Files
b4365440b5 feat: serve a Pydantic AI agent to editors over ACP (experimental) (#274)
* feat: add ACP capability to serve agents to editors

Editors and TUIs that speak the Agent Client Protocol (Zed and others)
can drive an external coding agent, but plugging a Pydantic AI agent
into one previously meant implementing the ACP server side by hand.
run_acp_stdio serves any Agent over stdio: streamed text and thinking,
file edits rendered as diffs, human-in-the-loop tool approval mapped to
deferred-approval tools, per-workspace sessions via a session_config
hook, model switching, cancellation, and optional session persistence.

FileSystem.get_toolset/Shell.get_toolset now return their concrete
toolset types so the ACP presenter can recognize their tool calls by
name and annotate them with kinds, locations, and diffs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip ACP tests at collection when the acp extra is not installed

The slim CI jobs sync without extras, so `agent-client-protocol` is absent and
the ACP test modules failed at import during collection. Ignore them via
conftest when `acp` can't be found; `test_packaging.py` stays collected since
package metadata holds on base installs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): enable unstable routing and bound streamed updates by byte size

session/set_model and session/close are advertised at initialize, but the ACP
SDK router rejects them as unstable unless run_agent is given
use_unstable_protocol=True -- so the model picker and session-close affordance
returned method_not_found over a real connection. Enable the flag.

Streamed text was chunked by character count, but the SDK serializes with
ensure_ascii=True, so a non-ASCII code point expands up to 12 bytes (a surrogate
pair) inside the JSON string. A single agent_message_chunk of emoji/CJK could
exceed the client's 64 KiB read buffer and drop the connection. Chunk by escaped
byte length instead.

Both gaps were invisible to the suite: the close/set_model tests called the
adapter directly (bypassing the router) and the large-output test used only
ASCII. Add a through-the-router stdio test and a non-ASCII chunking test as guards.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(acp): per-turn usage, read-resilient terminal cleanup, persistence + native-toolset tests

Address review follow-ups on the ACP capability:

- Report per-turn token usage on `PromptResponse.usage`, summed across approval
  passes (UNSTABLE ACP field; clients that don't support it ignore it).
- Suppress client errors during the shielded terminal kill/release so a failing
  cleanup call can't mask the in-flight CancelledError (the spec requires the turn
  to end with a `cancelled` stop reason).
- Cover the persistence guarantees that previously had no store-active test: a
  cancelled turn commits nothing, an approval-resume turn persists each update
  once (no duplicate tool-call start), and `StoredSession` round-trips through
  Pydantic across the full `SessionUpdate` union.
- Add a through-the-wire stdio test that the editor-native fs/terminal toolsets
  route to the client when mounted per session.
- Document the dynamic-`ApprovalRequired` partial-side-effect nuance, per-turn
  usage, and that session persistence composes with per-run step durability.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(acp): editor-native reads for read-only fs clients, writes delegated locally

A client that advertises filesystem reads but not writes previously got no
editor-native filesystem at all (acp_filesystem returned None, so callers fell
back to a fully-local toolset and lost the editor's live view, e.g. unsaved
buffers). It now returns a combined toolset: reads route through the editor, and
writes are delegated to the local FileSystem capability rooted at the session
cwd (reusing its path sandboxing rather than reimplementing writes).

This is coherent only when the agent shares the workspace disk with the editor
(same machine, or an agent inside the editor's container); for a remote editor
the writes land on the agent's disk. Documented as such at the helper and README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(acp): point _all_known_model_names at the now-merged known_model_names()

pydantic-ai#5803 added `pydantic_ai.models.known_model_names()`, the public
replacement for the `KnownModelName.__value__` introspection. It isn't in a
released `pydantic-ai-slim` yet, so the swap (and the floor bump it requires)
waits for that release; update the breadcrumb so it's actioned then.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): replay user turns on session/load, advertise MCP capabilities

Two spec-conformance gaps from PR review:

- The transcript only ever recorded agent-direction updates, so a reopened
  session replayed a one-sided conversation. ACP requires session/load to
  replay the entire conversation, user turns included. The prompt's content
  blocks are now seeded into the turn's update list -- recorded for replay
  but never sent live (the client renders its own prompt; the prompt-turn
  spec sends no user echo) -- riding the existing commit path so a cancelled
  turn still rolls its user message back.

- initialize left mcp_capabilities at the default (http/sse false), and the
  spec forbids clients from sending HTTP/SSE MCP servers that are not
  advertised -- making the documented session_config -> mcp_servers path
  unreachable for conforming clients over those transports (stdio is not
  gated). Advertising is now an explicit opt-in mirroring prompt_capabilities,
  since only the embedder knows which transports their session_config
  connects; setting it without a session_config fails at construction rather
  than inviting servers that session/new would reject.

Also adds the guard test from review follow-up: _all_known_model_names
fails loudly if pyai ever recomposes the KnownModelName alias.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): make the collection guard coverable in a single environment

The acp-extra collection guard was an `if` statement whose true arm only
runs on slim installs, so local `make testcov` (always all-extras) could
never reach 100% -- only CI's combined slim+all-extras matrix could. A
conditional expression has no statement arc for branch coverage to miss,
so the documented local gate works again without excluding a line CI
genuinely covers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(acp): record why _all_known_model_names avoids the unreleased public API

The breadcrumb read as if known_model_names() were already usable; make the
deliberate avoidance explicit. The public enumerator is merged upstream but
not in any released pydantic-ai-slim, and the test-floor CI job runs against
the floor release, so calling it would break there. Move the rationale from
the docstring to a code comment (docstring stays contract-only) and spell out
the swap-and-delete trigger: a release that ships it plus a floor bump.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(acp): add spec-conformance suite driven over a real in-memory wire

The existing tests invoke adapter methods directly, below the SDK's JSON-RPC
router and serialization -- a boundary that cannot see two bug classes that
already bit this adapter: a method the router gates before the adapter runs
(the use_unstable_protocol reachability bug) and a frame whose serialized
bytes overrun the client buffer (the ensure_ascii chunking bug).

`tests/acp/_wire.py` closes that gap without a subprocess: a real
ClientSideConnection talks to acp.run_agent across a socket.socketpair in one
event loop, so every request crosses the router and codec and every update
arrives as bytes the client re-parses, with asyncio's default 64 KiB reader
limit standing in for the stdio buffer.

`tests/acp/test_conformance.py` is organized by spec clause, not by adapter
method, each with an oracle built from the spec/input rather than the
adapter's own output:
- version negotiation echoes the requested version (not a literal)
- capabilities are advertised iff supported (load_session, mcp, auth_methods,
  session list/fork/resume, modes, config options) -- read back off the wire
- unstable methods route through with the flag and are method_not_found
  without it (the load-bearing reason run_acp_stdio enables it)
- error codes distinguish method_not_found from invalid_params
- session/load replays the entire conversation including user turns
- large non-ASCII output reassembles intact within the client's read buffer

CONFORMANCE.md records the clause-to-test matrix, the open gaps (none a known
bug), the two verified deviations, and the N/A ledger, derived from a
spec-page sweep with adversarial verification of every candidate finding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(acp): stop surfacing unconsumed additionalDirectories

The adapter accepted the client's additionalDirectories and forwarded them to
the session_config AcpSession, but never advertised
sessionCapabilities.additionalDirectories -- so a conformant client never sent
them, and nothing downstream consumed them (the FileSystem capability is
single-root). The ACP capability is also still UNSTABLE.

Drop the dead surface: remove the field from AcpSession and stop forwarding it.
The acp.Agent base signature still carries the parameter, so the session
methods accept and ignore it. Supporting it properly (multi-root filesystem +
advertisement) is recorded as a deferred feature.

Also trims CONFORMANCE.md to a public supported-capability summary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): keep inline image bytes and let run_acp_stdio advertise MCP

An ACP image block always carries inline `data`; `uri` is only an optional
source reference, so preferring the URL dropped the bytes the client actually
sent in favour of a link the model may be unable to fetch. Prefer the inline
data, matching the reference ACP agents.

`run_acp_stdio`/`run_acp_stdio_sync` forwarded every adapter option except
`mcp_capabilities`, so advertising MCP transports was only reachable by
constructing `PydanticAIACPAgent` by hand. Forward it for parity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): reliable approval scope, mapped stop reasons, safe session reload

"Always allow"/"always reject" keyed the scope on the raw tool arguments,
which a streaming model (and OpenAI by default) delivers as a JSON string;
re-ordered keys then produced a different key and silently re-prompted for a
call already decided. Canonicalize via `args_as_dict()` so the same logical
call shares one remembered decision.

Completed turns always reported `end_turn`, hiding `max_tokens`/`refusal`
from the client. Map the model's finish reason to the ACP stop reason.

`session/load` overwrote a still-open session without cancelling its in-flight
turn, leaking a task that could later persist stale state over the restored
transcript. Tear it down first, sharing the close_session teardown path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(acp): correct the API reference and capability notes

The README API block omitted `session_store`/`models` (and now
`mcp_capabilities`), the limitations list contradicted the documented
MCP-via-`session_config` support, and the overwrite-diff note misdescribed
what the code emits. Also drop a dangling internal-doc reference from a
source comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(acp): record the unhandled SessionStore failure contract

A durable SessionStore can fail on save or return a corrupt payload on load,
but the adapter currently propagates those exceptions rather than handling
them. Document the gap on the Protocol where store implementers will see it,
so the behaviour is a known boundary rather than a surprise -- without adding
handling we have no consumer for yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(acp): correct the SessionStore failure note to match observed behaviour

The previous note assumed store exceptions surface "raw". Verified against the
SDK (connection.py `_run_request`) and over a real in-memory wire with a raising
stub store: they are converted to JSON-RPC errors before reaching the client -- a
`pydantic.ValidationError` to `invalid_params` (-32602), anything else to a
generic internal error (-32603). Record what the client actually receives rather
than what was guessed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): handle SessionStore failures instead of leaking them

`session_store` is a public, documented extension point, so a durable store
that fails on save or returns a corrupt payload on load is reachable today --
not hypothetical. A failed save previously errored the very turn the user had
already watched stream to completion; a corrupt load leaked raw pydantic/IO
detail to the client.

Make save failures non-fatal: log and swallow them so the turn (or session)
that already committed in memory still succeeds, and the next save catches the
store up. Make load failures fail `session/load` with a clear internal error
rather than a leaked exception, since a session that cannot be read cannot be
reopened. Verified over the in-memory wire with a failing stub store.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): close out in-flight tool calls when a turn is cancelled

A tool call announced as pending/in_progress was never driven to a terminal
status when its turn was cancelled (via session/cancel or a dismissed permission
dialog), so a client kept rendering it as running after the turn ended cancelled.

On the cancel unwind, fail any tool call still lacking a terminal result -- sent
live (a cancelled turn never commits its transcript) and shielded so the asyncio
cancellation cannot abort the send. Verified over the in-memory wire.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): reject prompts queued behind a session that closed or reloaded

A prompt waiting on the session's turn lock held a reference to the old
SessionState; close_session/load_session only cancel the *active* turn, so
the queued prompt would run against the discarded state - invisible to
session/cancel - and persist its orphaned history over the closed (or just
restored) session. Re-checking liveness after acquiring the lock turns that
zombie turn into the invalid_params the client already gets for a prompt
sent after close.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): never swallow a handler's own teardown cancellation

prompt() and _cancel_active_turn awaited the turn task bare, so the
CancelledError from connection teardown was indistinguishable from the
turn's own cancellation and got converted into a response (or, via a
dismissed permission dialog, replaced by the internal _TurnCancelled).
The SDK cancels each handler task exactly once on shutdown and its sender
is already closed by then, so a handler that survives that one cancel and
tries to answer hangs Connection.close() forever. Awaiting through
asyncio.shield keeps the two cancellation sources apart: the turn's end
is read off the (done) task, while the handler's own cancellation
propagates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): don't report rollback when a cancel lands in the post-commit save

The store save after a turn commits was the one suspension point left
between commit and return: a session/cancel delivered there escaped the
turn task and the prompt answered 'cancelled' (the rollback signal, no
user_message_id) while the session's in-memory history and transcript
already contained the whole turn - the next prompt would build on history
the client believed was discarded. The InMemorySessionStore never
suspends, which is why the existing cancel-persistence test could not see
this; any real (file/db) store can. A cancel that arrives after commit
has simply lost the race, so the interrupted save is treated like the
write failures _persist already swallows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): don't leak a terminal when run_command is cancelled mid-create

The terminal/create call sat before the cleanup try-block, so a
cancellation landing there unwound without a kill or release - but the
request may already be on the wire (the SDK sender flushes queued
payloads even when the awaiting future is cancelled), leaving the
command running client-side with nobody holding its id. Running the
create as a shielded task lets the cleanup await the response late,
learn the id, and kill/release as usual. Folding the late-id case into
one kill path and one release path also keeps the existing guarantee
that a failing kill never skips the release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): end limit-hit turns with max_turn_requests, close out tool calls on errors

pydantic-ai's default UsageLimits(request_limit=50) means a long tool
loop routinely raises UsageLimitExceeded - which escaped the turn as a
JSON-RPC internal_error, the exact condition ACP defines the
max_turn_requests stop reason for (token limits map to max_tokens). The
raising run's partial messages are not retrievable, so such a turn rolls
back like a cancellation and says so (no user_message_id, no usage).
Turns failing with any other exception now also close out their
announced tool calls before the error reaches the client, matching the
cancellation path, so the client does not render them as running next to
the turn's failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): resolve workspace-relative paths before they reach fs/read|write

ACP requires absolute paths on fs/read_text_file and fs/write_text_file,
but models routinely emit workspace-relative ones - the local FileSystem
tools document relative paths and share these tools' names, and the
presenter layer already absolutizes for exactly that reason. The
client-backed toolset forwarded them raw, producing non-conformant
requests the client may reject. acp_filesystem now hands the toolset the
session cwd so relative paths resolve before the wire; absolute paths
and directly-constructed cwd-less toolsets are untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(acp): true up the conformance claims, comments, and doc links

The stop-reason note predated the finish-reason mapping and said the
opposite of what the code (and its tests) do; the prompt-capabilities
bullet read as inbound enforcement when the spec puts that restriction
on the client; the stdio MCP gap (the spec's unconditional MUST) was
undisclosed; and two code comments claimed validation/rejection the SDK
router does not actually perform - the adapter's own raises are the
load-bearing behavior. Doc links now use the canonical pydantic.dev
paths both old URLs redirect to.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(acp): shield the terminal create in place instead of via a side task

The ensure_future + asyncio.shield shape from the previous commit hit
Python 3.12+'s shield behavior: once the outer await is cancelled, a
late failure of the inner create is reported to the loop exception
handler even when the cleanup retrieves it, which spams production logs
and fails under pytest-anyio. An anyio shield around the create await
itself is simpler and leans on the same anyio-mediated cancellation the
kill/release cleanup already depends on: the cancellation defers to the
next await, by which point the terminal id is known and the existing
cleanup kills and releases as usual.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(acp): small type and surface cleanups from review

- ToolCallPermission.args was typed object although the only
  construction site passes args_as_dict(); Mapping[str, object] lets a
  custom policy scope by an argument without isinstance gymnastics.
- default_permission_scope is referenced by the permission_policy docs
  as the fallback to compose with, so it must be importable: exported.
- McpServer names the per-server union once instead of spelling it in
  two places; McpServers gains the TypeAlias marker its sibling had.
- _model_state folds the None case so both call sites drop a repeated
  conditional; the load_session store guard's no-cover pragma was wrong
  (the SDK router routes session/load regardless of the advertisement,
  and test_persistence already executes the branch).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(acp): pin claimed behavior the suite asserted too weakly or not at all

- The unsupported-method test asserted only RequestError despite name and
  CONFORMANCE.md promising method_not_found; codes now pinned (-32601,
  and -32602 for the unknown-session prompt).
- The model-override test was tautological: both models answered
  successfully either way. It now asserts the override's distinct canned
  output (mutation-checked: dropping the per-run override fails it).
- Usage summation across approval passes had no test; an approval turn's
  output tokens must exceed the resume pass alone (mutation-checked
  against 'usage = result.usage()').
- New protocol-contract coverage: cancel racing an unanswered permission
  dialog (turn ends cancelled, pending call driven to failed), double
  cancel idempotency, image block arriving in model history as decoded
  BinaryContent, the denial message reaching the failed update's
  raw_output, chunk_text's exact-budget boundary, and a set_model save
  failure being swallowed like every other persist failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(acp): survive raw cancellation during terminal create; answer cancelled after a post-commit cancel

An adversarial re-review of this branch's own fixes caught a regression:
the anyio shield around terminal/create only blocks anyio-mediated
cancellation, but the adapter and pydantic-ai deliver raw task.cancel()
(turn.cancel, cancel_and_drain), which pierces it - reintroducing the
leaked-terminal window end to end. The create now runs as its own task
awaited via asyncio.wait: a raw cancel hits the waiter, not the create,
and unlike asyncio.shield (3.12+) a late create failure is not reported
to the loop exception handler when the cleanup retrieves it. The leak
scenario is pinned at both the toolset level and through the real
adapter/agent path.

Also from the re-review: a cancel that lands after the turn committed
(inside the store save) now answers 'cancelled' as the spec requires -
while keeping the committed signals (user_message_id, usage, history) -
and the one-tick teardown-vs-turn ambiguity that 3.10 cannot resolve is
documented at both await sites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(acp): record the post-commit-cancel semantics in CONFORMANCE

Also drops an unbounded poll loop in the permission-dialog race test for
a single deterministic tick (prompt sets active_turn before its first
suspension point), which was the one partial branch left repo-wide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(acp): let the turn build its own response and drop the commit-flag tuple

_run_turn returned (usage, stop_reason, committed) so prompt() could
reassemble a PromptResponse it had all the pieces for; building the
response in the turn removes that protocol and the committed flag.
Recording turn.updates is now unconditional (only the commit gate
matters), and the presenter-fields/acp_filesystem branches collapse to
single construction paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(acp): appease codespell (unparseable -> unparsable)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Support Pydantic AI 2.x in ACP

* feat(acp): forward usage limits into agent runs

Let hosts bound each ACP run segment with Pydantic AI usage ceilings while preserving the default run behavior when no explicit limits are configured.

* feat(acp): resolve selected session models

Let embedders map advertised ACP model ids to concrete Pydantic AI models and re-surface a resident session's current model state.

* feat(acp): expose read-only session history

Hosts can gauge context with the same estimate_token_count path the compaction tiers use by reading committed resident-session history.

The returned list is a shallow snapshot, and callers must treat the shared ModelMessage objects as read-only.

* Track ACP 0.11 session config models

* chore(acp): fix coverage, trim redundancy, clarify module names

Get the ACP PR to green CI and simpler to review, without changing behavior.

- Coverage: the only uncovered line was a dead `return None` branch in the
  `_model_option` test helper (source was already 100%). Assert the option is
  present instead, dropping the untested branch and its now-redundant guards.
- Remove CONFORMANCE.md: its supported/not-supported matrix duplicated the
  package README's feature sections and "Cancellation and limitations". Point
  the two references at the README.
- Dedup the test ACP clients: RecordingClient, FakeClient, and WireClient each
  re-spelled the same ~13-method "unused capability" stub block to satisfy the
  SDK Client interface. Extract it once into RecordingClientBase; each client now
  subclasses it and overrides only what it exercises. Interface drift is one edit.
- Rename two opaque modules for clarity (files only; public symbols unchanged):
  _present.py -> _presentation.py (matches its ToolCallPresentation exports) and
  _native.py -> _client_toolsets.py (client-routed filesystem/shell toolsets),
  with tests/acp/test_native.py -> test_client_toolsets.py to mirror the source.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(acp): move under experimental and shrink the public surface

New capabilities start under pydantic_ai_harness.experimental, so ACP
follows: importing warns HarnessExperimentalWarning and the API may
change without deprecation. __all__ drops the typing-only aliases
(25 to 18 names); default_permission_scope and McpServer stay because
policies compose with the default scope and AcpSession.mcp_servers is
typed by McpServer. Tests move to tests/experimental/acp to mirror the
source tree; the experimental warning test lives in the SDK-gated
test_acp.py so slim (no-extras) installs stay green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(acp): expose model_resolver and usage_limits on the stdio entry points

PydanticAIACPAgent already accepted both, so wanting a per-run token
ceiling or host-defined model ids forced users off run_acp_stdio onto
the class and a hand-rolled acp.run_agent call, where forgetting
use_unstable_protocol=True silently loses session/close. Forward the
two params so the one-liner covers every adapter option.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: David SF <david.sanchez@pydantic.dev>
2026-07-07 23:36:09 +05:30

952 lines
49 KiB
Python

"""Adapt a Pydantic AI agent to the Agent Client Protocol (ACP) agent interface.
ACP (https://agentclientprotocol.com) lets a code editor or terminal UI (the *client*)
drive a coding agent (the *server*) over stdio JSON-RPC. This module exposes a Pydantic AI
[`Agent`][pydantic_ai.Agent] as such a server: it streams the agent's output to the client
as `session/update` notifications and bridges ACP permission requests to Pydantic AI's
human-in-the-loop tool approval.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import contextlib
import json
import logging
from collections.abc import Callable, Hashable, Sequence
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from inspect import isawaitable
from typing import Generic, Literal
from uuid import uuid4
import acp
import anyio
from acp import schema
from acp.interfaces import Client
from pydantic_ai import DeferredToolRequests, DeferredToolResults, ToolDenied, UsageLimitExceeded
from pydantic_ai.agent import AbstractAgent
from pydantic_ai.messages import (
AgentStreamEvent,
FinishReason,
FunctionToolCallEvent,
FunctionToolResultEvent,
ModelMessage,
PartDeltaEvent,
PartStartEvent,
RetryPromptPart,
TextPart,
TextPartDelta,
ThinkingPart,
ThinkingPartDelta,
ToolCallPart,
UserContent,
)
from pydantic_ai.models import KnownModelName, Model, known_model_names
from pydantic_ai.output import OutputDataT
from pydantic_ai.run import AgentRunResultEvent
from pydantic_ai.tools import AgentDepsT
from pydantic_ai.toolsets import AbstractToolset, FunctionToolset
from pydantic_ai.usage import RunUsage, UsageLimits
from pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp._content import PromptContentBlock, prompt_blocks_to_user_content
from pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp._permission import (
PermissionPolicy,
ToolCallPermission,
default_permission_scope,
)
from pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp._presentation import (
ToolCallContent,
ToolCallPresentation,
ToolCallPresenter,
absolutize,
default_coding_presenter,
)
from pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp._serialize import bounded_jsonable, chunk_text, jsonable
from pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp._session import (
AcpSession,
AcpSessionConfig,
McpServers,
SessionConfigFunc,
SessionState,
SessionUpdate,
)
from pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp._store import SessionStore, StoredSession
# Version advertised to the client when the caller does not supply one.
DEFAULT_VERSION = '0.1.0'
_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_MODEL_CONFIG_ID = 'model'
def _all_known_model_names() -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Every model name Pydantic AI exposes through the public `known_model_names()` API."""
return known_model_names()
def _finish_reason_to_stop_reason(finish_reason: FinishReason | None) -> schema.StopReason:
"""Map the model's terminal `finish_reason` to the ACP stop reason for a completed turn.
Only `length` and `content_filter` carry a distinct ACP meaning; every other reason (a normal
stop, a final tool call, an unknown/missing reason) is reported as a plain `end_turn`.
Cancellation is handled by the caller and never reaches here.
"""
if finish_reason == 'length':
return 'max_tokens'
if finish_reason == 'content_filter':
return 'refusal'
return 'end_turn'
def _usage_limit_stop_reason(exc: UsageLimitExceeded) -> schema.StopReason:
"""Map a run's exceeded usage limit to the ACP stop reason ending the turn.
Token-based limits report `max_tokens`; the request/tool-call count limits report
`max_turn_requests`. The exception carries no structured detail, so this reads its message; an
unrecognized wording falls back to `max_turn_requests` (the limit pydantic-ai's default
configuration can hit).
"""
return 'max_tokens' if 'tokens_limit' in str(exc) else 'max_turn_requests'
def _to_acp_usage(usage: RunUsage) -> schema.Usage:
"""Map a Pydantic AI `RunUsage` to ACP's per-turn `Usage` (an UNSTABLE field on `PromptResponse`)."""
return schema.Usage(
input_tokens=usage.input_tokens,
output_tokens=usage.output_tokens,
total_tokens=usage.total_tokens,
cached_read_tokens=usage.cache_read_tokens,
cached_write_tokens=usage.cache_write_tokens,
)
class _TurnCancelled(Exception):
"""Raised internally to unwind a turn the client cancelled mid-flight (e.g. via a permission dialog)."""
@dataclass(kw_only=True)
class _TurnState:
"""Per-turn state shared by the stream handlers, created once per turn in `_run_turn`."""
conn: Client
session_id: str
cwd: str
approval_names: frozenset[str]
# Tool-call ids accumulated across the turn's approval-resume passes: `started` so a call
# paused for approval is announced only once, `denied` so a rejected call's result is failed,
# `resulted` so a cancelled turn can fail only the calls still left without a terminal status.
started: set[str] = field(default_factory=set[str])
denied: set[str] = field(default_factory=set[str])
resulted: set[str] = field(default_factory=set[str])
# The `session/update`s sent this turn; appended to the session transcript only on commit.
updates: list[SessionUpdate] = field(default_factory=list[SessionUpdate])
@dataclass(frozen=True, kw_only=True)
class _ToolCallFields:
"""The ACP tool-call fields derived from the presenter, shared by the start and permission paths."""
title: str
kind: schema.ToolKind | None
content: list[ToolCallContent] | None
locations: list[schema.ToolCallLocation] | None
class PydanticAIACPAgent(acp.Agent, Generic[AgentDepsT, OutputDataT]):
"""An ACP agent backed by a Pydantic AI [`Agent`][pydantic_ai.Agent].
Each ACP session is an independent conversation, keyed by session ID. Pass the instance to
[`run_acp_stdio`][pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp.run_acp_stdio] (or the lower-level `acp.run_agent`)
to serve it over stdio. When calling `acp.run_agent` yourself, pass `use_unstable_protocol=True`
as `run_acp_stdio` does, or the SDK router rejects `session/close` (still UNSTABLE in the SDK)
with `method_not_found`.
A tool that [requires approval](https://pydantic.dev/docs/ai/tools-toolsets/deferred-tools/)
pauses the run and asks the client via `session/request_permission`; "always allow"/"always
reject" decisions are remembered for the rest of the session. Per-session workspace setup
(the client's `cwd` and MCP servers) is surfaced through the optional `session_config` factory.
`session/close` cancels any in-flight turn and discards the session. `session/load` (with a
`session_store`) and model selection via `session/set_config_option` (with `models`) are
supported when configured; fork, resume, and modes are advertised as unsupported. As with any
`output_type` override, this adapter is incompatible with agents that define output validators.
"""
def __init__(
self,
agent: AbstractAgent[AgentDepsT, OutputDataT],
*,
deps: AgentDepsT = None,
name: str | None = None,
version: str = DEFAULT_VERSION,
session_config: SessionConfigFunc[AgentDepsT] | None = None,
permission_policy: PermissionPolicy | None = None,
prompt_capabilities: schema.PromptCapabilities | None = None,
mcp_capabilities: schema.McpCapabilities | None = None,
tool_presenter: ToolCallPresenter | None = None,
session_store: SessionStore | None = None,
models: Sequence[KnownModelName | str] | Literal['all'] | None = None,
model_resolver: Callable[[str], Model | str] | None = None,
usage_limits: UsageLimits | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Build the adapter.
Args:
agent: The Pydantic AI agent to expose. Its model, tools, and instructions are used as-is.
deps: Dependencies passed to every agent run, equivalent to `Agent.run(..., deps=deps)`.
Used for sessions that `session_config` does not configure (or when it is not given).
name: Name advertised to the client. Defaults to the agent's name, then `'pydantic-ai-agent'`.
version: Version advertised to the client.
session_config: Optional factory called once per session with the client's
[`AcpSession`][pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp.AcpSession] setup (its `cwd`, MCP servers,
and capabilities). It returns an
[`AcpSessionConfig`][pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp.AcpSessionConfig] whose `deps` and
`toolsets` are applied to every run in that session. May be sync or async.
permission_policy: Optional function deciding the scope under which an "always
allow"/"always reject" decision is remembered. Defaults to the exact call (tool
name plus arguments).
prompt_capabilities: Prompt content the agent advertises support for (image, audio,
embedded context). Defaults to text-only; enable what the backing model handles,
e.g. `schema.PromptCapabilities(image=True, embedded_context=True)`.
mcp_capabilities: MCP transports the agent advertises support for, e.g.
`schema.McpCapabilities(http=True, sse=True)`. A spec-following client only sends
HTTP/SSE MCP servers when these are advertised (stdio servers are not gated), so
set this when the `session_config` connects them. Defaults to neither; requires a
`session_config`, since without one MCP servers are rejected at `session/new`.
tool_presenter: Maps a tool call to its rich ACP presentation (`kind`, file
`locations`, and diff `content`). Defaults to
[`default_coding_presenter`][pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp.default_coding_presenter],
which recognizes the `FileSystem`/`Shell` tools by name (a custom tool sharing a
name is also matched). Pass your own presenter (optionally chained ahead of the
default with [`chain_presenters`][pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp.chain_presenters]), or
`lambda _call: None` to disable rich rendering.
session_store: Optional [`SessionStore`][pydantic_ai_harness.experimental.acp.SessionStore] enabling
`session/load`: each committed turn is persisted (model history plus client
transcript) and a stored session can be reopened. Defaults to `None`, advertising
`session/load` as unsupported.
models: Optional models the client may switch between with the stable ACP session
config option `model`. The first is each session's default. A selection applies as
a per-run override (the shared agent is never mutated) and is persisted with the
session. Pass `'all'` to offer every model Pydantic AI knows (its default is then
the first known model, so the user should pick one). Defaults to `None`,
advertising no model config option.
model_resolver: Optional hook mapping an advertised model id to the `Model` (or model
string) used for that run, applied just before each run's per-run override. Lets a
host advertise ids Pydantic AI's `infer_model` does not understand (e.g. OAuth/
subscription models) and supply a pre-built `Model` for them. Returning the id
unchanged falls back to `infer_model`. Defaults to identity.
usage_limits: Optional per-run ceilings (`request_limit`, `tool_calls_limit`, token
limits) applied to every agent run, equivalent to `Agent.run(..., usage_limits=...)`.
A turn that resumes after a tool approval starts a fresh run, so the limits bound
each approval-to-approval segment, not the whole turn. An exceeded limit ends the
turn with a `max_tokens`/`max_turn_requests` stop reason, never a request error.
Defaults to Pydantic AI's own defaults (50 requests per run).
"""
self._agent = agent
self._deps = deps
self._name = name or agent.name or 'pydantic-ai-agent'
self._version = version
self._session_config = session_config
self._permission_policy = permission_policy or default_permission_scope
# Text-only by default, so a client is not invited to send image/audio/resource blocks
# the backing model may not accept.
self._prompt_capabilities = prompt_capabilities or schema.PromptCapabilities()
if mcp_capabilities is not None and session_config is None:
# Advertising HTTP/SSE MCP support would invite server definitions that
# `_build_config` then rejects; fail at construction instead of per session.
raise ValueError('mcp_capabilities requires a session_config that connects the MCP servers')
self._mcp_capabilities = mcp_capabilities or schema.McpCapabilities()
self._tool_presenter = tool_presenter or default_coding_presenter
self._session_store = session_store
self._models: tuple[str, ...] = _all_known_model_names() if models == 'all' else tuple(models) if models else ()
self._model_resolver = model_resolver
self._usage_limits = usage_limits
self._client_capabilities: schema.ClientCapabilities | None = None
self._conn: Client | None = None
# All live sessions, keyed by session id. Each owns its own turn lock (the dispatcher
# delivers requests concurrently), so turns within a session are serialized.
self._sessions: dict[str, SessionState[AgentDepsT]] = {}
def on_connect(self, conn: Client) -> None:
"""Capture the outbound connection used to stream updates and request permission."""
self._conn = conn
async def initialize(
self,
protocol_version: int,
client_capabilities: schema.ClientCapabilities | None = None,
client_info: schema.Implementation | None = None,
**kwargs: object,
) -> schema.InitializeResponse:
"""Negotiate the protocol version and advertise the agent's capabilities."""
self._client_capabilities = client_capabilities
# Echo a supported client version; otherwise answer with the latest version we speak so
# an out-of-range client does not negotiate an unsupported one.
if 1 <= protocol_version <= acp.PROTOCOL_VERSION:
negotiated_version = protocol_version
else:
negotiated_version = acp.PROTOCOL_VERSION
return schema.InitializeResponse(
protocol_version=negotiated_version,
agent_capabilities=schema.AgentCapabilities(
load_session=self._session_store is not None,
prompt_capabilities=self._prompt_capabilities,
mcp_capabilities=self._mcp_capabilities,
session_capabilities=schema.SessionCapabilities(close=schema.SessionCloseCapabilities()),
),
agent_info=schema.Implementation(name=self._name, version=self._version),
)
async def new_session(
self,
cwd: str,
additional_directories: list[str] | None = None,
mcp_servers: McpServers = None,
**kwargs: object,
) -> schema.NewSessionResponse:
"""Start a new session with an empty conversation history.
The session's `cwd` is the workspace the client opened: root the agent's tools at it via
`session_config` (see the package README) so file edits and tool-call locations line up
with that workspace. A request with MCP servers but no `session_config` is rejected (see
`_build_config`).
"""
# The spec requires `cwd` to be absolute, a MUST on the client; neither the SDK router
# nor this adapter re-validates it. `additional_directories` is
# part of the `acp.Agent` interface but not consumed: the capability is not advertised, so
# a conformant client never sends extra roots, and they are not surfaced to `session_config`.
session_id = uuid4().hex
config = await self._build_config(session_id, cwd, mcp_servers)
# The first configured model is the session default; `None` (no models) uses the agent's own.
default_model = self._models[0] if self._models else None
state = SessionState(session_id=session_id, config=config, cwd=cwd, model=default_model)
self._sessions[session_id] = state
# Persist the empty session so the client can reopen it even before its first turn.
await self._persist(state)
return schema.NewSessionResponse(session_id=session_id, config_options=self._model_config_options(state.model))
async def load_session(
self,
cwd: str,
session_id: str,
mcp_servers: McpServers = None,
additional_directories: list[str] | None = None,
**kwargs: object,
) -> schema.LoadSessionResponse | None:
"""Reopen a stored session: restore its model history and replay its transcript to the client.
Only called when a `session_store` was given (`session/load` is otherwise advertised as
unsupported). The run configuration is rebuilt from `cwd`/`mcp_servers` via
`session_config`, as in `new_session`.
Raises:
acp.RequestError: if no session with `session_id` is stored, or the stored session
cannot be read.
"""
if self._session_store is None:
# Advertised off, but the SDK router routes `session/load` regardless; a client
# calling it anyway gets the rejection the advertisement implies.
raise acp.RequestError.method_not_found('session/load')
if self._conn is None: # pragma: no cover - on_connect always runs before load_session
raise RuntimeError('load_session called before on_connect()')
try:
stored = await self._session_store.load(session_id)
except Exception as exc:
# A read or deserialization failure is a server-side durability problem, not a bad
# client request: surface a clear, purpose-built error rather than leaking the store's
# low-level exception (a corrupt payload would otherwise reach the client as raw
# pydantic validation detail).
raise acp.RequestError.internal_error(
{'session_id': session_id, 'reason': 'stored session could not be read'}
) from exc
if stored is None:
raise acp.RequestError.invalid_params(
{'session_id': session_id, 'reason': 'no stored session with this id'}
)
# A client may load a session id that is still open (a reconnecting editor, or a double
# load). Tear down any live turn first so the orphaned turn cannot later persist its stale
# state over the transcript and history we are about to restore.
prior = self._sessions.pop(session_id, None)
if prior is not None:
await self._cancel_active_turn(prior)
config = await self._build_config(session_id, cwd, mcp_servers)
state = SessionState(
session_id=session_id,
config=config,
cwd=cwd,
history=list(stored.messages),
transcript=list(stored.updates),
model=stored.model,
)
self._sessions[session_id] = state
for update in stored.updates:
await self._conn.session_update(session_id=session_id, update=update)
return schema.LoadSessionResponse(config_options=self._model_config_options(state.model))
async def _persist(self, state: SessionState[AgentDepsT]) -> None:
"""Save a session's committed state (history, transcript, selected model), if a store is configured.
A store failure is logged and swallowed rather than failing the operation that triggered the
save: the turn (or session) has already streamed and committed in memory, so a durable-write
error must not surface as a failure for work the user already saw succeed. The session stays
usable and the next successful save catches the store back up.
"""
if self._session_store is None:
return
try:
await self._session_store.save(
state.session_id,
StoredSession(messages=list(state.history), updates=list(state.transcript), model=state.model),
)
except Exception:
_logger.exception('failed to persist ACP session %s; durable state is now behind', state.session_id)
def _model_option(self, current_model_id: str | None) -> schema.SessionConfigOptionSelect | None:
"""The model config option advertised to the client, or `None` when none is configured."""
if current_model_id is None or not self._models:
return None
return schema.SessionConfigOptionSelect(
id=_MODEL_CONFIG_ID,
name='Model',
type='select',
current_value=current_model_id,
options=[schema.SessionConfigSelectOption(value=model, name=model) for model in self._models],
)
def _model_config_options(
self, current_model_id: str | None
) -> list[schema.SessionConfigOptionSelect | schema.SessionConfigOptionBoolean] | None:
"""The full session config option list, or `None` when model switching is not configured."""
option = self._model_option(current_model_id)
return None if option is None else [option]
def session_history(self, session_id: str) -> list[ModelMessage] | None:
"""A snapshot of a resident session's committed model history (what the next turn will send).
Returns a shallow copy: the list is the caller's to keep, but the `ModelMessage` objects are
shared with the live session -- treat them as read-only. `None` when the session is not
resident in this adapter.
"""
state = self._sessions.get(session_id)
return list(state.history) if state is not None else None
def session_model_option(self, session_id: str) -> schema.SessionConfigOptionSelect | None:
"""The model config option for a resident session -- its option set + current selection.
The public counterpart to the `config_options` entry `new_session`/`load_session` return,
for callers that re-surface model selection on a later interaction (e.g. an attach/resume
reply) without re-creating or reloading the session. `None` when the session is unknown to
this adapter or no switch-set was configured.
"""
state = self._sessions.get(session_id)
return self._model_option(state.model) if state is not None else None
async def _build_config(self, session_id: str, cwd: str, mcp_servers: McpServers) -> AcpSessionConfig[AgentDepsT]:
"""Derive a session's run configuration, calling the `session_config` factory if present.
Raises:
acp.RequestError: if the client provides MCP servers but no `session_config` is
installed to connect them.
"""
if self._session_config is None:
if mcp_servers:
raise acp.RequestError.invalid_params(
{
'reason': 'this agent does not connect MCP servers; provide a session_config '
'that turns mcp_servers into toolsets to use them',
'mcp_server_count': len(mcp_servers),
}
)
return AcpSessionConfig(deps=self._deps)
if self._conn is None: # pragma: no cover - on_connect always runs before session setup
raise RuntimeError('_build_config called before on_connect()')
session = AcpSession(
cwd=cwd,
mcp_servers=mcp_servers or [],
client_capabilities=self._client_capabilities,
client=self._conn,
session_id=session_id,
)
result = self._session_config(session)
return await result if isawaitable(result) else result
async def prompt(
self,
session_id: str,
prompt: list[PromptContentBlock],
**kwargs: object,
) -> schema.PromptResponse:
"""Run one user turn, streaming the agent's output to the client.
Turns for a session are serialized. The turn runs in a cancellable task so a concurrent
`session/cancel` (or a cancelled permission dialog) stops it promptly with a `cancelled`
stop reason; a cancelled turn's prompt and partial output are not committed to the
session history.
"""
if self._conn is None: # pragma: no cover - on_connect always runs first in practice
raise RuntimeError('prompt() called before on_connect()')
state = self._sessions.get(session_id)
if state is None:
raise acp.RequestError.invalid_params({'session_id': session_id})
user_content = prompt_blocks_to_user_content(prompt)
async with state.lock:
if self._sessions.get(session_id) is not state:
# The session was closed or reloaded while this prompt waited its turn on the
# lock. Running now would resurrect the discarded state: `cancel` could no longer
# reach the turn, and its commit would persist the orphaned history over the
# live session.
raise acp.RequestError.invalid_params(
{'session_id': session_id, 'reason': 'session was closed while the prompt was queued'}
)
state.cancel_requested = False
turn = asyncio.ensure_future(self._run_turn(state, prompt, user_content))
state.active_turn = turn
try:
# Shielded so this coroutine's *own* cancellation (connection teardown) surfaces
# here instead of propagating into the turn: with a bare `await turn` the two are
# indistinguishable, and answering a request whose handler the connection already
# cancelled would deadlock its shutdown (the response future is never resolved).
return await asyncio.shield(turn)
except _TurnCancelled:
return schema.PromptResponse(stop_reason='cancelled')
except asyncio.CancelledError:
# `turn.done()` cannot fully prove the cancellation came from the turn: in the one
# tick between the turn completing and this coroutine resuming, a teardown cancel
# aimed at *this* handler is indistinguishable on 3.10 (3.11's `Task.cancelling()`
# would settle it). Accepted residual; every wider window is covered below.
if turn.done() and state.cancel_requested:
return schema.PromptResponse(stop_reason='cancelled')
if state.cancel_requested:
# `cancel()` already delivered cancellation to the turn. Do not inject a second
# one while Pydantic AI's stream context is closing, or its internal event stream
# can be interrupted before its receive side closes.
with contextlib.suppress(asyncio.CancelledError, _TurnCancelled):
await asyncio.shield(turn)
raise
# The prompt coroutine itself was cancelled (e.g. connection teardown): stop the
# child turn before propagating, so it is not left running on a closing connection.
turn.cancel()
with contextlib.suppress(asyncio.CancelledError, _TurnCancelled):
await turn
raise
finally:
state.active_turn = None
state.cancel_requested = False
async def cancel(self, session_id: str, **kwargs: object) -> None:
"""Cancel the in-flight turn for a session, if any."""
state = self._sessions.get(session_id)
if state is None:
return
state.cancel_requested = True
if state.active_turn is not None and not state.active_turn.done():
state.active_turn.cancel()
async def close_session(self, session_id: str, **kwargs: object) -> schema.CloseSessionResponse | None:
"""Cancel any in-flight turn and discard all state for the session.
Closing an unknown (or already-closed) session is a no-op.
"""
state = self._sessions.pop(session_id, None)
if state is not None:
await self._cancel_active_turn(state)
return schema.CloseSessionResponse()
async def _cancel_active_turn(self, state: SessionState[AgentDepsT]) -> None:
"""End a session's in-flight turn (if any) with a `cancelled` stop reason and await its unwind.
Awaiting the turn keeps the caller from racing the turn's teardown -- the prompt has fully
returned `cancelled` and released the session's resources before this returns.
"""
turn = state.active_turn
if turn is not None and not turn.done():
state.cancel_requested = True
turn.cancel()
try:
# Shielded for the same reason as in `prompt`: only the turn's own unwind may be
# swallowed here, never this coroutine's cancellation (see the comment there).
await asyncio.shield(turn)
except (asyncio.CancelledError, _TurnCancelled):
# As in `prompt`, `turn.done()` is a heuristic with a one-tick residual: a
# teardown cancel landing between the turn completing and this resuming is
# swallowed here on 3.10. Accepted.
if not turn.done():
raise
async def _run_turn(
self,
state: SessionState[AgentDepsT],
prompt: list[PromptContentBlock],
user_content: list[UserContent],
) -> schema.PromptResponse:
"""Drive the agent (resuming across tool-approval pauses), stream updates, and build the response.
The response carries the ACP stop reason mapped from the final model response, plus the
turn's total token usage (summed across every run pass, one per approval pause). A turn
ended by a usage limit rolls back like a cancellation, so its response omits usage while
still answering with the limit's `max_tokens`/`max_turn_requests` stop reason.
"""
conn = self._conn
assert conn is not None
history = state.history
config = state.config
usage = RunUsage()
stop_reason: schema.StopReason = 'end_turn'
deferred_results: DeferredToolResults | None = None
run_input: list[UserContent] | None = user_content
output_type = [self._agent.output_type, DeferredToolRequests]
turn = _TurnState(
conn=conn, session_id=state.session_id, cwd=state.cwd, approval_names=self._approval_tool_names(config)
)
# Recorded for replay only, never sent live: the client renders its own prompt during
# the turn, but `session/load` must rebuild the user side of the conversation too.
# Going through `turn.updates` keeps the cancel semantics: a rolled-back turn does not
# persist its user message either.
turn.updates.extend(acp.update_user_message(block) for block in prompt)
try:
while True:
result = None
async with self._agent.run_stream_events(
run_input,
message_history=history,
deferred_tool_results=deferred_results,
output_type=output_type,
deps=config.deps,
toolsets=config.toolsets,
# Per-run override for the client's model config choice; `None` uses the
# agent's own model, never mutating the shared agent. A `model_resolver` (if
# given) maps the advertised id to a pre-built `Model` for ids `infer_model`
# can't parse.
model=self._resolve_run_model(state.model),
usage_limits=self._usage_limits,
) as stream:
event: AgentStreamEvent | AgentRunResultEvent[object]
async for event in stream:
if isinstance(event, AgentRunResultEvent):
result = event.result
else:
await self._emit_event(turn, event)
assert result is not None, 'run_stream_events always yields a final result event'
history = result.all_messages()
usage += result.usage # pydantic-ai 2.0: `usage` is a property, not a method
output = result.output
if isinstance(output, DeferredToolRequests):
if not output.approvals and not output.calls: # pragma: no cover
break # defensive: the run never yields an empty DeferredToolRequests
deferred_results = await self._resolve_approvals(turn, state, output)
run_input = None
continue
if output is not None and not isinstance(output, str):
# Structured output isn't streamed as text parts, so deliver it as a final message.
# (`str` output already streamed via text deltas; `None` has nothing to show.)
await self._emit_text(turn, json.dumps(jsonable(output)), thought=False)
stop_reason = _finish_reason_to_stop_reason(result.response.finish_reason)
break
except (asyncio.CancelledError, _TurnCancelled):
# The turn is ending without finishing its tool calls; close out any still shown as
# pending/in_progress so the client stops rendering them as running. Shielded because an
# asyncio cancellation would otherwise abort the sends, and live-only: a cancelled turn
# never commits its transcript.
with anyio.CancelScope(shield=True):
await self._fail_outstanding_tool_calls(turn)
raise
except UsageLimitExceeded as exc:
# ACP models a turn ending at a limit as a normal stop reason, not a request error.
# The raising run's partial messages are not retrievable, so nothing is committed --
# the turn rolls back to the prior state, like a cancellation, and the response must
# not report uncommitted usage.
await self._fail_outstanding_tool_calls(turn)
return schema.PromptResponse(stop_reason=_usage_limit_stop_reason(exc))
except Exception:
# The turn is failing with the error the client receives as the prompt's response;
# close out its announced tool calls so they are not left rendering as running.
await self._fail_outstanding_tool_calls(turn)
raise
state.history = history
# Commit and persist this turn's updates alongside the history; a cancelled turn never
# reaches here, so only committed turns are persisted.
if self._session_store is not None:
state.transcript.extend(turn.updates)
try:
await self._persist(state)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
# The turn is already committed: a cancel landing inside the store's save came
# too late to roll anything back. The spec still requires the prompt to answer
# `cancelled`, so that stop reason is reported alongside committed usage. The
# interrupted save is the same benign failure `_persist` swallows; the next
# successful save catches the store up.
_logger.warning(
'persisting ACP session %s was cancelled; durable state is now behind', state.session_id
)
stop_reason = 'cancelled'
return schema.PromptResponse(stop_reason=stop_reason, usage=_to_acp_usage(usage))
async def _fail_outstanding_tool_calls(self, turn: _TurnState) -> None:
"""Drive every announced-but-unfinished tool call to a terminal `failed` status.
Called when a turn is cancelled, so a client does not keep rendering a `pending`/`in_progress`
tool call as running. Sent directly (not recorded for the transcript) and best-effort: the
connection may already be going away.
"""
for tool_call_id in turn.started - turn.resulted:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await turn.conn.session_update(
session_id=turn.session_id,
update=acp.update_tool_call(tool_call_id=tool_call_id, status='failed'),
)
async def _send_update(self, turn: _TurnState, update: SessionUpdate) -> None:
"""Send one `session/update` to the client, recording it for the transcript."""
turn.updates.append(update)
await turn.conn.session_update(session_id=turn.session_id, update=update)
async def _emit_text(self, turn: _TurnState, text: str, *, thought: bool) -> None:
"""Stream text to the client as one or more chunked `session/update` notifications."""
for chunk in chunk_text(text):
update = acp.update_agent_thought_text(chunk) if thought else acp.update_agent_message_text(chunk)
await self._send_update(turn, update)
def _tool_call_fields(
self, call: ToolCallPart, cwd: str, *, default_kind: schema.ToolKind | None
) -> _ToolCallFields:
"""Derive the ACP tool-call fields shared by the start and permission paths via the presenter.
Falls back to the tool name for the title, and to `default_kind` when the presenter
offers no `kind`.
"""
presentation = self._tool_presenter(call)
presentation = absolutize(presentation, cwd) if presentation is not None else ToolCallPresentation()
return _ToolCallFields(
title=presentation.title or call.tool_name,
kind=presentation.kind or default_kind,
content=list(presentation.content) or None,
locations=list(presentation.locations) or None,
)
async def _emit_event(self, turn: _TurnState, event: AgentStreamEvent) -> None:
"""Translate a single Pydantic AI stream event into an ACP `session/update`."""
if isinstance(event, PartStartEvent):
part = event.part
if isinstance(part, TextPart) and part.content:
await self._emit_text(turn, part.content, thought=False)
elif isinstance(part, ThinkingPart) and part.content:
await self._emit_text(turn, part.content, thought=True)
elif isinstance(event, PartDeltaEvent):
delta = event.delta
if isinstance(delta, TextPartDelta) and delta.content_delta:
await self._emit_text(turn, delta.content_delta, thought=False)
elif isinstance(delta, ThinkingPartDelta) and delta.content_delta:
await self._emit_text(turn, delta.content_delta, thought=True)
elif isinstance(event, FunctionToolCallEvent):
call = event.part
if call.tool_call_id in turn.started:
return # the model re-emits the call event when resuming after approval
turn.started.add(call.tool_call_id)
fields = self._tool_call_fields(call, turn.cwd, default_kind=None)
# A call awaiting approval is not running yet: it starts `pending` and
# `_resolve_approvals` promotes it once approved. Any other call is already executing.
status: schema.ToolCallStatus = 'pending' if call.tool_name in turn.approval_names else 'in_progress'
await self._send_update(
turn,
acp.start_tool_call(
tool_call_id=call.tool_call_id,
title=fields.title,
kind=fields.kind,
status=status,
content=fields.content,
locations=fields.locations,
raw_input=bounded_jsonable(call.args),
),
)
elif isinstance(event, FunctionToolResultEvent):
part = event.part
if isinstance(part, RetryPromptPart):
status, raw_output = 'failed', part.model_response()
elif part.tool_call_id in turn.denied:
status, raw_output = 'failed', part.content
else:
status, raw_output = 'completed', part.content
turn.resulted.add(part.tool_call_id)
await self._send_update(
turn,
acp.update_tool_call(
tool_call_id=part.tool_call_id,
status=status,
raw_output=bounded_jsonable(raw_output),
),
)
async def _resolve_approvals(
self, turn: _TurnState, state: SessionState[AgentDepsT], requests: DeferredToolRequests
) -> DeferredToolResults:
"""Ask the client to approve each pending tool call and collect the decisions.
Records rejected call IDs in `turn.denied` so the eventual result event is reported as failed.
Raises:
_TurnCancelled: if the client cancels a permission request.
acp.RequestError: if the agent requests external tool execution, which is unsupported.
"""
if requests.calls:
names = sorted({call.tool_name for call in requests.calls})
raise acp.RequestError.internal_error(
{'reason': 'external tool execution is not supported by the ACP adapter', 'tools': names}
)
results = DeferredToolResults()
for call in requests.approvals:
# `args_as_dict()` canonicalizes the call's arguments to a dict: a model may deliver them
# as a JSON string (the OpenAI default, and how streamed calls accumulate), and a raw
# string would make the scope key sensitive to key order, defeating a remembered "always"
# decision for what is the same logical call.
scope = self._permission_policy(
ToolCallPermission(tool_name=call.tool_name, tool_call_id=call.tool_call_id, args=call.args_as_dict())
)
if scope in state.always_allow:
results.approvals[call.tool_call_id] = True
await self._mark_running(turn, call.tool_call_id)
continue
if scope in state.always_reject:
results.approvals[call.tool_call_id] = ToolDenied('Rejected by the client.')
turn.denied.add(call.tool_call_id)
continue
# Only an approved call is promoted to `in_progress`; a rejected one stays `pending`
# until its `failed` result, never shown as running.
decision = await self._request_permission(turn, state, call, scope)
results.approvals[call.tool_call_id] = decision
if isinstance(decision, ToolDenied):
turn.denied.add(call.tool_call_id)
else:
await self._mark_running(turn, call.tool_call_id)
return results
async def _mark_running(self, turn: _TurnState, tool_call_id: str) -> None:
"""Promote an approved tool call from `pending` to `in_progress`, just before it executes."""
await self._send_update(turn, acp.update_tool_call(tool_call_id=tool_call_id, status='in_progress'))
def _approval_tool_names(self, config: AcpSessionConfig[AgentDepsT]) -> frozenset[str]:
"""Names of the tools that pause for the client's approval, announced `pending` in `_emit_event`.
Only `FunctionToolset`-held tools expose `requires_approval` without a live run context;
tools from other toolset types are treated as not requiring approval.
"""
toolsets: list[AbstractToolset[AgentDepsT]] = [*self._agent.toolsets, *(config.toolsets or [])]
names: set[str] = set()
for toolset in toolsets:
if isinstance(toolset, FunctionToolset):
names.update(name for name, tool in toolset.tools.items() if tool.requires_approval)
return frozenset(names)
async def _request_permission(
self, turn: _TurnState, state: SessionState[AgentDepsT], call: ToolCallPart, scope: Hashable
) -> bool | ToolDenied:
"""Ask the client to approve a single tool call, remembering "always" decisions by `scope`."""
fields = self._tool_call_fields(call, turn.cwd, default_kind='execute')
response = await turn.conn.request_permission(
session_id=turn.session_id,
tool_call=schema.ToolCallUpdate(
tool_call_id=call.tool_call_id,
title=fields.title,
kind=fields.kind,
status='pending',
content=fields.content,
locations=fields.locations,
raw_input=bounded_jsonable(call.args),
),
options=[
schema.PermissionOption(kind='allow_once', name='Allow', option_id='allow_once'),
schema.PermissionOption(kind='allow_always', name='Always allow', option_id='allow_always'),
schema.PermissionOption(kind='reject_once', name='Reject', option_id='reject_once'),
schema.PermissionOption(kind='reject_always', name='Always reject', option_id='reject_always'),
],
)
outcome = response.outcome
if isinstance(outcome, schema.DeniedOutcome):
# ACP signals a cancelled turn via a "cancelled" permission outcome.
raise _TurnCancelled
if outcome.option_id == 'allow_always':
state.always_allow.add(scope)
elif outcome.option_id == 'reject_always':
state.always_reject.add(scope)
if outcome.option_id in ('allow_once', 'allow_always'):
return True
return ToolDenied('Rejected by the client.')
# --- Optional ACP methods not supported by this adapter ------------------------------
# The capabilities for these are advertised as off in `initialize`, but the SDK router still
# routes the methods here (`acp.Agent` is a Protocol whose inherited stub bodies would answer
# success-`null`), so these raises are what a client calling them anyway actually receives.
async def authenticate(self, method_id: str, **kwargs: object) -> schema.AuthenticateResponse | None:
"""No authentication is required, so this is a no-op."""
return None
async def list_sessions(
self,
cwd: str | None = None,
cursor: str | None = None,
**kwargs: object,
) -> schema.ListSessionsResponse:
raise acp.RequestError.method_not_found('session/list')
def _resolve_run_model(self, model_id: str | None) -> Model | str | None:
"""Map an advertised model id to the per-run override, applying `model_resolver` if set.
`None` (no advertised models) is passed through so the run uses the agent's own model.
"""
if model_id is None or self._model_resolver is None:
return model_id
return self._model_resolver(model_id)
async def set_session_mode(
self, session_id: str, mode_id: str, **kwargs: object
) -> schema.SetSessionModeResponse | None:
raise acp.RequestError.method_not_found('session/set_mode')
async def set_config_option(
self, config_id: str, session_id: str, value: str | bool, **kwargs: object
) -> schema.SetSessionConfigOptionResponse | None:
"""Switch the session's model through ACP's stable session config option surface."""
state = self._sessions.get(session_id)
if state is None:
raise acp.RequestError.invalid_params({'session_id': session_id})
if config_id != _MODEL_CONFIG_ID:
raise acp.RequestError.invalid_params({'config_id': config_id, 'reason': 'unknown config option'})
if not isinstance(value, str) or value not in self._models:
raise acp.RequestError.invalid_params({'model_id': value, 'reason': 'not an advertised model'})
state.model = value
await self._persist(state)
options = self._model_config_options(state.model)
assert options is not None
return schema.SetSessionConfigOptionResponse(config_options=options)
async def fork_session(
self,
session_id: str,
cwd: str,
additional_directories: list[str] | None = None,
mcp_servers: McpServers = None,
**kwargs: object,
) -> schema.ForkSessionResponse:
raise acp.RequestError.method_not_found('session/fork')
async def resume_session(
self,
session_id: str,
cwd: str,
additional_directories: list[str] | None = None,
mcp_servers: McpServers = None,
**kwargs: object,
) -> schema.ResumeSessionResponse:
raise acp.RequestError.method_not_found('session/resume')
async def ext_method(self, method: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
raise acp.RequestError.method_not_found(method)
async def ext_notification(self, method: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> None:
return None