e75a2ff29a
* feat(auth): introduce backend auth module
Port RFC-001 authentication core from PR #1728:
- JWT token handling (create_access_token, decode_token, TokenPayload)
- Password hashing (bcrypt) with verify_password
- SQLite UserRepository with base interface
- Provider Factory pattern (LocalAuthProvider)
- CLI reset_admin tool
- Auth-specific errors (AuthErrorCode, TokenError, AuthErrorResponse)
Deps:
- bcrypt>=4.0.0
- pyjwt>=2.9.0
- email-validator>=2.0.0
- backend/uv.toml pins public PyPI index
Tests: 12 pure unit tests (test_auth_config.py, test_auth_errors.py).
Scope note: authz.py, test_auth.py, and test_auth_type_system.py are
deferred to commit 2 because they depend on middleware and deps wiring
that is not yet in place. Commit 1 stays "pure new files only" as the
spec mandates.
* feat(auth): wire auth end-to-end (middleware + frontend replacement)
Backend:
- Port auth_middleware, csrf_middleware, langgraph_auth, routers/auth
- Port authz decorator (owner_filter_key defaults to 'owner_id')
- Merge app.py: register AuthMiddleware + CSRFMiddleware + CORS, add
_ensure_admin_user lifespan hook, _migrate_orphaned_threads helper,
register auth router
- Merge deps.py: add get_local_provider, get_current_user_from_request,
get_optional_user_from_request; keep get_current_user as thin str|None
adapter for feedback router
- langgraph.json: add auth path pointing to langgraph_auth.py:auth
- Rename metadata['user_id'] -> metadata['owner_id'] in langgraph_auth
(both metadata write and LangGraph filter dict) + test fixtures
Frontend:
- Delete better-auth library and api catch-all route
- Remove better-auth npm dependency and env vars (BETTER_AUTH_SECRET,
BETTER_AUTH_GITHUB_*) from env.js
- Port frontend/src/core/auth/* (AuthProvider, gateway-config,
proxy-policy, server-side getServerSideUser, types)
- Port frontend/src/core/api/fetcher.ts
- Port (auth)/layout, (auth)/login, (auth)/setup pages
- Rewrite workspace/layout.tsx as server component that calls
getServerSideUser and wraps in AuthProvider
- Port workspace/workspace-content.tsx for the client-side sidebar logic
Tests:
- Port 5 auth test files (test_auth, test_auth_middleware,
test_auth_type_system, test_ensure_admin, test_langgraph_auth)
- 176 auth tests PASS
After this commit: login/logout/registration flow works, but persistence
layer does not yet filter by owner_id. Commit 4 closes that gap.
* feat(auth): account settings page + i18n
- Port account-settings-page.tsx (change password, change email, logout)
- Wire into settings-dialog.tsx as new "account" section with UserIcon,
rendered first in the section list
- Add i18n keys:
- en-US/zh-CN: settings.sections.account ("Account" / "账号")
- en-US/zh-CN: button.logout ("Log out" / "退出登录")
- types.ts: matching type declarations
* feat(auth): enforce owner_id across 2.0-rc persistence layer
Add request-scoped contextvar-based owner filtering to threads_meta,
runs, run_events, and feedback repositories. Router code is unchanged
— isolation is enforced at the storage layer so that any caller that
forgets to pass owner_id still gets filtered results, and new routes
cannot accidentally leak data.
Core infrastructure
-------------------
- deerflow/runtime/user_context.py (new):
- ContextVar[CurrentUser | None] with default None
- runtime_checkable CurrentUser Protocol (structural subtype with .id)
- set/reset/get/require helpers
- AUTO sentinel + resolve_owner_id(value, method_name) for sentinel
three-state resolution: AUTO reads contextvar, explicit str
overrides, explicit None bypasses the filter (for migration/CLI)
Repository changes
------------------
- ThreadMetaRepository: create/get/search/update_*/delete gain
owner_id=AUTO kwarg; read paths filter by owner, writes stamp it,
mutations check ownership before applying
- RunRepository: put/get/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg
- FeedbackRepository: create/get/list_by_run/list_by_thread/delete
gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg
- DbRunEventStore: list_messages/list_events/list_messages_by_run/
count_messages/delete_by_thread/delete_by_run gain owner_id=AUTO
kwarg. Write paths (put/put_batch) read contextvar softly: when a
request-scoped user is available, owner_id is stamped; background
worker writes without a user context pass None which is valid
(orphan row to be bound by migration)
Schema
------
- persistence/models/run_event.py: RunEventRow.owner_id = Mapped[
str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True, index=True)
- No alembic migration needed: 2.0 ships fresh, Base.metadata.create_all
picks up the new column automatically
Middleware
----------
- auth_middleware.py: after cookie check, call get_optional_user_from_
request to load the real User, stamp it into request.state.user AND
the contextvar via set_current_user, reset in a try/finally. Public
paths and unauthenticated requests continue without contextvar, and
@require_auth handles the strict 401 path
Test infrastructure
-------------------
- tests/conftest.py: @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) _auto_user_context
sets a default SimpleNamespace(id="test-user-autouse") on every test
unless marked @pytest.mark.no_auto_user. Keeps existing 20+
persistence tests passing without modification
- pyproject.toml [tool.pytest.ini_options]: register no_auto_user
marker so pytest does not emit warnings for opt-out tests
- tests/test_user_context.py: 6 tests covering three-state semantics,
Protocol duck typing, and require/optional APIs
- tests/test_thread_meta_repo.py: one test updated to pass owner_id=
None explicitly where it was previously relying on the old default
Test results
------------
- test_user_context.py: 6 passed
- test_auth*.py + test_langgraph_auth.py + test_ensure_admin.py: 127
- test_run_event_store / test_run_repository / test_thread_meta_repo
/ test_feedback: 92 passed
- Full backend suite: 1905 passed, 2 failed (both @requires_llm flaky
integration tests unrelated to auth), 1 skipped
* feat(auth): extend orphan migration to 2.0-rc persistence tables
_ensure_admin_user now runs a three-step pipeline on every boot:
Step 1 (fatal): admin user exists / is created / password is reset
Step 2 (non-fatal): LangGraph store orphan threads → admin
Step 3 (non-fatal): SQL persistence tables → admin
- threads_meta
- runs
- run_events
- feedback
Each step is idempotent. The fatal/non-fatal split mirrors PR #1728's
original philosophy: admin creation failure blocks startup (the system
is unusable without an admin), whereas migration failures log a warning
and let the service proceed (a partial migration is recoverable; a
missing admin is not).
Key helpers
-----------
- _iter_store_items(store, namespace, *, page_size=500):
async generator that cursor-paginates across LangGraph store pages.
Fixes PR #1728's hardcoded limit=1000 bug that would silently lose
orphans beyond the first page.
- _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_user_id):
Rewritten to use _iter_store_items. Returns the migrated count so the
caller can log it; raises only on unhandled exceptions.
- _migrate_orphan_sql_tables(admin_user_id):
Imports the 4 ORM models lazily, grabs the shared session factory,
runs one UPDATE per table in a single transaction, commits once.
No-op when no persistence backend is configured (in-memory dev).
Tests: test_ensure_admin.py (8 passed)
* test(auth): port AUTH test plan docs + lint/format pass
- Port backend/docs/AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md and AUTH_UPGRADE.md from PR #1728
- Rename metadata.user_id → metadata.owner_id in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md
(4 occurrences from the original PR doc)
- ruff auto-fix UP037 in sentinel type annotations: drop quotes around
"str | None | _AutoSentinel" now that from __future__ import
annotations makes them implicit string forms
- ruff format: 2 files (app/gateway/app.py, runtime/user_context.py)
Note on test coverage additions:
- conftest.py autouse fixture was already added in commit 4 (had to
be co-located with the repository changes to keep pre-existing
persistence tests passing)
- cross-user isolation E2E tests (test_owner_isolation.py) deferred
— enforcement is already proven by the 98-test repository suite
via the autouse fixture + explicit _AUTO sentinel exercises
- New test cases (TC-API-17..20, TC-ATK-13, TC-MIG-01..07) listed
in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md are deferred to a follow-up PR — they are
manual-QA test cases rather than pytest code, and the spec-level
coverage is already met by test_user_context.py + the 98-test
repository suite.
Final test results:
- Auth suite (test_auth*, test_langgraph_auth, test_ensure_admin,
test_user_context): 186 passed
- Persistence suite (test_run_event_store, test_run_repository,
test_thread_meta_repo, test_feedback): 98 passed
- Lint: ruff check + ruff format both clean
* test(auth): add cross-user isolation test suite
10 tests exercising the storage-layer owner filter by manually
switching the user_context contextvar between two users. Verifies
the safety invariant:
After a repository write with owner_id=A, a subsequent read with
owner_id=B must not return the row, and vice versa.
Covers all 4 tables that own user-scoped data:
TC-API-17 threads_meta — read, search, update, delete cross-user
TC-API-18 runs — get, list_by_thread, delete cross-user
TC-API-19 run_events — list_messages, list_events, count_messages,
delete_by_thread (CRITICAL: raw conversation
content leak vector)
TC-API-20 feedback — get, list_by_run, delete cross-user
Plus two meta-tests verifying the sentinel pattern itself:
- AUTO + unset contextvar raises RuntimeError
- explicit owner_id=None bypasses the filter (migration escape hatch)
Architecture note
-----------------
These tests bypass the HTTP layer by design. The full chain
(cookie → middleware → contextvar → repository) is covered piecewise:
- test_auth_middleware.py: middleware sets contextvar from cookies
- test_owner_isolation.py: repositories enforce isolation when
contextvar is set to different users
Together they prove the end-to-end safety property without the
ceremony of spinning up a full TestClient + in-memory DB for every
router endpoint.
Tests pass: 231 (full auth + persistence + isolation suite)
Lint: clean
* refactor(auth): migrate user repository to SQLAlchemy ORM
Move the users table into the shared persistence engine so auth
matches the pattern of threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback —
one engine, one session factory, one schema init codepath.
New files
---------
- persistence/user/__init__.py, persistence/user/model.py: UserRow
ORM class with partial unique index on (oauth_provider, oauth_id)
- Registered in persistence/models/__init__.py so
Base.metadata.create_all() picks it up
Modified
--------
- auth/repositories/sqlite.py: rewritten as async SQLAlchemy,
identical constructor pattern to the other four repositories
(def __init__(self, session_factory) + self._sf = session_factory)
- auth/config.py: drop users_db_path field — storage is configured
through config.database like every other table
- deps.py/get_local_provider: construct SQLiteUserRepository with
the shared session factory, fail fast if engine is not initialised
- tests/test_auth.py: rewrite test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields to
use the shared engine (init_engine + close_engine in a tempdir)
- tests/test_auth_type_system.py: add per-test autouse fixture that
spins up a scratch engine and resets deps._cached_* singletons
* refactor(auth): remove SQL orphan migration (unused in supported scenarios)
The _migrate_orphan_sql_tables helper existed to bind NULL owner_id
rows in threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback to the admin on
first boot. But in every supported upgrade path, it's a no-op:
1. Fresh install: create_all builds fresh tables, no legacy rows
2. No-auth → with-auth (no existing persistence DB): persistence
tables are created fresh by create_all, no legacy rows
3. No-auth → with-auth (has existing persistence DB from #1930):
NOT a supported upgrade path — "有 DB 到有 DB" schema evolution
is out of scope; users wipe DB or run manual ALTER
So the SQL orphan migration never has anything to do in the
supported matrix. Delete the function, simplify _ensure_admin_user
from a 3-step pipeline to a 2-step one (admin creation + LangGraph
store orphan migration only).
LangGraph store orphan migration stays: it serves the real
"no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path where a user's existing LangGraph
thread metadata has no owner_id field and needs to be stamped with
the newly-created admin's id.
Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation)
Lint: clean
* security(auth): write initial admin password to 0600 file instead of logs
CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data flagged 3 call sites that
logged the auto-generated admin password to stdout via logger.info().
Production log aggregators (ELK/Splunk/etc) would have captured those
cleartext secrets. Replace with a shared helper that writes to
.deer-flow/admin_initial_credentials.txt with mode 0600, and log only
the path.
New file
--------
- app/gateway/auth/credential_file.py: write_initial_credentials()
helper. Takes email, password, and a "initial"/"reset" label.
Creates .deer-flow/ if missing, writes a header comment plus the
email+password, chmods 0o600, returns the absolute Path.
Modified
--------
- app/gateway/app.py: both _ensure_admin_user paths (fresh creation
+ needs_setup password reset) now write to file and log the path
- app/gateway/auth/reset_admin.py: rewritten to use the shared ORM
repo (SQLiteUserRepository with session_factory) and the
credential_file helper. The previous implementation was broken
after the earlier ORM refactor — it still imported _get_users_conn
and constructed SQLiteUserRepository() without a session factory.
No tests changed — the three password-log sites are all exercised
via existing test_ensure_admin.py which checks that startup
succeeds, not that a specific string appears in logs.
CodeQL alerts 272, 283, 284: all resolved.
* security(auth): strict JWT validation in middleware (fix junk cookie bypass)
AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8 expects junk cookies to be rejected with
401. The previous middleware behaviour was "presence-only": check
that some access_token cookie exists, then pass through. In
combination with my Task-12 decision to skip @require_auth
decorators on routes, this created a gap where a request with any
cookie-shaped string (e.g. access_token=not-a-jwt) would bypass
authentication on routes that do not touch the repository
(/api/models, /api/mcp/config, /api/memory, /api/skills, …).
Fix: middleware now calls get_current_user_from_request() strictly
and catches the resulting HTTPException to render a 401 with the
proper fine-grained error code (token_invalid, token_expired,
user_not_found, …). On success it stamps request.state.user and
the contextvar so repository-layer owner filters work downstream.
The 4 old "_with_cookie_passes" tests in test_auth_middleware.py
were written for the presence-only behaviour; they asserted that
a junk cookie would make the handler return 200. They are renamed
to "_with_junk_cookie_rejected" and their assertions flipped to
401. The negative path (no cookie → 401 not_authenticated)
is unchanged.
Verified:
no cookie → 401 not_authenticated
junk cookie → 401 token_invalid (the fixed bug)
expired cookie → 401 token_expired
Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation)
Lint: clean
* security(auth): wire @require_permission(owner_check=True) on isolation routes
Apply the require_permission decorator to all 28 routes that take a
{thread_id} path parameter. Combined with the strict middleware
(previous commit), this gives the double-layer protection that
AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.9 documents:
Layer 1 (AuthMiddleware): cookie + JWT validation, rejects junk
cookies and stamps request.state.user
Layer 2 (@require_permission with owner_check=True): per-resource
ownership verification via
ThreadMetaStore.check_access — returns
404 if a different user owns the thread
The decorator's owner_check branch is rewritten to use the SQL
thread_meta_repo (the 2.0-rc persistence layer) instead of the
LangGraph store path that PR #1728 used (_store_get / get_store
in routers/threads.py). The inject_record convenience is dropped
— no caller in 2.0 needs the LangGraph blob, and the SQL repo has
a different shape.
Routes decorated (28 total):
- threads.py: delete, patch, get, get-state, post-state, post-history
- thread_runs.py: post-runs, post-runs-stream, post-runs-wait,
list_runs, get_run, cancel_run, join_run, stream_existing_run,
list_thread_messages, list_run_messages, list_run_events,
thread_token_usage
- feedback.py: create, list, stats, delete
- uploads.py: upload (added Request param), list, delete
- artifacts.py: get_artifact
- suggestions.py: generate (renamed body parameter to avoid
conflict with FastAPI Request)
Test fixes:
- test_suggestions_router.py: bypass the decorator via __wrapped__
(the unit tests cover parsing logic, not auth — no point spinning
up a thread_meta_repo just to test JSON unwrapping)
- test_auth_middleware.py 4 fake-cookie tests: already updated in
the previous commit (745bf432)
Tests: 293 passed (auth + persistence + isolation + suggestions)
Lint: clean
* security(auth): defense-in-depth fixes from release validation pass
Eight findings caught while running the AUTH_TEST_PLAN end-to-end against
the deployed sg_dev stack. Each is a pre-condition for shipping
release/2.0-rc that the previous PRs missed.
Backend hardening
- routers/auth.py: rate limiter X-Real-IP now requires AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES
whitelist (CIDR/IP allowlist). Without nginx in front, the previous code
honored arbitrary X-Real-IP, letting an attacker rotate the header to
fully bypass the per-IP login lockout.
- routers/auth.py: 36-entry common-password blocklist via Pydantic
field_validator on RegisterRequest + ChangePasswordRequest. The shared
_validate_strong_password helper keeps the constraint in one place.
- routers/threads.py: ThreadCreateRequest + ThreadPatchRequest strip
server-reserved metadata keys (owner_id, user_id) via Pydantic
field_validator so a forged value can never round-trip back to other
clients reading the same thread. The actual ownership invariant stays
on the threads_meta row; this closes the metadata-blob echo gap.
- authz.py + thread_meta/sql.py: require_permission gains a require_existing
flag plumbed through check_access(require_existing=True). Destructive
routes (DELETE/PATCH/state-update/runs/feedback) now treat a missing
thread_meta row as 404 instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow",
closing the cross-user delete-idempotence gap where any user could
successfully DELETE another user's deleted thread.
- repositories/sqlite.py + base.py: update_user raises UserNotFoundError
on a vanished row instead of silently returning the input. Concurrent
delete during password reset can no longer look like a successful update.
- runtime/user_context.py: resolve_owner_id() coerces User.id (UUID) to
str at the contextvar boundary so SQLAlchemy String(64) columns can
bind it. The whole 2.0-rc isolation pipeline was previously broken
end-to-end (POST /api/threads → 500 "type 'UUID' is not supported").
- persistence/engine.py: SQLAlchemy listener enables PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL,
synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON on every new SQLite connection.
TC-UPG-06 in the test plan expects WAL; previous code shipped with the
default 'delete' journal.
- auth_middleware.py: stamp request.state.auth = AuthContext(...) so
@require_permission's short-circuit fires; previously every isolation
request did a duplicate JWT decode + users SELECT. Also unifies the
401 payload through AuthErrorResponse(...).model_dump().
- app.py: _ensure_admin_user restructure removes the noqa F821 scoping
bug where 'password' was referenced outside the branch that defined it.
New _announce_credentials helper absorbs the duplicate log block in
the fresh-admin and reset-admin branches.
* fix(frontend+nginx): rollout CSRF on every state-changing client path
The frontend was 100% broken in gateway-pro mode for any user trying to
open a specific chat thread. Three cumulative bugs each silently
masked the next.
LangGraph SDK CSRF gap (api-client.ts)
- The Client constructor took only apiUrl, no defaultHeaders, no fetch
interceptor. The SDK's internal fetch never sent X-CSRF-Token, so
every state-changing /api/langgraph-compat/* call (runs/stream,
threads/search, threads/{tid}/history, ...) hit CSRFMiddleware and
got 403 before reaching the auth check. UI symptom: empty thread page
with no error message; the SPA's hooks swallowed the rejection.
- Fix: pass an onRequest hook that injects X-CSRF-Token from the
csrf_token cookie per request. Reading the cookie per call (not at
construction time) handles login / logout / password-change cookie
rotation transparently. The SDK's prepareFetchOptions calls
onRequest for both regular requests AND streaming/SSE/reconnect, so
the same hook covers runs.stream and runs.joinStream.
Raw fetch CSRF gap (7 files)
- Audit: 11 frontend fetch sites, only 2 included CSRF (login/setup +
account-settings change-password). The other 7 routed through raw
fetch() with no header — suggestions, memory, agents, mcp, skills,
uploads, and the local thread cleanup hook all 403'd silently.
- Fix: enhance fetcher.ts:fetchWithAuth to auto-inject X-CSRF-Token on
POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH from a single shared readCsrfCookie() helper.
Convert all 7 raw fetch() callers to fetchWithAuth so the contract
is centrally enforced. api-client.ts and fetcher.ts share
readCsrfCookie + STATE_CHANGING_METHODS to avoid drift.
nginx routing + buffering (nginx.local.conf)
- The auth feature shipped without updating the nginx config: per-API
explicit location blocks but no /api/v1/auth/, /api/feedback, /api/runs.
The frontend's client-side fetches to /api/v1/auth/login/local 404'd
from the Next.js side because nginx routed /api/* to the frontend.
- Fix: add catch-all `location /api/` that proxies to the gateway.
nginx longest-prefix matching keeps the explicit blocks (/api/models,
/api/threads regex, /api/langgraph/, ...) winning for their paths.
- Fix: disable proxy_buffering + proxy_request_buffering for the
frontend `location /` block. Without it, nginx tries to spool large
Next.js chunks into /var/lib/nginx/proxy (root-owned) and fails with
Permission denied → ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING → ChunkLoadError.
* test(auth): release-validation test infra and new coverage
Test fixtures and unit tests added during the validation pass.
Router test helpers (NEW: tests/_router_auth_helpers.py)
- make_authed_test_app(): builds a FastAPI test app with a stub
middleware that stamps request.state.user + request.state.auth and a
permissive thread_meta_repo mock. TestClient-based router tests
(test_artifacts_router, test_threads_router) use it instead of bare
FastAPI() so the new @require_permission(owner_check=True) decorators
short-circuit cleanly.
- call_unwrapped(): walks the __wrapped__ chain to invoke the underlying
handler without going through the authz wrappers. Direct-call tests
(test_uploads_router) use it. Typed with ParamSpec so the wrapped
signature flows through.
Backend test additions
- test_auth.py: 7 tests for the new _get_client_ip trust model (no
proxy / trusted proxy / untrusted peer / XFF rejection / invalid
CIDR / no client). 5 tests for the password blocklist (literal,
case-insensitive, strong password accepted, change-password binding,
short-password length-check still fires before blocklist).
test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted: closes a
shipped-without-coverage gap on the new UserNotFoundError contract.
- test_thread_meta_repo.py: 4 tests for check_access(require_existing=True)
— strict missing-row denial, strict owner match, strict owner mismatch,
strict null-owner still allowed (shared rows survive the tightening).
- test_ensure_admin.py: 3 tests for _migrate_orphaned_threads /
_iter_store_items pagination, covering the TC-UPG-02 upgrade story
end-to-end via mock store. Closes the gap where the cursor pagination
was untested even though the previous PR rewrote it.
- test_threads_router.py: 5 tests for _strip_reserved_metadata
(owner_id removal, user_id removal, safe-keys passthrough, empty
input, both-stripped).
- test_auth_type_system.py: replace "password123" fixtures with
Tr0ub4dor3a / AnotherStr0ngPwd! so the new password blocklist
doesn't reject the test data.
* docs(auth): refresh TC-DOCKER-05 + document Docker validation gap
- AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md TC-DOCKER-05: the previous expectation
("admin password visible in docker logs") was stale after the simplify
pass that moved credentials to a 0600 file. The grep "Password:" check
would have silently failed and given a false sense of coverage. New
expectation matches the actual file-based path: 0600 file in
DEER_FLOW_HOME, log shows the path (not the secret), reverse-grep
asserts no leaked password in container logs.
- NEW: docs/AUTH_TEST_DOCKER_GAP.md documents the only un-executed
block in the test plan (TC-DOCKER-01..06). Reason: sg_dev validation
host has no Docker daemon installed. The doc maps each Docker case
to an already-validated bare-metal equivalent (TC-1.1, TC-REENT-01,
TC-API-02 etc.) so the gap is auditable, and includes pre-flight
reproduction steps for whoever has Docker available.
---------
Co-authored-by: greatmengqi <chenmengqi.0376@bytedance.com>
617 lines
26 KiB
Python
617 lines
26 KiB
Python
"""Thread CRUD, state, and history endpoints.
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Combines the existing thread-local filesystem cleanup with LangGraph
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Platform-compatible thread management backed by the checkpointer.
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Channel values returned in state responses are serialized through
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:func:`deerflow.runtime.serialization.serialize_channel_values` to
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ensure LangChain message objects are converted to JSON-safe dicts
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matching the LangGraph Platform wire format expected by the
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``useStream`` React hook.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import time
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import uuid
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from typing import Any
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from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
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from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator
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from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
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from app.gateway.deps import get_checkpointer
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from app.gateway.utils import sanitize_log_param
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from deerflow.config.paths import Paths, get_paths
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from deerflow.runtime import serialize_channel_values
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/threads", tags=["threads"])
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# Metadata keys that the server controls; clients are not allowed to set
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# them. Pydantic ``@field_validator("metadata")`` strips them on every
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# inbound model below so a malicious client cannot reflect a forged
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# owner identity through the API surface. Defense-in-depth — the
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# row-level invariant is still ``threads_meta.owner_id`` populated from
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# the auth contextvar; this list closes the metadata-blob echo gap.
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_SERVER_RESERVED_METADATA_KEYS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"owner_id", "user_id"})
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def _strip_reserved_metadata(metadata: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
|
"""Return ``metadata`` with server-controlled keys removed."""
|
|
if not metadata:
|
|
return metadata or {}
|
|
return {k: v for k, v in metadata.items() if k not in _SERVER_RESERVED_METADATA_KEYS}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Response / request models
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ThreadDeleteResponse(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Response model for thread cleanup."""
|
|
|
|
success: bool
|
|
message: str
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ThreadResponse(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Response model for a single thread."""
|
|
|
|
thread_id: str = Field(description="Unique thread identifier")
|
|
status: str = Field(default="idle", description="Thread status: idle, busy, interrupted, error")
|
|
created_at: str = Field(default="", description="ISO timestamp")
|
|
updated_at: str = Field(default="", description="ISO timestamp")
|
|
metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Thread metadata")
|
|
values: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Current state channel values")
|
|
interrupts: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Pending interrupts")
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ThreadCreateRequest(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Request body for creating a thread."""
|
|
|
|
thread_id: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Optional thread ID (auto-generated if omitted)")
|
|
assistant_id: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Associate thread with an assistant")
|
|
metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Initial metadata")
|
|
|
|
_strip_reserved = field_validator("metadata")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _strip_reserved_metadata(v)))
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ThreadSearchRequest(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Request body for searching threads."""
|
|
|
|
metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Metadata filter (exact match)")
|
|
limit: int = Field(default=100, ge=1, le=1000, description="Maximum results")
|
|
offset: int = Field(default=0, ge=0, description="Pagination offset")
|
|
status: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Filter by thread status")
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ThreadStateResponse(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Response model for thread state."""
|
|
|
|
values: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Current channel values")
|
|
next: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Next tasks to execute")
|
|
metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Checkpoint metadata")
|
|
checkpoint: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Checkpoint info")
|
|
checkpoint_id: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Current checkpoint ID")
|
|
parent_checkpoint_id: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Parent checkpoint ID")
|
|
created_at: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Checkpoint timestamp")
|
|
tasks: list[dict[str, Any]] = Field(default_factory=list, description="Interrupted task details")
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ThreadPatchRequest(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Request body for patching thread metadata."""
|
|
|
|
metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Metadata to merge")
|
|
|
|
_strip_reserved = field_validator("metadata")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _strip_reserved_metadata(v)))
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ThreadStateUpdateRequest(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Request body for updating thread state (human-in-the-loop resume)."""
|
|
|
|
values: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(default=None, description="Channel values to merge")
|
|
checkpoint_id: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Checkpoint to branch from")
|
|
checkpoint: dict[str, Any] | None = Field(default=None, description="Full checkpoint object")
|
|
as_node: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Node identity for the update")
|
|
|
|
|
|
class HistoryEntry(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Single checkpoint history entry."""
|
|
|
|
checkpoint_id: str
|
|
parent_checkpoint_id: str | None = None
|
|
metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict)
|
|
values: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict)
|
|
created_at: str | None = None
|
|
next: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ThreadHistoryRequest(BaseModel):
|
|
"""Request body for checkpoint history."""
|
|
|
|
limit: int = Field(default=10, ge=1, le=100, description="Maximum entries")
|
|
before: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Cursor for pagination")
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Helpers
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _delete_thread_data(thread_id: str, paths: Paths | None = None) -> ThreadDeleteResponse:
|
|
"""Delete local persisted filesystem data for a thread."""
|
|
path_manager = paths or get_paths()
|
|
try:
|
|
path_manager.delete_thread_dir(thread_id)
|
|
except ValueError as exc:
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail=str(exc)) from exc
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
# Not critical — thread data may not exist on disk
|
|
logger.debug("No local thread data to delete for %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
return ThreadDeleteResponse(success=True, message=f"No local data for {thread_id}")
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to delete thread data for %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to delete local thread data.") from exc
|
|
|
|
logger.info("Deleted local thread data for %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
return ThreadDeleteResponse(success=True, message=f"Deleted local thread data for {thread_id}")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _derive_thread_status(checkpoint_tuple) -> str:
|
|
"""Derive thread status from checkpoint metadata."""
|
|
if checkpoint_tuple is None:
|
|
return "idle"
|
|
pending_writes = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "pending_writes", None) or []
|
|
|
|
# Check for error in pending writes
|
|
for pw in pending_writes:
|
|
if len(pw) >= 2 and pw[1] == "__error__":
|
|
return "error"
|
|
|
|
# Check for pending next tasks (indicates interrupt)
|
|
tasks = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "tasks", None)
|
|
if tasks:
|
|
return "interrupted"
|
|
|
|
return "idle"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Endpoints
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.delete("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadDeleteResponse)
|
|
@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
|
async def delete_thread_data(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadDeleteResponse:
|
|
"""Delete local persisted filesystem data for a thread.
|
|
|
|
Cleans DeerFlow-managed thread directories, removes checkpoint data,
|
|
and removes the thread_meta row from the configured ThreadMetaStore
|
|
(sqlite or memory).
|
|
"""
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
|
|
|
|
# Clean local filesystem
|
|
response = _delete_thread_data(thread_id)
|
|
|
|
# Remove checkpoints (best-effort)
|
|
checkpointer = getattr(request.app.state, "checkpointer", None)
|
|
if checkpointer is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
if hasattr(checkpointer, "adelete_thread"):
|
|
await checkpointer.adelete_thread(thread_id)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Could not delete checkpoints for thread %s (not critical)", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
|
|
# Remove thread_meta row (best-effort) — required for sqlite backend
|
|
# so the deleted thread no longer appears in /threads/search.
|
|
try:
|
|
thread_meta_repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
|
|
await thread_meta_repo.delete(thread_id)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Could not delete thread_meta for %s (not critical)", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
|
|
return response
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.post("", response_model=ThreadResponse)
|
|
async def create_thread(body: ThreadCreateRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:
|
|
"""Create a new thread.
|
|
|
|
Writes a thread_meta record (so the thread appears in /threads/search)
|
|
and an empty checkpoint (so state endpoints work immediately).
|
|
Idempotent: returns the existing record when ``thread_id`` already exists.
|
|
"""
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
|
|
|
|
checkpointer = get_checkpointer(request)
|
|
thread_meta_repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
|
|
thread_id = body.thread_id or str(uuid.uuid4())
|
|
now = time.time()
|
|
# ``body.metadata`` is already stripped of server-reserved keys by
|
|
# ``ThreadCreateRequest._strip_reserved`` — see the model definition.
|
|
|
|
# Idempotency: return existing record when already present
|
|
existing_record = await thread_meta_repo.get(thread_id)
|
|
if existing_record is not None:
|
|
return ThreadResponse(
|
|
thread_id=thread_id,
|
|
status=existing_record.get("status", "idle"),
|
|
created_at=str(existing_record.get("created_at", "")),
|
|
updated_at=str(existing_record.get("updated_at", "")),
|
|
metadata=existing_record.get("metadata", {}),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Write thread_meta so the thread appears in /threads/search immediately
|
|
try:
|
|
await thread_meta_repo.create(
|
|
thread_id,
|
|
assistant_id=getattr(body, "assistant_id", None),
|
|
metadata=body.metadata,
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to write thread_meta for %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to create thread")
|
|
|
|
# Write an empty checkpoint so state endpoints work immediately
|
|
config = {"configurable": {"thread_id": thread_id, "checkpoint_ns": ""}}
|
|
try:
|
|
from langgraph.checkpoint.base import empty_checkpoint
|
|
|
|
ckpt_metadata = {
|
|
"step": -1,
|
|
"source": "input",
|
|
"writes": None,
|
|
"parents": {},
|
|
**body.metadata,
|
|
"created_at": now,
|
|
}
|
|
await checkpointer.aput(config, empty_checkpoint(), ckpt_metadata, {})
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to create checkpoint for thread %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to create thread")
|
|
|
|
logger.info("Thread created: %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
return ThreadResponse(
|
|
thread_id=thread_id,
|
|
status="idle",
|
|
created_at=str(now),
|
|
updated_at=str(now),
|
|
metadata=body.metadata,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.post("/search", response_model=list[ThreadResponse])
|
|
async def search_threads(body: ThreadSearchRequest, request: Request) -> list[ThreadResponse]:
|
|
"""Search and list threads.
|
|
|
|
Delegates to the configured ThreadMetaStore implementation
|
|
(SQL-backed for sqlite/postgres, Store-backed for memory mode).
|
|
"""
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
|
|
|
|
repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
|
|
rows = await repo.search(
|
|
metadata=body.metadata or None,
|
|
status=body.status,
|
|
limit=body.limit,
|
|
offset=body.offset,
|
|
)
|
|
return [
|
|
ThreadResponse(
|
|
thread_id=r["thread_id"],
|
|
status=r.get("status", "idle"),
|
|
created_at=r.get("created_at", ""),
|
|
updated_at=r.get("updated_at", ""),
|
|
metadata=r.get("metadata", {}),
|
|
values={"title": r["display_name"]} if r.get("display_name") else {},
|
|
interrupts={},
|
|
)
|
|
for r in rows
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.patch("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadResponse)
|
|
@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
|
async def patch_thread(thread_id: str, body: ThreadPatchRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:
|
|
"""Merge metadata into a thread record."""
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
|
|
|
|
thread_meta_repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
|
|
record = await thread_meta_repo.get(thread_id)
|
|
if record is None:
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found")
|
|
|
|
# ``body.metadata`` already stripped by ``ThreadPatchRequest._strip_reserved``.
|
|
try:
|
|
await thread_meta_repo.update_metadata(thread_id, body.metadata)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to patch thread %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to update thread")
|
|
|
|
# Re-read to get the merged metadata + refreshed updated_at
|
|
record = await thread_meta_repo.get(thread_id) or record
|
|
return ThreadResponse(
|
|
thread_id=thread_id,
|
|
status=record.get("status", "idle"),
|
|
created_at=str(record.get("created_at", "")),
|
|
updated_at=str(record.get("updated_at", "")),
|
|
metadata=record.get("metadata", {}),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.get("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadResponse)
|
|
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
|
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:
|
|
"""Get thread info.
|
|
|
|
Reads metadata from the ThreadMetaStore and derives the accurate
|
|
execution status from the checkpointer. Falls back to the checkpointer
|
|
alone for threads that pre-date ThreadMetaStore adoption (backward compat).
|
|
"""
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
|
|
|
|
thread_meta_repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
|
|
checkpointer = get_checkpointer(request)
|
|
|
|
record: dict | None = await thread_meta_repo.get(thread_id)
|
|
|
|
# Derive accurate status from the checkpointer
|
|
config = {"configurable": {"thread_id": thread_id, "checkpoint_ns": ""}}
|
|
try:
|
|
checkpoint_tuple = await checkpointer.aget_tuple(config)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to get checkpoint for thread %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to get thread")
|
|
|
|
if record is None and checkpoint_tuple is None:
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found")
|
|
|
|
# If the thread exists in the checkpointer but not in thread_meta (e.g.
|
|
# legacy data created before thread_meta adoption), synthesize a minimal
|
|
# record from the checkpoint metadata.
|
|
if record is None and checkpoint_tuple is not None:
|
|
ckpt_meta = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "metadata", {}) or {}
|
|
record = {
|
|
"thread_id": thread_id,
|
|
"status": "idle",
|
|
"created_at": ckpt_meta.get("created_at", ""),
|
|
"updated_at": ckpt_meta.get("updated_at", ckpt_meta.get("created_at", "")),
|
|
"metadata": {k: v for k, v in ckpt_meta.items() if k not in ("created_at", "updated_at", "step", "source", "writes", "parents")},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if record is None:
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found")
|
|
|
|
status = _derive_thread_status(checkpoint_tuple) if checkpoint_tuple is not None else record.get("status", "idle")
|
|
checkpoint = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "checkpoint", {}) or {} if checkpoint_tuple is not None else {}
|
|
channel_values = checkpoint.get("channel_values", {})
|
|
|
|
return ThreadResponse(
|
|
thread_id=thread_id,
|
|
status=status,
|
|
created_at=str(record.get("created_at", "")),
|
|
updated_at=str(record.get("updated_at", "")),
|
|
metadata=record.get("metadata", {}),
|
|
values=serialize_channel_values(channel_values),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.get("/{thread_id}/state", response_model=ThreadStateResponse)
|
|
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
|
async def get_thread_state(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadStateResponse:
|
|
"""Get the latest state snapshot for a thread.
|
|
|
|
Channel values are serialized to ensure LangChain message objects
|
|
are converted to JSON-safe dicts.
|
|
"""
|
|
checkpointer = get_checkpointer(request)
|
|
|
|
config = {"configurable": {"thread_id": thread_id, "checkpoint_ns": ""}}
|
|
try:
|
|
checkpoint_tuple = await checkpointer.aget_tuple(config)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to get state for thread %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to get thread state")
|
|
|
|
if checkpoint_tuple is None:
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found")
|
|
|
|
checkpoint = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "checkpoint", {}) or {}
|
|
metadata = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "metadata", {}) or {}
|
|
checkpoint_id = None
|
|
ckpt_config = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "config", {})
|
|
if ckpt_config:
|
|
checkpoint_id = ckpt_config.get("configurable", {}).get("checkpoint_id")
|
|
|
|
channel_values = checkpoint.get("channel_values", {})
|
|
|
|
parent_config = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "parent_config", None)
|
|
parent_checkpoint_id = None
|
|
if parent_config:
|
|
parent_checkpoint_id = parent_config.get("configurable", {}).get("checkpoint_id")
|
|
|
|
tasks_raw = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "tasks", []) or []
|
|
next_tasks = [t.name for t in tasks_raw if hasattr(t, "name")]
|
|
tasks = [{"id": getattr(t, "id", ""), "name": getattr(t, "name", "")} for t in tasks_raw]
|
|
|
|
return ThreadStateResponse(
|
|
values=serialize_channel_values(channel_values),
|
|
next=next_tasks,
|
|
metadata=metadata,
|
|
checkpoint={"id": checkpoint_id, "ts": str(metadata.get("created_at", ""))},
|
|
checkpoint_id=checkpoint_id,
|
|
parent_checkpoint_id=parent_checkpoint_id,
|
|
created_at=str(metadata.get("created_at", "")),
|
|
tasks=tasks,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.post("/{thread_id}/state", response_model=ThreadStateResponse)
|
|
@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
|
async def update_thread_state(thread_id: str, body: ThreadStateUpdateRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadStateResponse:
|
|
"""Update thread state (e.g. for human-in-the-loop resume or title rename).
|
|
|
|
Writes a new checkpoint that merges *body.values* into the latest
|
|
channel values, then syncs any updated ``title`` field through the
|
|
ThreadMetaStore abstraction so that ``/threads/search`` reflects the
|
|
change immediately in both sqlite and memory backends.
|
|
"""
|
|
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
|
|
|
|
checkpointer = get_checkpointer(request)
|
|
thread_meta_repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
|
|
|
|
# checkpoint_ns must be present in the config for aput — default to ""
|
|
# (the root graph namespace). checkpoint_id is optional; omitting it
|
|
# fetches the latest checkpoint for the thread.
|
|
read_config: dict[str, Any] = {
|
|
"configurable": {
|
|
"thread_id": thread_id,
|
|
"checkpoint_ns": "",
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if body.checkpoint_id:
|
|
read_config["configurable"]["checkpoint_id"] = body.checkpoint_id
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
checkpoint_tuple = await checkpointer.aget_tuple(read_config)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to get state for thread %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to get thread state")
|
|
|
|
if checkpoint_tuple is None:
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found")
|
|
|
|
# Work on mutable copies so we don't accidentally mutate cached objects.
|
|
checkpoint: dict[str, Any] = dict(getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "checkpoint", {}) or {})
|
|
metadata: dict[str, Any] = dict(getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "metadata", {}) or {})
|
|
channel_values: dict[str, Any] = dict(checkpoint.get("channel_values", {}))
|
|
|
|
if body.values:
|
|
channel_values.update(body.values)
|
|
|
|
checkpoint["channel_values"] = channel_values
|
|
metadata["updated_at"] = time.time()
|
|
|
|
if body.as_node:
|
|
metadata["source"] = "update"
|
|
metadata["step"] = metadata.get("step", 0) + 1
|
|
metadata["writes"] = {body.as_node: body.values}
|
|
|
|
# aput requires checkpoint_ns in the config — use the same config used for the
|
|
# read (which always includes checkpoint_ns=""). Do NOT include checkpoint_id
|
|
# so that aput generates a fresh checkpoint ID for the new snapshot.
|
|
write_config: dict[str, Any] = {
|
|
"configurable": {
|
|
"thread_id": thread_id,
|
|
"checkpoint_ns": "",
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
try:
|
|
new_config = await checkpointer.aput(write_config, checkpoint, metadata, {})
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to update state for thread %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to update thread state")
|
|
|
|
new_checkpoint_id: str | None = None
|
|
if isinstance(new_config, dict):
|
|
new_checkpoint_id = new_config.get("configurable", {}).get("checkpoint_id")
|
|
|
|
# Sync title changes through the ThreadMetaStore abstraction so /threads/search
|
|
# reflects them immediately in both sqlite and memory backends.
|
|
if body.values and "title" in body.values:
|
|
new_title = body.values["title"]
|
|
if new_title: # Skip empty strings and None
|
|
try:
|
|
await thread_meta_repo.update_display_name(thread_id, new_title)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.debug("Failed to sync title to thread_meta for %s (non-fatal)", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
|
|
return ThreadStateResponse(
|
|
values=serialize_channel_values(channel_values),
|
|
next=[],
|
|
metadata=metadata,
|
|
checkpoint_id=new_checkpoint_id,
|
|
created_at=str(metadata.get("created_at", "")),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.post("/{thread_id}/history", response_model=list[HistoryEntry])
|
|
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
|
async def get_thread_history(thread_id: str, body: ThreadHistoryRequest, request: Request) -> list[HistoryEntry]:
|
|
"""Get checkpoint history for a thread.
|
|
|
|
Messages are read from the checkpointer's channel values (the
|
|
authoritative source) and serialized via
|
|
:func:`~deerflow.runtime.serialization.serialize_channel_values`.
|
|
Only the latest (first) checkpoint carries the ``messages`` key to
|
|
avoid duplicating them across every entry.
|
|
"""
|
|
checkpointer = get_checkpointer(request)
|
|
|
|
config: dict[str, Any] = {"configurable": {"thread_id": thread_id}}
|
|
if body.before:
|
|
config["configurable"]["checkpoint_id"] = body.before
|
|
|
|
entries: list[HistoryEntry] = []
|
|
is_latest_checkpoint = True
|
|
try:
|
|
async for checkpoint_tuple in checkpointer.alist(config, limit=body.limit):
|
|
ckpt_config = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "config", {})
|
|
parent_config = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "parent_config", None)
|
|
metadata = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "metadata", {}) or {}
|
|
checkpoint = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "checkpoint", {}) or {}
|
|
|
|
checkpoint_id = ckpt_config.get("configurable", {}).get("checkpoint_id", "")
|
|
parent_id = None
|
|
if parent_config:
|
|
parent_id = parent_config.get("configurable", {}).get("checkpoint_id")
|
|
|
|
channel_values = checkpoint.get("channel_values", {})
|
|
|
|
# Build values from checkpoint channel_values
|
|
values: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
|
if title := channel_values.get("title"):
|
|
values["title"] = title
|
|
if thread_data := channel_values.get("thread_data"):
|
|
values["thread_data"] = thread_data
|
|
|
|
# Attach messages from checkpointer only for the latest checkpoint
|
|
if is_latest_checkpoint:
|
|
messages = channel_values.get("messages")
|
|
if messages:
|
|
values["messages"] = serialize_channel_values({"messages": messages}).get("messages", [])
|
|
is_latest_checkpoint = False
|
|
|
|
# Derive next tasks
|
|
tasks_raw = getattr(checkpoint_tuple, "tasks", []) or []
|
|
next_tasks = [t.name for t in tasks_raw if hasattr(t, "name")]
|
|
|
|
# Strip LangGraph internal keys from metadata
|
|
user_meta = {k: v for k, v in metadata.items() if k not in ("created_at", "updated_at", "step", "source", "writes", "parents")}
|
|
# Keep step for ordering context
|
|
if "step" in metadata:
|
|
user_meta["step"] = metadata["step"]
|
|
|
|
entries.append(
|
|
HistoryEntry(
|
|
checkpoint_id=checkpoint_id,
|
|
parent_checkpoint_id=parent_id,
|
|
metadata=user_meta,
|
|
values=values,
|
|
created_at=str(metadata.get("created_at", "")),
|
|
next=next_tasks,
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.exception("Failed to get history for thread %s", sanitize_log_param(thread_id))
|
|
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to get thread history")
|
|
|
|
return entries
|