mirror of
https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow.git
synced 2026-06-13 10:55:59 +00:00
aa015462a7
* Add user-owned IM channel connections * Fix dev startup and channel connect popup * Use async channel connect flow * Harden dev service daemon startup * Support local IM channel connections * Align IM connections with local channels * Fix safe user id digest algorithm * Address Copilot IM channel feedback * Address IM channel review comments * Support all integrated IM channel connections * Format additional channel connection tests * Keep unavailable channel connect buttons clickable * Fix IM channel provider icons * Add runtime setup for enabled IM channels * Guard global shortcut key handling * Keep configured IM channels editable * Avoid password autofill for channel secrets * Make channel threads visible to connection owners * Persist IM runtime config locally * Allow disconnecting runtime IM channels * Route no-auth channel sessions to local user * Use default user for auth-disabled local mode * Show IM channel source on threads * Prefill IM channel runtime config * Reflect IM channel runtime health * Ignore Feishu message read events * Ignore Feishu non-content message events * Let setup wizard enable IM channels * Fix frontend formatting after merge * Stabilize backend tests without local config * Isolate channel runtime config tests * Address channel connection review comments * Use sha256 user buckets with legacy migration * Ensure runtime IM channels are ready after restart * Persist disconnected IM channel state * Address channel connection review comments * Address channel connection review findings Frontend connect flow: - Open the runtime-config dialog only when a provider still needs credentials; configured providers go straight to the connect flow, so the binding-code/deep-link path is reachable from the UI again. - After saving credentials, continue into the connect flow when a user binding is still required (multi-user mode) instead of stopping at a "Connected" toast. - Extract shared provider-state helpers to core/channels/provider-state and add unit + e2e coverage for the direct-connect and configure-then-connect paths. Provider status semantics: - Report connection_status from the user's newest connection row; with no binding it is not_connected, except in auth-disabled local mode where a configured running channel is effectively connected. Concurrency and event-loop correctness: - Offload ChannelRuntimeConfigStore construction and writes, channel service construction, and Slack connection replies to threads; add a tests/blocking_io/ anchor for the runtime-config handlers. - Consume binding codes with a conditional UPDATE so a code can only be used once under concurrent workers; retry upsert_connection as an update when a concurrent insert wins the unique constraint. - Serialize ensure_channel_ready per channel so concurrent provider polls cannot double-start a channel worker. Config and migration hardening: - Stop mutating the get_app_config()-cached Telegram provider config; the runtime store now owns the UI-entered bot username. - Register channel_connections in STARTUP_ONLY_FIELDS with the standardized startup-only Field description. - Match the legacy unsafe-id bucket by recomputing its exact SHA-1 name so another user's same-prefix bucket can never be migrated. - Remove the unused Telegram process_webhook_update path and document src/core/channels in the frontend docs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Address PR review comments on authz scoping and channel runtime Security (review feedback from ShenAC-SAC): - Scope internal-token callers to the connection owner carried in X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id instead of bypassing owner checks outright, in both require_permission(owner_check=True) and the stateless run endpoints. Internal callers keep access to their own and shared/legacy threads, and may claim a default-owned channel thread for its real owner, but a leaked internal token no longer grants cross-user thread access. - Require admin privileges for POST/DELETE /api/channels/{provider}/ runtime-config: runtime credentials and channel workers are instance-wide shared state (same model as the MCP config API). Read-only provider listing stays available to all users. Performance (review feedback from willem-bd): - Skip the redundant thread channel-metadata PATCH after the first successful backfill per thread. - Reuse the per-connection Slack WebClient until its token changes instead of constructing one per outbound message. - Reconcile channel readiness for all providers concurrently in GET /api/channels/providers. Also resolve the code-quality unused-import flag in the blocking-io anchor by pre-importing the channel service via importlib. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix prettier formatting in provider-state test Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Reconcile UI runtime channel config with config reload on restart Main now reloads a channel's config.yaml entry on restart_channel() (#3514, issue #3497). Adapt the user-owned connection flow to coexist: - configure_channel() restarts with reload_config=False — the caller just supplied the authoritative config (browser-entered credentials that are never written to config.yaml), so a file reload must not clobber it with the stale on-disk entry. - _load_channel_config() re-applies the UI runtime-store overlay used at startup, so an operator-triggered restart keeps browser-entered credentials for channels without a config.yaml entry and does not resurrect a channel disconnected from the UI. - Offload the reload's disk IO (config.yaml + runtime store) with asyncio.to_thread, matching the blocking-IO policy on this branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
248 lines
7.4 KiB
Python
248 lines
7.4 KiB
Python
"""Tests for CSRF middleware."""
|
|
|
|
from fastapi import FastAPI
|
|
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
|
|
|
|
from app.gateway.csrf_middleware import CSRFMiddleware
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _make_app() -> FastAPI:
|
|
app = FastAPI()
|
|
app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
|
|
|
|
@app.post("/api/v1/auth/login/local")
|
|
async def login_local():
|
|
return {"ok": True}
|
|
|
|
@app.post("/api/v1/auth/register")
|
|
async def register():
|
|
return {"ok": True}
|
|
|
|
@app.post("/api/threads/abc/runs/stream")
|
|
async def protected_mutation():
|
|
return {"ok": True}
|
|
|
|
return app
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_rejects_cross_origin_browser_request():
|
|
"""CSRF-exempt auth routes must not accept hostile browser origins.
|
|
|
|
Login/register endpoints intentionally skip the double-submit token because
|
|
first-time callers do not have a token yet. They still set an auth session,
|
|
so a hostile cross-site form POST must be rejected to avoid login CSRF /
|
|
session fixation.
|
|
"""
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 403
|
|
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_allows_same_origin_browser_request():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_rejects_malformed_origin_with_path():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example/path"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 403
|
|
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token") is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_rejects_malformed_origin_with_invalid_port():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example:bad"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 403
|
|
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token") is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_allows_same_origin_default_port_equivalence():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example:443"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_allows_forwarded_same_origin():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={
|
|
"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
|
|
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
|
|
"X-Forwarded-Host": "deerflow.example, internal:8000",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_allows_forwarded_same_origin_with_non_default_port():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={
|
|
"Origin": "http://localhost:2026",
|
|
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "http",
|
|
"X-Forwarded-Host": "localhost:2026",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_allows_rfc_forwarded_same_origin():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={
|
|
"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
|
|
"Forwarded": "proto=https;host=deerflow.example",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
|
|
assert "secure" in response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_allows_explicit_configured_origin(monkeypatch):
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://app.example")
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://api.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/register",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://app.example"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_does_not_treat_wildcard_cors_as_allowed_origin(monkeypatch):
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS", "*")
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://api.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 403
|
|
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_sets_strict_samesite_csrf_cookie():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
set_cookie = response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
|
|
assert "csrf_token=" in set_cookie
|
|
assert "samesite=strict" in set_cookie
|
|
assert "secure" in set_cookie
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_auth_post_without_origin_still_allows_non_browser_clients():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post("/api/v1/auth/login/local")
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_non_auth_mutation_still_requires_double_submit_token():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 403
|
|
assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header."
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_non_auth_mutation_allows_valid_double_submit_token():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
client.cookies.set("csrf_token", "known-token")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
|
|
headers={
|
|
"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
|
|
"X-CSRF-Token": "known-token",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_non_auth_mutation_rejects_mismatched_double_submit_token():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
client.cookies.set("csrf_token", "cookie-token")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
|
|
headers={
|
|
"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
|
|
"X-CSRF-Token": "header-token",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 403
|
|
assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token mismatch."
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_channel_posts_require_double_submit_csrf():
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
|
|
|
|
response = client.post(
|
|
"/api/channels/slack/connect",
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 403
|
|
assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header."
|