stale on-disk entry.
- _load_channel_config() re-applies the UI runtime-store overlay used
  at startup, so an operator-triggered restart keeps browser-entered
  credentials for channels without a config.yaml entry and does not
  resurrect a channel disconnected from the UI.
- Offload the reload's disk IO (config.yaml + runtime store) with
  asyncio.to_thread, matching the blocking-IO policy on this branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 15:24:58 +08:00

320 lines
12 KiB
Python

"""Authorization decorators and context for DeerFlow.
Inspired by LangGraph Auth system: https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/blob/main/libs/sdk-py/langgraph_sdk/auth/__init__.py
**Usage:**
1. Use ``@require_auth`` on routes that need authentication
2. Use ``@require_permission("resource", "action", filter_key=...)`` for permission checks
3. The decorator chain processes from bottom to top
**Example:**
@router.get("/{thread_id}")
@require_auth
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
# User is authenticated and has threads:read permission
...
**Permission Model:**
- threads:read - View thread
- threads:write - Create/update thread
- threads:delete - Delete thread
- runs:create - Run agent
- runs:read - View run
- runs:cancel - Cancel run
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import functools
import inspect
from collections.abc import Callable
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, ParamSpec, TypeVar
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
P = ParamSpec("P")
T = TypeVar("T")
# Permission constants
class Permissions:
"""Permission constants for resource:action format."""
# Threads
THREADS_READ = "threads:read"
THREADS_WRITE = "threads:write"
THREADS_DELETE = "threads:delete"
# Runs
RUNS_CREATE = "runs:create"
RUNS_READ = "runs:read"
RUNS_CANCEL = "runs:cancel"
class AuthContext:
"""Authentication context for the current request.
Stored in request.state.auth after require_auth decoration.
Attributes:
user: The authenticated user, or None if anonymous
permissions: List of permission strings (e.g., "threads:read")
"""
__slots__ = ("user", "permissions")
def __init__(self, user: User | None = None, permissions: list[str] | None = None):
self.user = user
self.permissions = permissions or []
@property
def is_authenticated(self) -> bool:
"""Check if user is authenticated."""
return self.user is not None
def has_permission(self, resource: str, action: str) -> bool:
"""Check if context has permission for resource:action.
Args:
resource: Resource name (e.g., "threads")
action: Action name (e.g., "read")
Returns:
True if user has permission
"""
permission = f"{resource}:{action}"
return permission in self.permissions
def require_user(self) -> User:
"""Get user or raise 401.
Raises:
HTTPException 401 if not authenticated
"""
if not self.user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Authentication required")
return self.user
def get_auth_context(request: Request) -> AuthContext | None:
"""Get AuthContext from request state."""
return getattr(request.state, "auth", None)
_ALL_PERMISSIONS: list[str] = [
Permissions.THREADS_READ,
Permissions.THREADS_WRITE,
Permissions.THREADS_DELETE,
Permissions.RUNS_CREATE,
Permissions.RUNS_READ,
Permissions.RUNS_CANCEL,
]
def _make_test_request_stub() -> Any:
"""Create a minimal request-like object for direct unit calls.
Used when decorated route handlers are invoked without FastAPI's
request injection. Includes fields accessed by auth helpers.
"""
return SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(), cookies={}, _deerflow_test_bypass_auth=True)
async def _authenticate(request: Request) -> AuthContext:
"""Authenticate request and return AuthContext.
Delegates to deps.get_optional_user_from_request() for the JWT→User pipeline.
Returns AuthContext with user=None for anonymous requests.
"""
from app.gateway.deps import get_optional_user_from_request
user = await get_optional_user_from_request(request)
if user is None:
return AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
# In future, permissions could be stored in user record
return AuthContext(user=user, permissions=_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
def require_auth[**P, T](func: Callable[P, T]) -> Callable[P, T]:
"""Decorator that authenticates the request and enforces authentication.
Independently raises HTTP 401 for unauthenticated requests, regardless of
whether ``AuthMiddleware`` is present in the ASGI stack. Sets the resolved
``AuthContext`` on ``request.state.auth`` for downstream handlers.
Must be placed ABOVE other decorators (executes after them).
Usage:
@router.get("/{thread_id}")
@require_auth # Bottom decorator (executes first after permission check)
@require_permission("threads", "read")
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
auth: AuthContext = request.state.auth
...
Raises:
HTTPException: 401 if the request is unauthenticated.
ValueError: If 'request' parameter is missing.
"""
@functools.wraps(func)
async def wrapper(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
request = kwargs.get("request")
if request is None:
# Unit tests may call decorated handlers directly without a
# FastAPI Request object. Inject a minimal request stub when
# the wrapped function declares `request`.
if "request" in inspect.signature(func).parameters:
kwargs["request"] = _make_test_request_stub()
else:
raise ValueError("require_auth decorator requires 'request' parameter")
request = kwargs["request"]
if getattr(request, "_deerflow_test_bypass_auth", False):
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
# Authenticate and set context
auth_context = await _authenticate(request)
request.state.auth = auth_context
if not auth_context.is_authenticated:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Authentication required")
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapper
def require_permission(
resource: str,
action: str,
owner_check: bool = False,
require_existing: bool = False,
) -> Callable[[Callable[P, T]], Callable[P, T]]:
"""Decorator that checks permission for resource:action.
Must be used AFTER @require_auth.
Args:
resource: Resource name (e.g., "threads", "runs")
action: Action name (e.g., "read", "write", "delete")
owner_check: If True, validates that the current user owns the resource.
Requires 'thread_id' path parameter and performs ownership check.
require_existing: Only meaningful with ``owner_check=True``. If True, a
missing ``threads_meta`` row counts as a denial (404)
instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow". Use on
**destructive / mutating** routes (DELETE, PATCH,
state-update) so a deleted thread can't be re-targeted
by another user via the missing-row code path.
Usage:
# Read-style: legacy untracked threads are allowed
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
...
# Destructive: thread row MUST exist and be owned by caller
@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
async def delete_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
...
Raises:
HTTPException 401: If authentication required but user is anonymous
HTTPException 403: If user lacks permission
HTTPException 404: If owner_check=True but user doesn't own the thread
ValueError: If owner_check=True but 'thread_id' parameter is missing
"""
def decorator(func: Callable[P, T]) -> Callable[P, T]:
@functools.wraps(func)
async def wrapper(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
request = kwargs.get("request")
if request is None:
# Unit tests may call decorated route handlers directly without
# constructing a FastAPI Request object. Inject a minimal stub
# when the wrapped function declares `request`.
if "request" in inspect.signature(func).parameters:
kwargs["request"] = _make_test_request_stub()
else:
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
request = kwargs["request"]
if getattr(request, "_deerflow_test_bypass_auth", False):
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
auth: AuthContext = getattr(request.state, "auth", None)
if auth is None:
auth = await _authenticate(request)
request.state.auth = auth
if not auth.is_authenticated:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Authentication required")
# Check permission
if not auth.has_permission(resource, action):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=f"Permission denied: {resource}:{action}",
)
# Owner check for thread-specific resources.
#
# 2.0-rc moved thread metadata into the SQL persistence layer
# (``threads_meta`` table). We verify ownership via
# ``ThreadMetaStore.check_access``: it returns True for
# missing rows (untracked legacy thread) and for rows whose
# ``user_id`` is NULL (shared / pre-auth data), so this is
# strict-deny rather than strict-allow — only an *existing*
# row with a *different* user_id triggers 404.
if owner_check:
from app.gateway.internal_auth import INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME, INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE
thread_id = kwargs.get("thread_id")
if thread_id is None:
raise ValueError("require_permission with owner_check=True requires 'thread_id' parameter")
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_store
thread_store = get_thread_store(request)
allowed = await thread_store.check_access(
thread_id,
str(auth.user.id),
require_existing=require_existing,
)
if not allowed and getattr(auth.user, "system_role", None) == INTERNAL_SYSTEM_ROLE:
# Trusted internal callers (channel workers) also act for
# the connection owner carried in X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id.
# Scope the check to that owner instead of bypassing it; a
# leaked internal token must not grant cross-user thread
# access. The header is honored only after ``auth`` proved
# the caller holds the internal token (mirrors
# get_trusted_internal_owner_user_id, which keys off the
# middleware-stamped ``request.state.user``).
header_owner = (request.headers.get(INTERNAL_OWNER_USER_ID_HEADER_NAME) or "").strip()
if header_owner:
allowed = await thread_store.check_access(
thread_id,
header_owner,
require_existing=require_existing,
)
if not allowed:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found",
)
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapper
return decorator