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feat(auth): release-validation pass for 2.0-rc — 12 blockers + simplify follow-ups (#2008)
* feat(auth): introduce backend auth module
Port RFC-001 authentication core from PR #1728:
- JWT token handling (create_access_token, decode_token, TokenPayload)
- Password hashing (bcrypt) with verify_password
- SQLite UserRepository with base interface
- Provider Factory pattern (LocalAuthProvider)
- CLI reset_admin tool
- Auth-specific errors (AuthErrorCode, TokenError, AuthErrorResponse)
Deps:
- bcrypt>=4.0.0
- pyjwt>=2.9.0
- email-validator>=2.0.0
- backend/uv.toml pins public PyPI index
Tests: 12 pure unit tests (test_auth_config.py, test_auth_errors.py).
Scope note: authz.py, test_auth.py, and test_auth_type_system.py are
deferred to commit 2 because they depend on middleware and deps wiring
that is not yet in place. Commit 1 stays "pure new files only" as the
spec mandates.
* feat(auth): wire auth end-to-end (middleware + frontend replacement)
Backend:
- Port auth_middleware, csrf_middleware, langgraph_auth, routers/auth
- Port authz decorator (owner_filter_key defaults to 'owner_id')
- Merge app.py: register AuthMiddleware + CSRFMiddleware + CORS, add
_ensure_admin_user lifespan hook, _migrate_orphaned_threads helper,
register auth router
- Merge deps.py: add get_local_provider, get_current_user_from_request,
get_optional_user_from_request; keep get_current_user as thin str|None
adapter for feedback router
- langgraph.json: add auth path pointing to langgraph_auth.py:auth
- Rename metadata['user_id'] -> metadata['owner_id'] in langgraph_auth
(both metadata write and LangGraph filter dict) + test fixtures
Frontend:
- Delete better-auth library and api catch-all route
- Remove better-auth npm dependency and env vars (BETTER_AUTH_SECRET,
BETTER_AUTH_GITHUB_*) from env.js
- Port frontend/src/core/auth/* (AuthProvider, gateway-config,
proxy-policy, server-side getServerSideUser, types)
- Port frontend/src/core/api/fetcher.ts
- Port (auth)/layout, (auth)/login, (auth)/setup pages
- Rewrite workspace/layout.tsx as server component that calls
getServerSideUser and wraps in AuthProvider
- Port workspace/workspace-content.tsx for the client-side sidebar logic
Tests:
- Port 5 auth test files (test_auth, test_auth_middleware,
test_auth_type_system, test_ensure_admin, test_langgraph_auth)
- 176 auth tests PASS
After this commit: login/logout/registration flow works, but persistence
layer does not yet filter by owner_id. Commit 4 closes that gap.
* feat(auth): account settings page + i18n
- Port account-settings-page.tsx (change password, change email, logout)
- Wire into settings-dialog.tsx as new "account" section with UserIcon,
rendered first in the section list
- Add i18n keys:
- en-US/zh-CN: settings.sections.account ("Account" / "账号")
- en-US/zh-CN: button.logout ("Log out" / "退出登录")
- types.ts: matching type declarations
* feat(auth): enforce owner_id across 2.0-rc persistence layer
Add request-scoped contextvar-based owner filtering to threads_meta,
runs, run_events, and feedback repositories. Router code is unchanged
— isolation is enforced at the storage layer so that any caller that
forgets to pass owner_id still gets filtered results, and new routes
cannot accidentally leak data.
Core infrastructure
-------------------
- deerflow/runtime/user_context.py (new):
- ContextVar[CurrentUser | None] with default None
- runtime_checkable CurrentUser Protocol (structural subtype with .id)
- set/reset/get/require helpers
- AUTO sentinel + resolve_owner_id(value, method_name) for sentinel
three-state resolution: AUTO reads contextvar, explicit str
overrides, explicit None bypasses the filter (for migration/CLI)
Repository changes
------------------
- ThreadMetaRepository: create/get/search/update_*/delete gain
owner_id=AUTO kwarg; read paths filter by owner, writes stamp it,
mutations check ownership before applying
- RunRepository: put/get/list_by_thread/delete gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg
- FeedbackRepository: create/get/list_by_run/list_by_thread/delete
gain owner_id=AUTO kwarg
- DbRunEventStore: list_messages/list_events/list_messages_by_run/
count_messages/delete_by_thread/delete_by_run gain owner_id=AUTO
kwarg. Write paths (put/put_batch) read contextvar softly: when a
request-scoped user is available, owner_id is stamped; background
worker writes without a user context pass None which is valid
(orphan row to be bound by migration)
Schema
------
- persistence/models/run_event.py: RunEventRow.owner_id = Mapped[
str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True, index=True)
- No alembic migration needed: 2.0 ships fresh, Base.metadata.create_all
picks up the new column automatically
Middleware
----------
- auth_middleware.py: after cookie check, call get_optional_user_from_
request to load the real User, stamp it into request.state.user AND
the contextvar via set_current_user, reset in a try/finally. Public
paths and unauthenticated requests continue without contextvar, and
@require_auth handles the strict 401 path
Test infrastructure
-------------------
- tests/conftest.py: @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) _auto_user_context
sets a default SimpleNamespace(id="test-user-autouse") on every test
unless marked @pytest.mark.no_auto_user. Keeps existing 20+
persistence tests passing without modification
- pyproject.toml [tool.pytest.ini_options]: register no_auto_user
marker so pytest does not emit warnings for opt-out tests
- tests/test_user_context.py: 6 tests covering three-state semantics,
Protocol duck typing, and require/optional APIs
- tests/test_thread_meta_repo.py: one test updated to pass owner_id=
None explicitly where it was previously relying on the old default
Test results
------------
- test_user_context.py: 6 passed
- test_auth*.py + test_langgraph_auth.py + test_ensure_admin.py: 127
- test_run_event_store / test_run_repository / test_thread_meta_repo
/ test_feedback: 92 passed
- Full backend suite: 1905 passed, 2 failed (both @requires_llm flaky
integration tests unrelated to auth), 1 skipped
* feat(auth): extend orphan migration to 2.0-rc persistence tables
_ensure_admin_user now runs a three-step pipeline on every boot:
Step 1 (fatal): admin user exists / is created / password is reset
Step 2 (non-fatal): LangGraph store orphan threads → admin
Step 3 (non-fatal): SQL persistence tables → admin
- threads_meta
- runs
- run_events
- feedback
Each step is idempotent. The fatal/non-fatal split mirrors PR #1728's
original philosophy: admin creation failure blocks startup (the system
is unusable without an admin), whereas migration failures log a warning
and let the service proceed (a partial migration is recoverable; a
missing admin is not).
Key helpers
-----------
- _iter_store_items(store, namespace, *, page_size=500):
async generator that cursor-paginates across LangGraph store pages.
Fixes PR #1728's hardcoded limit=1000 bug that would silently lose
orphans beyond the first page.
- _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_user_id):
Rewritten to use _iter_store_items. Returns the migrated count so the
caller can log it; raises only on unhandled exceptions.
- _migrate_orphan_sql_tables(admin_user_id):
Imports the 4 ORM models lazily, grabs the shared session factory,
runs one UPDATE per table in a single transaction, commits once.
No-op when no persistence backend is configured (in-memory dev).
Tests: test_ensure_admin.py (8 passed)
* test(auth): port AUTH test plan docs + lint/format pass
- Port backend/docs/AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md and AUTH_UPGRADE.md from PR #1728
- Rename metadata.user_id → metadata.owner_id in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md
(4 occurrences from the original PR doc)
- ruff auto-fix UP037 in sentinel type annotations: drop quotes around
"str | None | _AutoSentinel" now that from __future__ import
annotations makes them implicit string forms
- ruff format: 2 files (app/gateway/app.py, runtime/user_context.py)
Note on test coverage additions:
- conftest.py autouse fixture was already added in commit 4 (had to
be co-located with the repository changes to keep pre-existing
persistence tests passing)
- cross-user isolation E2E tests (test_owner_isolation.py) deferred
— enforcement is already proven by the 98-test repository suite
via the autouse fixture + explicit _AUTO sentinel exercises
- New test cases (TC-API-17..20, TC-ATK-13, TC-MIG-01..07) listed
in AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md are deferred to a follow-up PR — they are
manual-QA test cases rather than pytest code, and the spec-level
coverage is already met by test_user_context.py + the 98-test
repository suite.
Final test results:
- Auth suite (test_auth*, test_langgraph_auth, test_ensure_admin,
test_user_context): 186 passed
- Persistence suite (test_run_event_store, test_run_repository,
test_thread_meta_repo, test_feedback): 98 passed
- Lint: ruff check + ruff format both clean
* test(auth): add cross-user isolation test suite
10 tests exercising the storage-layer owner filter by manually
switching the user_context contextvar between two users. Verifies
the safety invariant:
After a repository write with owner_id=A, a subsequent read with
owner_id=B must not return the row, and vice versa.
Covers all 4 tables that own user-scoped data:
TC-API-17 threads_meta — read, search, update, delete cross-user
TC-API-18 runs — get, list_by_thread, delete cross-user
TC-API-19 run_events — list_messages, list_events, count_messages,
delete_by_thread (CRITICAL: raw conversation
content leak vector)
TC-API-20 feedback — get, list_by_run, delete cross-user
Plus two meta-tests verifying the sentinel pattern itself:
- AUTO + unset contextvar raises RuntimeError
- explicit owner_id=None bypasses the filter (migration escape hatch)
Architecture note
-----------------
These tests bypass the HTTP layer by design. The full chain
(cookie → middleware → contextvar → repository) is covered piecewise:
- test_auth_middleware.py: middleware sets contextvar from cookies
- test_owner_isolation.py: repositories enforce isolation when
contextvar is set to different users
Together they prove the end-to-end safety property without the
ceremony of spinning up a full TestClient + in-memory DB for every
router endpoint.
Tests pass: 231 (full auth + persistence + isolation suite)
Lint: clean
* refactor(auth): migrate user repository to SQLAlchemy ORM
Move the users table into the shared persistence engine so auth
matches the pattern of threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback —
one engine, one session factory, one schema init codepath.
New files
---------
- persistence/user/__init__.py, persistence/user/model.py: UserRow
ORM class with partial unique index on (oauth_provider, oauth_id)
- Registered in persistence/models/__init__.py so
Base.metadata.create_all() picks it up
Modified
--------
- auth/repositories/sqlite.py: rewritten as async SQLAlchemy,
identical constructor pattern to the other four repositories
(def __init__(self, session_factory) + self._sf = session_factory)
- auth/config.py: drop users_db_path field — storage is configured
through config.database like every other table
- deps.py/get_local_provider: construct SQLiteUserRepository with
the shared session factory, fail fast if engine is not initialised
- tests/test_auth.py: rewrite test_sqlite_round_trip_new_fields to
use the shared engine (init_engine + close_engine in a tempdir)
- tests/test_auth_type_system.py: add per-test autouse fixture that
spins up a scratch engine and resets deps._cached_* singletons
* refactor(auth): remove SQL orphan migration (unused in supported scenarios)
The _migrate_orphan_sql_tables helper existed to bind NULL owner_id
rows in threads_meta, runs, run_events, and feedback to the admin on
first boot. But in every supported upgrade path, it's a no-op:
1. Fresh install: create_all builds fresh tables, no legacy rows
2. No-auth → with-auth (no existing persistence DB): persistence
tables are created fresh by create_all, no legacy rows
3. No-auth → with-auth (has existing persistence DB from #1930):
NOT a supported upgrade path — "有 DB 到有 DB" schema evolution
is out of scope; users wipe DB or run manual ALTER
So the SQL orphan migration never has anything to do in the
supported matrix. Delete the function, simplify _ensure_admin_user
from a 3-step pipeline to a 2-step one (admin creation + LangGraph
store orphan migration only).
LangGraph store orphan migration stays: it serves the real
"no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path where a user's existing LangGraph
thread metadata has no owner_id field and needs to be stamped with
the newly-created admin's id.
Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation)
Lint: clean
* security(auth): write initial admin password to 0600 file instead of logs
CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data flagged 3 call sites that
logged the auto-generated admin password to stdout via logger.info().
Production log aggregators (ELK/Splunk/etc) would have captured those
cleartext secrets. Replace with a shared helper that writes to
.deer-flow/admin_initial_credentials.txt with mode 0600, and log only
the path.
New file
--------
- app/gateway/auth/credential_file.py: write_initial_credentials()
helper. Takes email, password, and a "initial"/"reset" label.
Creates .deer-flow/ if missing, writes a header comment plus the
email+password, chmods 0o600, returns the absolute Path.
Modified
--------
- app/gateway/app.py: both _ensure_admin_user paths (fresh creation
+ needs_setup password reset) now write to file and log the path
- app/gateway/auth/reset_admin.py: rewritten to use the shared ORM
repo (SQLiteUserRepository with session_factory) and the
credential_file helper. The previous implementation was broken
after the earlier ORM refactor — it still imported _get_users_conn
and constructed SQLiteUserRepository() without a session factory.
No tests changed — the three password-log sites are all exercised
via existing test_ensure_admin.py which checks that startup
succeeds, not that a specific string appears in logs.
CodeQL alerts 272, 283, 284: all resolved.
* security(auth): strict JWT validation in middleware (fix junk cookie bypass)
AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8 expects junk cookies to be rejected with
401. The previous middleware behaviour was "presence-only": check
that some access_token cookie exists, then pass through. In
combination with my Task-12 decision to skip @require_auth
decorators on routes, this created a gap where a request with any
cookie-shaped string (e.g. access_token=not-a-jwt) would bypass
authentication on routes that do not touch the repository
(/api/models, /api/mcp/config, /api/memory, /api/skills, …).
Fix: middleware now calls get_current_user_from_request() strictly
and catches the resulting HTTPException to render a 401 with the
proper fine-grained error code (token_invalid, token_expired,
user_not_found, …). On success it stamps request.state.user and
the contextvar so repository-layer owner filters work downstream.
The 4 old "_with_cookie_passes" tests in test_auth_middleware.py
were written for the presence-only behaviour; they asserted that
a junk cookie would make the handler return 200. They are renamed
to "_with_junk_cookie_rejected" and their assertions flipped to
401. The negative path (no cookie → 401 not_authenticated)
is unchanged.
Verified:
no cookie → 401 not_authenticated
junk cookie → 401 token_invalid (the fixed bug)
expired cookie → 401 token_expired
Tests: 284 passed (auth + persistence + isolation)
Lint: clean
* security(auth): wire @require_permission(owner_check=True) on isolation routes
Apply the require_permission decorator to all 28 routes that take a
{thread_id} path parameter. Combined with the strict middleware
(previous commit), this gives the double-layer protection that
AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.9 documents:
Layer 1 (AuthMiddleware): cookie + JWT validation, rejects junk
cookies and stamps request.state.user
Layer 2 (@require_permission with owner_check=True): per-resource
ownership verification via
ThreadMetaStore.check_access — returns
404 if a different user owns the thread
The decorator's owner_check branch is rewritten to use the SQL
thread_meta_repo (the 2.0-rc persistence layer) instead of the
LangGraph store path that PR #1728 used (_store_get / get_store
in routers/threads.py). The inject_record convenience is dropped
— no caller in 2.0 needs the LangGraph blob, and the SQL repo has
a different shape.
Routes decorated (28 total):
- threads.py: delete, patch, get, get-state, post-state, post-history
- thread_runs.py: post-runs, post-runs-stream, post-runs-wait,
list_runs, get_run, cancel_run, join_run, stream_existing_run,
list_thread_messages, list_run_messages, list_run_events,
thread_token_usage
- feedback.py: create, list, stats, delete
- uploads.py: upload (added Request param), list, delete
- artifacts.py: get_artifact
- suggestions.py: generate (renamed body parameter to avoid
conflict with FastAPI Request)
Test fixes:
- test_suggestions_router.py: bypass the decorator via __wrapped__
(the unit tests cover parsing logic, not auth — no point spinning
up a thread_meta_repo just to test JSON unwrapping)
- test_auth_middleware.py 4 fake-cookie tests: already updated in
the previous commit (745bf432)
Tests: 293 passed (auth + persistence + isolation + suggestions)
Lint: clean
* security(auth): defense-in-depth fixes from release validation pass
Eight findings caught while running the AUTH_TEST_PLAN end-to-end against
the deployed sg_dev stack. Each is a pre-condition for shipping
release/2.0-rc that the previous PRs missed.
Backend hardening
- routers/auth.py: rate limiter X-Real-IP now requires AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES
whitelist (CIDR/IP allowlist). Without nginx in front, the previous code
honored arbitrary X-Real-IP, letting an attacker rotate the header to
fully bypass the per-IP login lockout.
- routers/auth.py: 36-entry common-password blocklist via Pydantic
field_validator on RegisterRequest + ChangePasswordRequest. The shared
_validate_strong_password helper keeps the constraint in one place.
- routers/threads.py: ThreadCreateRequest + ThreadPatchRequest strip
server-reserved metadata keys (owner_id, user_id) via Pydantic
field_validator so a forged value can never round-trip back to other
clients reading the same thread. The actual ownership invariant stays
on the threads_meta row; this closes the metadata-blob echo gap.
- authz.py + thread_meta/sql.py: require_permission gains a require_existing
flag plumbed through check_access(require_existing=True). Destructive
routes (DELETE/PATCH/state-update/runs/feedback) now treat a missing
thread_meta row as 404 instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow",
closing the cross-user delete-idempotence gap where any user could
successfully DELETE another user's deleted thread.
- repositories/sqlite.py + base.py: update_user raises UserNotFoundError
on a vanished row instead of silently returning the input. Concurrent
delete during password reset can no longer look like a successful update.
- runtime/user_context.py: resolve_owner_id() coerces User.id (UUID) to
str at the contextvar boundary so SQLAlchemy String(64) columns can
bind it. The whole 2.0-rc isolation pipeline was previously broken
end-to-end (POST /api/threads → 500 "type 'UUID' is not supported").
- persistence/engine.py: SQLAlchemy listener enables PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL,
synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON on every new SQLite connection.
TC-UPG-06 in the test plan expects WAL; previous code shipped with the
default 'delete' journal.
- auth_middleware.py: stamp request.state.auth = AuthContext(...) so
@require_permission's short-circuit fires; previously every isolation
request did a duplicate JWT decode + users SELECT. Also unifies the
401 payload through AuthErrorResponse(...).model_dump().
- app.py: _ensure_admin_user restructure removes the noqa F821 scoping
bug where 'password' was referenced outside the branch that defined it.
New _announce_credentials helper absorbs the duplicate log block in
the fresh-admin and reset-admin branches.
* fix(frontend+nginx): rollout CSRF on every state-changing client path
The frontend was 100% broken in gateway-pro mode for any user trying to
open a specific chat thread. Three cumulative bugs each silently
masked the next.
LangGraph SDK CSRF gap (api-client.ts)
- The Client constructor took only apiUrl, no defaultHeaders, no fetch
interceptor. The SDK's internal fetch never sent X-CSRF-Token, so
every state-changing /api/langgraph-compat/* call (runs/stream,
threads/search, threads/{tid}/history, ...) hit CSRFMiddleware and
got 403 before reaching the auth check. UI symptom: empty thread page
with no error message; the SPA's hooks swallowed the rejection.
- Fix: pass an onRequest hook that injects X-CSRF-Token from the
csrf_token cookie per request. Reading the cookie per call (not at
construction time) handles login / logout / password-change cookie
rotation transparently. The SDK's prepareFetchOptions calls
onRequest for both regular requests AND streaming/SSE/reconnect, so
the same hook covers runs.stream and runs.joinStream.
Raw fetch CSRF gap (7 files)
- Audit: 11 frontend fetch sites, only 2 included CSRF (login/setup +
account-settings change-password). The other 7 routed through raw
fetch() with no header — suggestions, memory, agents, mcp, skills,
uploads, and the local thread cleanup hook all 403'd silently.
- Fix: enhance fetcher.ts:fetchWithAuth to auto-inject X-CSRF-Token on
POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH from a single shared readCsrfCookie() helper.
Convert all 7 raw fetch() callers to fetchWithAuth so the contract
is centrally enforced. api-client.ts and fetcher.ts share
readCsrfCookie + STATE_CHANGING_METHODS to avoid drift.
nginx routing + buffering (nginx.local.conf)
- The auth feature shipped without updating the nginx config: per-API
explicit location blocks but no /api/v1/auth/, /api/feedback, /api/runs.
The frontend's client-side fetches to /api/v1/auth/login/local 404'd
from the Next.js side because nginx routed /api/* to the frontend.
- Fix: add catch-all `location /api/` that proxies to the gateway.
nginx longest-prefix matching keeps the explicit blocks (/api/models,
/api/threads regex, /api/langgraph/, ...) winning for their paths.
- Fix: disable proxy_buffering + proxy_request_buffering for the
frontend `location /` block. Without it, nginx tries to spool large
Next.js chunks into /var/lib/nginx/proxy (root-owned) and fails with
Permission denied → ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING → ChunkLoadError.
* test(auth): release-validation test infra and new coverage
Test fixtures and unit tests added during the validation pass.
Router test helpers (NEW: tests/_router_auth_helpers.py)
- make_authed_test_app(): builds a FastAPI test app with a stub
middleware that stamps request.state.user + request.state.auth and a
permissive thread_meta_repo mock. TestClient-based router tests
(test_artifacts_router, test_threads_router) use it instead of bare
FastAPI() so the new @require_permission(owner_check=True) decorators
short-circuit cleanly.
- call_unwrapped(): walks the __wrapped__ chain to invoke the underlying
handler without going through the authz wrappers. Direct-call tests
(test_uploads_router) use it. Typed with ParamSpec so the wrapped
signature flows through.
Backend test additions
- test_auth.py: 7 tests for the new _get_client_ip trust model (no
proxy / trusted proxy / untrusted peer / XFF rejection / invalid
CIDR / no client). 5 tests for the password blocklist (literal,
case-insensitive, strong password accepted, change-password binding,
short-password length-check still fires before blocklist).
test_update_user_raises_when_row_concurrently_deleted: closes a
shipped-without-coverage gap on the new UserNotFoundError contract.
- test_thread_meta_repo.py: 4 tests for check_access(require_existing=True)
— strict missing-row denial, strict owner match, strict owner mismatch,
strict null-owner still allowed (shared rows survive the tightening).
- test_ensure_admin.py: 3 tests for _migrate_orphaned_threads /
_iter_store_items pagination, covering the TC-UPG-02 upgrade story
end-to-end via mock store. Closes the gap where the cursor pagination
was untested even though the previous PR rewrote it.
- test_threads_router.py: 5 tests for _strip_reserved_metadata
(owner_id removal, user_id removal, safe-keys passthrough, empty
input, both-stripped).
- test_auth_type_system.py: replace "password123" fixtures with
Tr0ub4dor3a / AnotherStr0ngPwd! so the new password blocklist
doesn't reject the test data.
* docs(auth): refresh TC-DOCKER-05 + document Docker validation gap
- AUTH_TEST_PLAN.md TC-DOCKER-05: the previous expectation
("admin password visible in docker logs") was stale after the simplify
pass that moved credentials to a 0600 file. The grep "Password:" check
would have silently failed and given a false sense of coverage. New
expectation matches the actual file-based path: 0600 file in
DEER_FLOW_HOME, log shows the path (not the secret), reverse-grep
asserts no leaked password in container logs.
- NEW: docs/AUTH_TEST_DOCKER_GAP.md documents the only un-executed
block in the test plan (TC-DOCKER-01..06). Reason: sg_dev validation
host has no Docker daemon installed. The doc maps each Docker case
to an already-validated bare-metal equivalent (TC-1.1, TC-REENT-01,
TC-API-02 etc.) so the gap is auditable, and includes pre-flight
reproduction steps for whoever has Docker available.
---------
Co-authored-by: greatmengqi <chenmengqi.0376@bytedance.com>
This commit is contained in:
greatmengqi
committed by
jiangfeng.11
jiangfeng.11
parent
185f5649dd
commit
e75a2ff29a
+157
-1
@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
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import logging
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import os
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from collections.abc import AsyncGenerator
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from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
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from datetime import UTC
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
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from app.gateway.auth_middleware import AuthMiddleware
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from app.gateway.config import get_gateway_config
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from app.gateway.csrf_middleware import CSRFMiddleware
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from app.gateway.deps import langgraph_runtime
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from app.gateway.routers import (
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agents,
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artifacts,
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assistants_compat,
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auth,
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channels,
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feedback,
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mcp,
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@@ -34,6 +40,125 @@ logging.basicConfig(
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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async def _ensure_admin_user(app: FastAPI) -> None:
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"""Auto-create the admin user on first boot if no users exist.
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After admin creation, migrate orphan threads from the LangGraph
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store (metadata.owner_id unset) to the admin account. This is the
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"no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path: users who ran DeerFlow without
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authentication have existing LangGraph thread data that needs an
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owner assigned.
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No SQL persistence migration is needed: the four owner_id columns
|
||||
(threads_meta, runs, run_events, feedback) only come into existence
|
||||
alongside the auth module via create_all, so freshly created tables
|
||||
never contain NULL-owner rows. "Existing persistence DB + new auth"
|
||||
is not a supported upgrade path — fresh install or wipe-and-retry.
|
||||
|
||||
Multi-worker safe: relies on SQLite UNIQUE constraint to resolve
|
||||
races during admin creation. Only the worker that successfully
|
||||
creates/updates the admin prints the password; losers silently skip.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import secrets
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.credential_file import write_initial_credentials
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_local_provider
|
||||
|
||||
def _announce_credentials(email: str, password: str, *, label: str, headline: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Write the password to a 0600 file and log the path (never the secret)."""
|
||||
cred_path = write_initial_credentials(email, password, label=label)
|
||||
logger.info("=" * 60)
|
||||
logger.info(" %s", headline)
|
||||
logger.info(" Credentials written to: %s (mode 0600)", cred_path)
|
||||
logger.info(" Change it after login: Settings -> Account")
|
||||
logger.info("=" * 60)
|
||||
|
||||
provider = get_local_provider()
|
||||
user_count = await provider.count_users()
|
||||
|
||||
admin = None
|
||||
|
||||
if user_count == 0:
|
||||
password = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
admin = await provider.create_user(email="admin@deerflow.dev", password=password, system_role="admin", needs_setup=True)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return # Another worker already created the admin.
|
||||
_announce_credentials(admin.email, password, label="initial", headline="Admin account created on first boot")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# Admin exists but setup never completed — reset password so operator
|
||||
# can always find it in the console without needing the CLI.
|
||||
# Multi-worker guard: if admin was created less than 30s ago, another
|
||||
# worker just created it and will print the password — skip reset.
|
||||
admin = await provider.get_user_by_email("admin@deerflow.dev")
|
||||
if admin and admin.needs_setup:
|
||||
import time
|
||||
|
||||
age = time.time() - admin.created_at.replace(tzinfo=UTC).timestamp()
|
||||
if age >= 30:
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password_async
|
||||
|
||||
password = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
|
||||
admin.password_hash = await hash_password_async(password)
|
||||
admin.token_version += 1
|
||||
await provider.update_user(admin)
|
||||
_announce_credentials(admin.email, password, label="reset", headline="Admin account setup incomplete — password reset")
|
||||
|
||||
if admin is None:
|
||||
return # Nothing to bind orphans to.
|
||||
|
||||
admin_id = str(admin.id)
|
||||
|
||||
# LangGraph store orphan migration — non-fatal.
|
||||
# This covers the "no-auth → with-auth" upgrade path for users
|
||||
# whose existing LangGraph thread metadata has no owner_id set.
|
||||
store = getattr(app.state, "store", None)
|
||||
if store is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
migrated = await _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_id)
|
||||
if migrated:
|
||||
logger.info("Migrated %d orphan LangGraph thread(s) to admin", migrated)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
logger.exception("LangGraph thread migration failed (non-fatal)")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _iter_store_items(store, namespace, *, page_size: int = 500):
|
||||
"""Paginated async iterator over a LangGraph store namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
Replaces the old hardcoded ``limit=1000`` call with a cursor-style
|
||||
loop so that environments with more than one page of orphans do
|
||||
not silently lose data. Terminates when a page is empty OR when a
|
||||
short page arrives (indicating the last page).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
offset = 0
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
batch = await store.asearch(namespace, limit=page_size, offset=offset)
|
||||
if not batch:
|
||||
return
|
||||
for item in batch:
|
||||
yield item
|
||||
if len(batch) < page_size:
|
||||
return
|
||||
offset += page_size
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _migrate_orphaned_threads(store, admin_user_id: str) -> int:
|
||||
"""Migrate LangGraph store threads with no owner_id to the given admin.
|
||||
|
||||
Uses cursor pagination so all orphans are migrated regardless of
|
||||
count. Returns the number of rows migrated.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
migrated = 0
|
||||
async for item in _iter_store_items(store, ("threads",)):
|
||||
metadata = item.value.get("metadata", {})
|
||||
if not metadata.get("owner_id"):
|
||||
metadata["owner_id"] = admin_user_id
|
||||
item.value["metadata"] = metadata
|
||||
await store.aput(("threads",), item.key, item.value)
|
||||
migrated += 1
|
||||
return migrated
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@asynccontextmanager
|
||||
async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:
|
||||
"""Application lifespan handler."""
|
||||
@@ -53,6 +178,10 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:
|
||||
async with langgraph_runtime(app):
|
||||
logger.info("LangGraph runtime initialised")
|
||||
|
||||
# Ensure admin user exists (auto-create on first boot)
|
||||
# Must run AFTER langgraph_runtime so app.state.store is available for thread migration
|
||||
await _ensure_admin_user(app)
|
||||
|
||||
# Start IM channel service if any channels are configured
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from app.channels.service import start_channel_service
|
||||
@@ -164,7 +293,31 @@ This gateway provides custom endpoints for models, MCP configuration, skills, an
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# CORS is handled by nginx - no need for FastAPI middleware
|
||||
# Auth: reject unauthenticated requests to non-public paths (fail-closed safety net)
|
||||
app.add_middleware(AuthMiddleware)
|
||||
|
||||
# CSRF: Double Submit Cookie pattern for state-changing requests
|
||||
app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
|
||||
|
||||
# CORS: when GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS is set (dev without nginx), add CORS middleware.
|
||||
# In production, nginx handles CORS and no middleware is needed.
|
||||
cors_origins_env = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS", "")
|
||||
if cors_origins_env:
|
||||
cors_origins = [o.strip() for o in cors_origins_env.split(",") if o.strip()]
|
||||
# Validate: wildcard origin with credentials is a security misconfiguration
|
||||
for origin in cors_origins:
|
||||
if origin == "*":
|
||||
logger.error("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS contains wildcard '*' with allow_credentials=True. This is a security misconfiguration — browsers will reject the response. Use explicit scheme://host:port origins instead.")
|
||||
cors_origins = [o for o in cors_origins if o != "*"]
|
||||
break
|
||||
if cors_origins:
|
||||
app.add_middleware(
|
||||
CORSMiddleware,
|
||||
allow_origins=cors_origins,
|
||||
allow_credentials=True,
|
||||
allow_methods=["*"],
|
||||
allow_headers=["*"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Include routers
|
||||
# Models API is mounted at /api/models
|
||||
@@ -200,6 +353,9 @@ This gateway provides custom endpoints for models, MCP configuration, skills, an
|
||||
# Assistants compatibility API (LangGraph Platform stub)
|
||||
app.include_router(assistants_compat.router)
|
||||
|
||||
# Auth API is mounted at /api/v1/auth
|
||||
app.include_router(auth.router)
|
||||
|
||||
# Feedback API is mounted at /api/threads/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback
|
||||
app.include_router(feedback.router)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
"""Authentication module for DeerFlow.
|
||||
|
||||
This module provides:
|
||||
- JWT-based authentication
|
||||
- Provider Factory pattern for extensible auth methods
|
||||
- UserRepository interface for storage backends (SQLite)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.config import AuthConfig, get_auth_config, set_auth_config
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse, TokenError
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.jwt import TokenPayload, create_access_token, decode_token
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.local_provider import LocalAuthProvider
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.models import User, UserResponse
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password, verify_password
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.providers import AuthProvider
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import UserRepository
|
||||
|
||||
__all__ = [
|
||||
# Config
|
||||
"AuthConfig",
|
||||
"get_auth_config",
|
||||
"set_auth_config",
|
||||
# Errors
|
||||
"AuthErrorCode",
|
||||
"AuthErrorResponse",
|
||||
"TokenError",
|
||||
# JWT
|
||||
"TokenPayload",
|
||||
"create_access_token",
|
||||
"decode_token",
|
||||
# Password
|
||||
"hash_password",
|
||||
"verify_password",
|
||||
# Models
|
||||
"User",
|
||||
"UserResponse",
|
||||
# Providers
|
||||
"AuthProvider",
|
||||
"LocalAuthProvider",
|
||||
# Repository
|
||||
"UserRepository",
|
||||
]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
||||
"""Authentication configuration for DeerFlow."""
|
||||
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import secrets
|
||||
|
||||
from dotenv import load_dotenv
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
|
||||
|
||||
load_dotenv()
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuthConfig(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""JWT and auth-related configuration. Parsed once at startup.
|
||||
|
||||
Note: the ``users`` table now lives in the shared persistence
|
||||
database managed by ``deerflow.persistence.engine``. The old
|
||||
``users_db_path`` config key has been removed — user storage is
|
||||
configured through ``config.database`` like every other table.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
jwt_secret: str = Field(
|
||||
...,
|
||||
description="Secret key for JWT signing. MUST be set via AUTH_JWT_SECRET.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
token_expiry_days: int = Field(default=7, ge=1, le=30)
|
||||
oauth_github_client_id: str | None = Field(default=None)
|
||||
oauth_github_client_secret: str | None = Field(default=None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_auth_config: AuthConfig | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_auth_config() -> AuthConfig:
|
||||
"""Get the global AuthConfig instance. Parses from env on first call."""
|
||||
global _auth_config
|
||||
if _auth_config is None:
|
||||
jwt_secret = os.environ.get("AUTH_JWT_SECRET")
|
||||
if not jwt_secret:
|
||||
jwt_secret = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
|
||||
os.environ["AUTH_JWT_SECRET"] = jwt_secret
|
||||
logger.warning(
|
||||
"⚠ AUTH_JWT_SECRET is not set — using an auto-generated ephemeral secret. "
|
||||
"Sessions will be invalidated on restart. "
|
||||
"For production, add AUTH_JWT_SECRET to your .env file: "
|
||||
'python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))"'
|
||||
)
|
||||
_auth_config = AuthConfig(jwt_secret=jwt_secret)
|
||||
return _auth_config
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def set_auth_config(config: AuthConfig) -> None:
|
||||
"""Set the global AuthConfig instance (for testing)."""
|
||||
global _auth_config
|
||||
_auth_config = config
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
"""Write initial admin credentials to a restricted file instead of logs.
|
||||
|
||||
Logging secrets to stdout/stderr is a well-known CodeQL finding
|
||||
(py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data) — in production those logs
|
||||
get collected into ELK/Splunk/etc and become a secret sprawl
|
||||
source. This helper writes the credential to a 0600 file that only
|
||||
the process user can read, and returns the path so the caller can
|
||||
log **the path** (not the password) for the operator to pick up.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
|
||||
from deerflow.config.paths import get_paths
|
||||
|
||||
_CREDENTIAL_FILENAME = "admin_initial_credentials.txt"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_initial_credentials(email: str, password: str, *, label: str = "initial") -> Path:
|
||||
"""Write the admin email + password to ``{base_dir}/admin_initial_credentials.txt``.
|
||||
|
||||
The file is created **atomically** with mode 0600 via ``os.open``
|
||||
so the password is never world-readable, even for the single syscall
|
||||
window between ``write_text`` and ``chmod``.
|
||||
|
||||
``label`` distinguishes "initial" (fresh creation) from "reset"
|
||||
(password reset) in the file header so an operator picking up the
|
||||
file after a restart can tell which event produced it.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the absolute :class:`Path` to the file.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
target = get_paths().base_dir / _CREDENTIAL_FILENAME
|
||||
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
|
||||
content = (
|
||||
f"# DeerFlow admin {label} credentials\n# This file is generated on first boot or password reset.\n# Change the password after login via Settings -> Account,\n# then delete this file.\n#\nemail: {email}\npassword: {password}\n"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Atomic 0600 create-or-truncate. O_TRUNC (not O_EXCL) so the
|
||||
# reset-password path can rewrite an existing file without a
|
||||
# separate unlink-then-create dance.
|
||||
fd = os.open(target, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
|
||||
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
fh.write(content)
|
||||
|
||||
return target.resolve()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
||||
"""Typed error definitions for auth module.
|
||||
|
||||
AuthErrorCode: exhaustive enum of all auth failure conditions.
|
||||
TokenError: exhaustive enum of JWT decode failures.
|
||||
AuthErrorResponse: structured error payload for HTTP responses.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from enum import StrEnum
|
||||
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuthErrorCode(StrEnum):
|
||||
"""Exhaustive list of auth error conditions."""
|
||||
|
||||
INVALID_CREDENTIALS = "invalid_credentials"
|
||||
TOKEN_EXPIRED = "token_expired"
|
||||
TOKEN_INVALID = "token_invalid"
|
||||
USER_NOT_FOUND = "user_not_found"
|
||||
EMAIL_ALREADY_EXISTS = "email_already_exists"
|
||||
PROVIDER_NOT_FOUND = "provider_not_found"
|
||||
NOT_AUTHENTICATED = "not_authenticated"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TokenError(StrEnum):
|
||||
"""Exhaustive list of JWT decode failure reasons."""
|
||||
|
||||
EXPIRED = "expired"
|
||||
INVALID_SIGNATURE = "invalid_signature"
|
||||
MALFORMED = "malformed"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuthErrorResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Structured error response — replaces bare `detail` strings."""
|
||||
|
||||
code: AuthErrorCode
|
||||
message: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def token_error_to_code(err: TokenError) -> AuthErrorCode:
|
||||
"""Map TokenError to AuthErrorCode — single source of truth."""
|
||||
if err == TokenError.EXPIRED:
|
||||
return AuthErrorCode.TOKEN_EXPIRED
|
||||
return AuthErrorCode.TOKEN_INVALID
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
"""JWT token creation and verification."""
|
||||
|
||||
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
|
||||
|
||||
import jwt
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.config import get_auth_config
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TokenPayload(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""JWT token payload."""
|
||||
|
||||
sub: str # user_id
|
||||
exp: datetime
|
||||
iat: datetime | None = None
|
||||
ver: int = 0 # token_version — must match User.token_version
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def create_access_token(user_id: str, expires_delta: timedelta | None = None, token_version: int = 0) -> str:
|
||||
"""Create a JWT access token.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
user_id: The user's UUID as string
|
||||
expires_delta: Optional custom expiry, defaults to 7 days
|
||||
token_version: User's current token_version for invalidation
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Encoded JWT string
|
||||
"""
|
||||
config = get_auth_config()
|
||||
expiry = expires_delta or timedelta(days=config.token_expiry_days)
|
||||
|
||||
now = datetime.now(UTC)
|
||||
payload = {"sub": user_id, "exp": now + expiry, "iat": now, "ver": token_version}
|
||||
return jwt.encode(payload, config.jwt_secret, algorithm="HS256")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def decode_token(token: str) -> TokenPayload | TokenError:
|
||||
"""Decode and validate a JWT token.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
TokenPayload if valid, or a specific TokenError variant.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
config = get_auth_config()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
payload = jwt.decode(token, config.jwt_secret, algorithms=["HS256"])
|
||||
return TokenPayload(**payload)
|
||||
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
|
||||
return TokenError.EXPIRED
|
||||
except jwt.InvalidSignatureError:
|
||||
return TokenError.INVALID_SIGNATURE
|
||||
except jwt.PyJWTError:
|
||||
return TokenError.MALFORMED
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
|
||||
"""Local email/password authentication provider."""
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password_async, verify_password_async
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.providers import AuthProvider
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import UserRepository
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class LocalAuthProvider(AuthProvider):
|
||||
"""Email/password authentication provider using local database."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, repository: UserRepository):
|
||||
"""Initialize with a UserRepository.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
repository: UserRepository implementation (SQLite)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
self._repo = repository
|
||||
|
||||
async def authenticate(self, credentials: dict) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""Authenticate with email and password.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
credentials: dict with 'email' and 'password' keys
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
User if authentication succeeds, None otherwise
|
||||
"""
|
||||
email = credentials.get("email")
|
||||
password = credentials.get("password")
|
||||
|
||||
if not email or not password:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
user = await self._repo.get_user_by_email(email)
|
||||
if user is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
if user.password_hash is None:
|
||||
# OAuth user without local password
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
if not await verify_password_async(password, user.password_hash):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
return user
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_user(self, user_id: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""Get user by ID."""
|
||||
return await self._repo.get_user_by_id(user_id)
|
||||
|
||||
async def create_user(self, email: str, password: str | None = None, system_role: str = "user", needs_setup: bool = False) -> User:
|
||||
"""Create a new local user.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
email: User email address
|
||||
password: Plain text password (will be hashed)
|
||||
system_role: Role to assign ("admin" or "user")
|
||||
needs_setup: If True, user must complete setup on first login
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Created User instance
|
||||
"""
|
||||
password_hash = await hash_password_async(password) if password else None
|
||||
user = User(
|
||||
email=email,
|
||||
password_hash=password_hash,
|
||||
system_role=system_role,
|
||||
needs_setup=needs_setup,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return await self._repo.create_user(user)
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_user_by_oauth(self, provider: str, oauth_id: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""Get user by OAuth provider and ID."""
|
||||
return await self._repo.get_user_by_oauth(provider, oauth_id)
|
||||
|
||||
async def count_users(self) -> int:
|
||||
"""Return total number of registered users."""
|
||||
return await self._repo.count_users()
|
||||
|
||||
async def update_user(self, user: User) -> User:
|
||||
"""Update an existing user."""
|
||||
return await self._repo.update_user(user)
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_user_by_email(self, email: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""Get user by email."""
|
||||
return await self._repo.get_user_by_email(email)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
"""User Pydantic models for authentication."""
|
||||
|
||||
from datetime import UTC, datetime
|
||||
from typing import Literal
|
||||
from uuid import UUID, uuid4
|
||||
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, EmailStr, Field
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _utc_now() -> datetime:
|
||||
"""Return current UTC time (timezone-aware)."""
|
||||
return datetime.now(UTC)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class User(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Internal user representation."""
|
||||
|
||||
model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
|
||||
|
||||
id: UUID = Field(default_factory=uuid4, description="Primary key")
|
||||
email: EmailStr = Field(..., description="Unique email address")
|
||||
password_hash: str | None = Field(None, description="bcrypt hash, nullable for OAuth users")
|
||||
system_role: Literal["admin", "user"] = Field(default="user")
|
||||
created_at: datetime = Field(default_factory=_utc_now)
|
||||
|
||||
# OAuth linkage (optional)
|
||||
oauth_provider: str | None = Field(None, description="e.g. 'github', 'google'")
|
||||
oauth_id: str | None = Field(None, description="User ID from OAuth provider")
|
||||
|
||||
# Auth lifecycle
|
||||
needs_setup: bool = Field(default=False, description="True for auto-created admin until setup completes")
|
||||
token_version: int = Field(default=0, description="Incremented on password change to invalidate old JWTs")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class UserResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Response model for user info endpoint."""
|
||||
|
||||
id: str
|
||||
email: str
|
||||
system_role: Literal["admin", "user"]
|
||||
needs_setup: bool = False
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
"""Password hashing utilities using bcrypt directly."""
|
||||
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
|
||||
import bcrypt
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Hash a password using bcrypt."""
|
||||
return bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode("utf-8"), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode("utf-8")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def verify_password(plain_password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Verify a password against its hash."""
|
||||
return bcrypt.checkpw(plain_password.encode("utf-8"), hashed_password.encode("utf-8"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def hash_password_async(password: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Hash a password using bcrypt (non-blocking).
|
||||
|
||||
Wraps the blocking bcrypt operation in a thread pool to avoid
|
||||
blocking the event loop during password hashing.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return await asyncio.to_thread(hash_password, password)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def verify_password_async(plain_password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Verify a password against its hash (non-blocking).
|
||||
|
||||
Wraps the blocking bcrypt operation in a thread pool to avoid
|
||||
blocking the event loop during password verification.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return await asyncio.to_thread(verify_password, plain_password, hashed_password)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
"""Auth provider abstraction."""
|
||||
|
||||
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuthProvider(ABC):
|
||||
"""Abstract base class for authentication providers."""
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
async def authenticate(self, credentials: dict) -> "User | None":
|
||||
"""Authenticate user with given credentials.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns User if authentication succeeds, None otherwise.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
async def get_user(self, user_id: str) -> "User | None":
|
||||
"""Retrieve user by ID."""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Import User at runtime to avoid circular imports
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.models import User # noqa: E402
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
|
||||
"""User repository interface for abstracting database operations."""
|
||||
|
||||
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class UserNotFoundError(LookupError):
|
||||
"""Raised when a user repository operation targets a non-existent row.
|
||||
|
||||
Subclass of :class:`LookupError` so callers that already catch
|
||||
``LookupError`` for "missing entity" can keep working unchanged,
|
||||
while specific call sites can pin to this class to distinguish
|
||||
"concurrent delete during update" from other lookups.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class UserRepository(ABC):
|
||||
"""Abstract interface for user data storage.
|
||||
|
||||
Implement this interface to support different storage backends
|
||||
(SQLite)
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
async def create_user(self, user: User) -> User:
|
||||
"""Create a new user.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
user: User object to create
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Created User with ID assigned
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
ValueError: If email already exists
|
||||
"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
async def get_user_by_id(self, user_id: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""Get user by ID.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
user_id: User UUID as string
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
User if found, None otherwise
|
||||
"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
async def get_user_by_email(self, email: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""Get user by email.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
email: User email address
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
User if found, None otherwise
|
||||
"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
async def update_user(self, user: User) -> User:
|
||||
"""Update an existing user.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
user: User object with updated fields
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
Updated User
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
UserNotFoundError: If no row exists for ``user.id``. This is
|
||||
a hard failure (not a no-op) so callers cannot mistake a
|
||||
concurrent-delete race for a successful update.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
async def count_users(self) -> int:
|
||||
"""Return total number of registered users."""
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
async def get_user_by_oauth(self, provider: str, oauth_id: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
"""Get user by OAuth provider and ID.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
provider: OAuth provider name (e.g. 'github', 'google')
|
||||
oauth_id: User ID from the OAuth provider
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
User if found, None otherwise
|
||||
"""
|
||||
...
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
|
||||
"""SQLAlchemy-backed UserRepository implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
Uses the shared async session factory from
|
||||
``deerflow.persistence.engine`` — the ``users`` table lives in the
|
||||
same database as ``threads_meta``, ``runs``, ``run_events``, and
|
||||
``feedback``.
|
||||
|
||||
Constructor takes the session factory directly (same pattern as the
|
||||
other four repositories in ``deerflow.persistence.*``). Callers
|
||||
construct this after ``init_engine_from_config()`` has run.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from datetime import UTC
|
||||
from uuid import UUID
|
||||
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import func, select
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession, async_sessionmaker
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.base import UserNotFoundError, UserRepository
|
||||
from deerflow.persistence.user.model import UserRow
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class SQLiteUserRepository(UserRepository):
|
||||
"""Async user repository backed by the shared SQLAlchemy engine."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None:
|
||||
self._sf = session_factory
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Converters ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
@staticmethod
|
||||
def _row_to_user(row: UserRow) -> User:
|
||||
return User(
|
||||
id=UUID(row.id),
|
||||
email=row.email,
|
||||
password_hash=row.password_hash,
|
||||
system_role=row.system_role, # type: ignore[arg-type]
|
||||
# SQLite loses tzinfo on read; reattach UTC so downstream
|
||||
# code can compare timestamps reliably.
|
||||
created_at=row.created_at if row.created_at.tzinfo else row.created_at.replace(tzinfo=UTC),
|
||||
oauth_provider=row.oauth_provider,
|
||||
oauth_id=row.oauth_id,
|
||||
needs_setup=row.needs_setup,
|
||||
token_version=row.token_version,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@staticmethod
|
||||
def _user_to_row(user: User) -> UserRow:
|
||||
return UserRow(
|
||||
id=str(user.id),
|
||||
email=user.email,
|
||||
password_hash=user.password_hash,
|
||||
system_role=user.system_role,
|
||||
created_at=user.created_at,
|
||||
oauth_provider=user.oauth_provider,
|
||||
oauth_id=user.oauth_id,
|
||||
needs_setup=user.needs_setup,
|
||||
token_version=user.token_version,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── CRUD ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
async def create_user(self, user: User) -> User:
|
||||
"""Insert a new user. Raises ``ValueError`` on duplicate email."""
|
||||
row = self._user_to_row(user)
|
||||
async with self._sf() as session:
|
||||
session.add(row)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
except IntegrityError as exc:
|
||||
await session.rollback()
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Email already registered: {user.email}") from exc
|
||||
return user
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_user_by_id(self, user_id: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
async with self._sf() as session:
|
||||
row = await session.get(UserRow, user_id)
|
||||
return self._row_to_user(row) if row is not None else None
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_user_by_email(self, email: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
stmt = select(UserRow).where(UserRow.email == email)
|
||||
async with self._sf() as session:
|
||||
result = await session.execute(stmt)
|
||||
row = result.scalar_one_or_none()
|
||||
return self._row_to_user(row) if row is not None else None
|
||||
|
||||
async def update_user(self, user: User) -> User:
|
||||
async with self._sf() as session:
|
||||
row = await session.get(UserRow, str(user.id))
|
||||
if row is None:
|
||||
# Hard fail on concurrent delete: callers (reset_admin,
|
||||
# password change handlers, _ensure_admin_user) all
|
||||
# fetched the user just before this call, so a missing
|
||||
# row here means the row vanished underneath us. Silent
|
||||
# success would let the caller log "password reset" for
|
||||
# a row that no longer exists.
|
||||
raise UserNotFoundError(f"User {user.id} no longer exists")
|
||||
row.email = user.email
|
||||
row.password_hash = user.password_hash
|
||||
row.system_role = user.system_role
|
||||
row.oauth_provider = user.oauth_provider
|
||||
row.oauth_id = user.oauth_id
|
||||
row.needs_setup = user.needs_setup
|
||||
row.token_version = user.token_version
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
return user
|
||||
|
||||
async def count_users(self) -> int:
|
||||
stmt = select(func.count()).select_from(UserRow)
|
||||
async with self._sf() as session:
|
||||
return await session.scalar(stmt) or 0
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_user_by_oauth(self, provider: str, oauth_id: str) -> User | None:
|
||||
stmt = select(UserRow).where(UserRow.oauth_provider == provider, UserRow.oauth_id == oauth_id)
|
||||
async with self._sf() as session:
|
||||
result = await session.execute(stmt)
|
||||
row = result.scalar_one_or_none()
|
||||
return self._row_to_user(row) if row is not None else None
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
|
||||
"""CLI tool to reset an admin password.
|
||||
|
||||
Usage:
|
||||
python -m app.gateway.auth.reset_admin
|
||||
python -m app.gateway.auth.reset_admin --email admin@example.com
|
||||
|
||||
Writes the new password to ``.deer-flow/admin_initial_credentials.txt``
|
||||
(mode 0600) instead of printing it, so CI / log aggregators never see
|
||||
the cleartext secret.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import argparse
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
import secrets
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.credential_file import write_initial_credentials
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
|
||||
from deerflow.persistence.user.model import UserRow
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _run(email: str | None) -> int:
|
||||
from deerflow.config import get_app_config
|
||||
from deerflow.persistence.engine import (
|
||||
close_engine,
|
||||
get_session_factory,
|
||||
init_engine_from_config,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
config = get_app_config()
|
||||
await init_engine_from_config(config.database)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
sf = get_session_factory()
|
||||
if sf is None:
|
||||
print("Error: persistence engine not available (check config.database).", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
|
||||
repo = SQLiteUserRepository(sf)
|
||||
|
||||
if email:
|
||||
user = await repo.get_user_by_email(email)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# Find first admin via direct SELECT — repository does not
|
||||
# expose a "first admin" helper and we do not want to add
|
||||
# one just for this CLI.
|
||||
async with sf() as session:
|
||||
stmt = select(UserRow).where(UserRow.system_role == "admin").limit(1)
|
||||
row = (await session.execute(stmt)).scalar_one_or_none()
|
||||
if row is None:
|
||||
user = None
|
||||
else:
|
||||
user = await repo.get_user_by_id(row.id)
|
||||
|
||||
if user is None:
|
||||
if email:
|
||||
print(f"Error: user '{email}' not found.", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
print("Error: no admin user found.", file=sys.stderr)
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
|
||||
new_password = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
|
||||
user.password_hash = hash_password(new_password)
|
||||
user.token_version += 1
|
||||
user.needs_setup = True
|
||||
await repo.update_user(user)
|
||||
|
||||
cred_path = write_initial_credentials(user.email, new_password, label="reset")
|
||||
print(f"Password reset for: {user.email}")
|
||||
print(f"Credentials written to: {cred_path} (mode 0600)")
|
||||
print("Next login will require setup (new email + password).")
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
await close_engine()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main() -> None:
|
||||
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Reset admin password")
|
||||
parser.add_argument("--email", help="Admin email (default: first admin found)")
|
||||
args = parser.parse_args()
|
||||
|
||||
exit_code = asyncio.run(_run(args.email))
|
||||
sys.exit(exit_code)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
|
||||
"""Global authentication middleware — fail-closed safety net.
|
||||
|
||||
Rejects unauthenticated requests to non-public paths with 401. When a
|
||||
request passes the cookie check, resolves the JWT payload to a real
|
||||
``User`` object and stamps it into both ``request.state.user`` and the
|
||||
``deerflow.runtime.user_context`` contextvar so that repository-layer
|
||||
owner filtering works automatically via the sentinel pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
Fine-grained permission checks remain in authz.py decorators.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from collections.abc import Callable
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, Response
|
||||
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
|
||||
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
|
||||
from starlette.types import ASGIApp
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse
|
||||
from app.gateway.authz import _ALL_PERMISSIONS, AuthContext
|
||||
from deerflow.runtime.user_context import reset_current_user, set_current_user
|
||||
|
||||
# Paths that never require authentication.
|
||||
_PUBLIC_PATH_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
"/health",
|
||||
"/docs",
|
||||
"/redoc",
|
||||
"/openapi.json",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Exact auth paths that are public (login/register/status check).
|
||||
# /api/v1/auth/me, /api/v1/auth/change-password etc. are NOT public.
|
||||
_PUBLIC_EXACT_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/register",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/logout",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/setup-status",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_public(path: str) -> bool:
|
||||
stripped = path.rstrip("/")
|
||||
if stripped in _PUBLIC_EXACT_PATHS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return any(path.startswith(prefix) for prefix in _PUBLIC_PATH_PREFIXES)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
|
||||
"""Strict auth gate: reject requests without a valid session.
|
||||
|
||||
Two-stage check for non-public paths:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Cookie presence — return 401 NOT_AUTHENTICATED if missing
|
||||
2. JWT validation via ``get_optional_user_from_request`` — return 401
|
||||
TOKEN_INVALID if the token is absent, malformed, expired, or the
|
||||
signed user does not exist / is stale
|
||||
|
||||
On success, stamps ``request.state.user`` and the
|
||||
``deerflow.runtime.user_context`` contextvar so that repository-layer
|
||||
owner filters work downstream without every route needing a
|
||||
``@require_auth`` decorator. Routes that need per-resource
|
||||
authorization (e.g. "user A cannot read user B's thread by guessing
|
||||
the URL") should additionally use ``@require_permission(...,
|
||||
owner_check=True)`` for explicit enforcement — but authentication
|
||||
itself is fully handled here.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp) -> None:
|
||||
super().__init__(app)
|
||||
|
||||
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
|
||||
if _is_public(request.url.path):
|
||||
return await call_next(request)
|
||||
|
||||
# Non-public path: require session cookie
|
||||
if not request.cookies.get("access_token"):
|
||||
return JSONResponse(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
content={
|
||||
"detail": AuthErrorResponse(
|
||||
code=AuthErrorCode.NOT_AUTHENTICATED,
|
||||
message="Authentication required",
|
||||
).model_dump()
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Strict JWT validation: reject junk/expired tokens with 401
|
||||
# right here instead of silently passing through. This closes
|
||||
# the "junk cookie bypass" gap (AUTH_TEST_PLAN test 7.5.8):
|
||||
# without this, non-isolation routes like /api/models would
|
||||
# accept any cookie-shaped string as authentication.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# We call the *strict* resolver so that fine-grained error
|
||||
# codes (token_expired, token_invalid, user_not_found, …)
|
||||
# propagate from AuthErrorCode, not get flattened into one
|
||||
# generic code. BaseHTTPMiddleware doesn't let HTTPException
|
||||
# bubble up, so we catch and render it as JSONResponse here.
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
|
||||
except HTTPException as exc:
|
||||
return JSONResponse(status_code=exc.status_code, content={"detail": exc.detail})
|
||||
|
||||
# Stamp both request.state.user (for the contextvar pattern)
|
||||
# and request.state.auth (so @require_permission's "auth is
|
||||
# None" branch short-circuits instead of running the entire
|
||||
# JWT-decode + DB-lookup pipeline a second time per request).
|
||||
request.state.user = user
|
||||
request.state.auth = AuthContext(user=user, permissions=_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
|
||||
token = set_current_user(user)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return await call_next(request)
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
reset_current_user(token)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
|
||||
"""Authorization decorators and context for DeerFlow.
|
||||
|
||||
Inspired by LangGraph Auth system: https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/blob/main/libs/sdk-py/langgraph_sdk/auth/__init__.py
|
||||
|
||||
**Usage:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. Use ``@require_auth`` on routes that need authentication
|
||||
2. Use ``@require_permission("resource", "action", filter_key=...)`` for permission checks
|
||||
3. The decorator chain processes from bottom to top
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}")
|
||||
@require_auth
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
|
||||
# User is authenticated and has threads:read permission
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
**Permission Model:**
|
||||
|
||||
- threads:read - View thread
|
||||
- threads:write - Create/update thread
|
||||
- threads:delete - Delete thread
|
||||
- runs:create - Run agent
|
||||
- runs:read - View run
|
||||
- runs:cancel - Cancel run
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import functools
|
||||
from collections.abc import Callable
|
||||
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, ParamSpec, TypeVar
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
|
||||
|
||||
if TYPE_CHECKING:
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.models import User
|
||||
|
||||
P = ParamSpec("P")
|
||||
T = TypeVar("T")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission constants
|
||||
class Permissions:
|
||||
"""Permission constants for resource:action format."""
|
||||
|
||||
# Threads
|
||||
THREADS_READ = "threads:read"
|
||||
THREADS_WRITE = "threads:write"
|
||||
THREADS_DELETE = "threads:delete"
|
||||
|
||||
# Runs
|
||||
RUNS_CREATE = "runs:create"
|
||||
RUNS_READ = "runs:read"
|
||||
RUNS_CANCEL = "runs:cancel"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuthContext:
|
||||
"""Authentication context for the current request.
|
||||
|
||||
Stored in request.state.auth after require_auth decoration.
|
||||
|
||||
Attributes:
|
||||
user: The authenticated user, or None if anonymous
|
||||
permissions: List of permission strings (e.g., "threads:read")
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
__slots__ = ("user", "permissions")
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, user: User | None = None, permissions: list[str] | None = None):
|
||||
self.user = user
|
||||
self.permissions = permissions or []
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def is_authenticated(self) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Check if user is authenticated."""
|
||||
return self.user is not None
|
||||
|
||||
def has_permission(self, resource: str, action: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Check if context has permission for resource:action.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
resource: Resource name (e.g., "threads")
|
||||
action: Action name (e.g., "read")
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
True if user has permission
|
||||
"""
|
||||
permission = f"{resource}:{action}"
|
||||
return permission in self.permissions
|
||||
|
||||
def require_user(self) -> User:
|
||||
"""Get user or raise 401.
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
HTTPException 401 if not authenticated
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not self.user:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Authentication required")
|
||||
return self.user
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_auth_context(request: Request) -> AuthContext | None:
|
||||
"""Get AuthContext from request state."""
|
||||
return getattr(request.state, "auth", None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_ALL_PERMISSIONS: list[str] = [
|
||||
Permissions.THREADS_READ,
|
||||
Permissions.THREADS_WRITE,
|
||||
Permissions.THREADS_DELETE,
|
||||
Permissions.RUNS_CREATE,
|
||||
Permissions.RUNS_READ,
|
||||
Permissions.RUNS_CANCEL,
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _authenticate(request: Request) -> AuthContext:
|
||||
"""Authenticate request and return AuthContext.
|
||||
|
||||
Delegates to deps.get_optional_user_from_request() for the JWT→User pipeline.
|
||||
Returns AuthContext with user=None for anonymous requests.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_optional_user_from_request
|
||||
|
||||
user = await get_optional_user_from_request(request)
|
||||
if user is None:
|
||||
return AuthContext(user=None, permissions=[])
|
||||
|
||||
# In future, permissions could be stored in user record
|
||||
return AuthContext(user=user, permissions=_ALL_PERMISSIONS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def require_auth[**P, T](func: Callable[P, T]) -> Callable[P, T]:
|
||||
"""Decorator that authenticates the request and sets AuthContext.
|
||||
|
||||
Must be placed ABOVE other decorators (executes after them).
|
||||
|
||||
Usage:
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}")
|
||||
@require_auth # Bottom decorator (executes first after permission check)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read")
|
||||
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
|
||||
auth: AuthContext = request.state.auth
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
ValueError: If 'request' parameter is missing
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
@functools.wraps(func)
|
||||
async def wrapper(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
request = kwargs.get("request")
|
||||
if request is None:
|
||||
raise ValueError("require_auth decorator requires 'request' parameter")
|
||||
|
||||
# Authenticate and set context
|
||||
auth_context = await _authenticate(request)
|
||||
request.state.auth = auth_context
|
||||
|
||||
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
return wrapper
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def require_permission(
|
||||
resource: str,
|
||||
action: str,
|
||||
owner_check: bool = False,
|
||||
require_existing: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> Callable[[Callable[P, T]], Callable[P, T]]:
|
||||
"""Decorator that checks permission for resource:action.
|
||||
|
||||
Must be used AFTER @require_auth.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
resource: Resource name (e.g., "threads", "runs")
|
||||
action: Action name (e.g., "read", "write", "delete")
|
||||
owner_check: If True, validates that the current user owns the resource.
|
||||
Requires 'thread_id' path parameter and performs ownership check.
|
||||
require_existing: Only meaningful with ``owner_check=True``. If True, a
|
||||
missing ``threads_meta`` row counts as a denial (404)
|
||||
instead of "untracked legacy thread, allow". Use on
|
||||
**destructive / mutating** routes (DELETE, PATCH,
|
||||
state-update) so a deleted thread can't be re-targeted
|
||||
by another user via the missing-row code path.
|
||||
|
||||
Usage:
|
||||
# Read-style: legacy untracked threads are allowed
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
# Destructive: thread row MUST exist and be owned by caller
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def delete_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request):
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
Raises:
|
||||
HTTPException 401: If authentication required but user is anonymous
|
||||
HTTPException 403: If user lacks permission
|
||||
HTTPException 404: If owner_check=True but user doesn't own the thread
|
||||
ValueError: If owner_check=True but 'thread_id' parameter is missing
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def decorator(func: Callable[P, T]) -> Callable[P, T]:
|
||||
@functools.wraps(func)
|
||||
async def wrapper(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
request = kwargs.get("request")
|
||||
if request is None:
|
||||
raise ValueError("require_permission decorator requires 'request' parameter")
|
||||
|
||||
auth: AuthContext = getattr(request.state, "auth", None)
|
||||
if auth is None:
|
||||
auth = await _authenticate(request)
|
||||
request.state.auth = auth
|
||||
|
||||
if not auth.is_authenticated:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Authentication required")
|
||||
|
||||
# Check permission
|
||||
if not auth.has_permission(resource, action):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=403,
|
||||
detail=f"Permission denied: {resource}:{action}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Owner check for thread-specific resources.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 2.0-rc moved thread metadata into the SQL persistence layer
|
||||
# (``threads_meta`` table). We verify ownership via
|
||||
# ``ThreadMetaStore.check_access``: it returns True for
|
||||
# missing rows (untracked legacy thread) and for rows whose
|
||||
# ``owner_id`` is NULL (shared / pre-auth data), so this is
|
||||
# strict-deny rather than strict-allow — only an *existing*
|
||||
# row with a *different* owner_id triggers 404.
|
||||
if owner_check:
|
||||
thread_id = kwargs.get("thread_id")
|
||||
if thread_id is None:
|
||||
raise ValueError("require_permission with owner_check=True requires 'thread_id' parameter")
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
|
||||
|
||||
thread_meta_repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
|
||||
allowed = await thread_meta_repo.check_access(
|
||||
thread_id,
|
||||
str(auth.user.id),
|
||||
require_existing=require_existing,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not allowed:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=404,
|
||||
detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return await func(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
return wrapper
|
||||
|
||||
return decorator
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
|
||||
"""CSRF protection middleware for FastAPI.
|
||||
|
||||
Per RFC-001:
|
||||
State-changing operations require CSRF protection.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import secrets
|
||||
from collections.abc import Callable
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import Request, Response
|
||||
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
|
||||
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
|
||||
from starlette.types import ASGIApp
|
||||
|
||||
CSRF_COOKIE_NAME = "csrf_token"
|
||||
CSRF_HEADER_NAME = "X-CSRF-Token"
|
||||
CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH = 64 # bytes
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_secure_request(request: Request) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Detect whether the original client request was made over HTTPS."""
|
||||
return request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto", request.url.scheme) == "https"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def generate_csrf_token() -> str:
|
||||
"""Generate a secure random CSRF token."""
|
||||
return secrets.token_urlsafe(CSRF_TOKEN_LENGTH)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def should_check_csrf(request: Request) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Determine if a request needs CSRF validation.
|
||||
|
||||
CSRF is checked for state-changing methods (POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH).
|
||||
GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, and TRACE are exempt per RFC 7231.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if request.method not in ("POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
path = request.url.path.rstrip("/")
|
||||
# Exempt /api/v1/auth/me endpoint
|
||||
if path == "/api/v1/auth/me":
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/logout",
|
||||
"/api/v1/auth/register",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_auth_endpoint(request: Request) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Check if the request is to an auth endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
Auth endpoints don't need CSRF validation on first call (no token).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return request.url.path.rstrip("/") in _AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class CSRFMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
|
||||
"""Middleware that implements CSRF protection using Double Submit Cookie pattern."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp) -> None:
|
||||
super().__init__(app)
|
||||
|
||||
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
|
||||
_is_auth = is_auth_endpoint(request)
|
||||
|
||||
if should_check_csrf(request) and not _is_auth:
|
||||
cookie_token = request.cookies.get(CSRF_COOKIE_NAME)
|
||||
header_token = request.headers.get(CSRF_HEADER_NAME)
|
||||
|
||||
if not cookie_token or not header_token:
|
||||
return JSONResponse(
|
||||
status_code=403,
|
||||
content={"detail": "CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header."},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not secrets.compare_digest(cookie_token, header_token):
|
||||
return JSONResponse(
|
||||
status_code=403,
|
||||
content={"detail": "CSRF token mismatch."},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
response = await call_next(request)
|
||||
|
||||
# For auth endpoints that set up session, also set CSRF cookie
|
||||
if _is_auth and request.method == "POST":
|
||||
# Generate a new CSRF token for the session
|
||||
csrf_token = generate_csrf_token()
|
||||
is_https = is_secure_request(request)
|
||||
response.set_cookie(
|
||||
key=CSRF_COOKIE_NAME,
|
||||
value=csrf_token,
|
||||
httponly=False, # Must be JS-readable for Double Submit Cookie pattern
|
||||
secure=is_https,
|
||||
samesite="strict",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return response
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_csrf_token(request: Request) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Get the CSRF token from the current request's cookies.
|
||||
|
||||
This is useful for server-side rendering where you need to embed
|
||||
token in forms or headers.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return request.cookies.get(CSRF_COOKIE_NAME)
|
||||
@@ -11,11 +11,16 @@ from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from collections.abc import AsyncGenerator
|
||||
from contextlib import AsyncExitStack, asynccontextmanager
|
||||
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
|
||||
|
||||
from deerflow.runtime import RunContext, RunManager
|
||||
|
||||
if TYPE_CHECKING:
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.local_provider import LocalAuthProvider
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@asynccontextmanager
|
||||
async def langgraph_runtime(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:
|
||||
@@ -127,10 +132,94 @@ def get_run_context(request: Request) -> RunContext:
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_current_user(request: Request) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Extract user identity from request.
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Auth helpers (used by authz.py and auth middleware)
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 2: always returns None (no authentication).
|
||||
Phase 3: extract user_id from JWT / session / API key header.
|
||||
# Cached singletons to avoid repeated instantiation per request
|
||||
_cached_local_provider: LocalAuthProvider | None = None
|
||||
_cached_repo: SQLiteUserRepository | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_local_provider() -> LocalAuthProvider:
|
||||
"""Get or create the cached LocalAuthProvider singleton.
|
||||
|
||||
Must be called after ``init_engine_from_config()`` — the shared
|
||||
session factory is required to construct the user repository.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return None
|
||||
global _cached_local_provider, _cached_repo
|
||||
if _cached_repo is None:
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.repositories.sqlite import SQLiteUserRepository
|
||||
from deerflow.persistence.engine import get_session_factory
|
||||
|
||||
sf = get_session_factory()
|
||||
if sf is None:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("get_local_provider() called before init_engine_from_config(); cannot access users table")
|
||||
_cached_repo = SQLiteUserRepository(sf)
|
||||
if _cached_local_provider is None:
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.local_provider import LocalAuthProvider
|
||||
|
||||
_cached_local_provider = LocalAuthProvider(repository=_cached_repo)
|
||||
return _cached_local_provider
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_current_user_from_request(request: Request):
|
||||
"""Get the current authenticated user from the request cookie.
|
||||
|
||||
Raises HTTPException 401 if not authenticated.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth import decode_token
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse, TokenError, token_error_to_code
|
||||
|
||||
access_token = request.cookies.get("access_token")
|
||||
if not access_token:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.NOT_AUTHENTICATED, message="Not authenticated").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
payload = decode_token(access_token)
|
||||
if isinstance(payload, TokenError):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=token_error_to_code(payload), message=f"Token error: {payload.value}").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
provider = get_local_provider()
|
||||
user = await provider.get_user(payload.sub)
|
||||
if user is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.USER_NOT_FOUND, message="User not found").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Token version mismatch → password was changed, token is stale
|
||||
if user.token_version != payload.ver:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.TOKEN_INVALID, message="Token revoked (password changed)").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return user
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_optional_user_from_request(request: Request):
|
||||
"""Get optional authenticated user from request.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns None if not authenticated.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return await get_current_user_from_request(request)
|
||||
except HTTPException:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_current_user(request: Request) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Extract user_id from request cookie, or None if not authenticated.
|
||||
|
||||
Thin adapter that returns the string id for callers that only need
|
||||
identification (e.g., ``feedback.py``). Full-user callers should use
|
||||
``get_current_user_from_request`` or ``get_optional_user_from_request``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
user = await get_optional_user_from_request(request)
|
||||
return str(user.id) if user else None
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
|
||||
"""LangGraph Server auth handler — shares JWT logic with Gateway.
|
||||
|
||||
Loaded by LangGraph Server via langgraph.json ``auth.path``.
|
||||
Reuses the same ``decode_token`` / ``get_auth_config`` as Gateway,
|
||||
so both modes validate tokens with the same secret and rules.
|
||||
|
||||
Two layers:
|
||||
1. @auth.authenticate — validates JWT cookie, extracts user_id,
|
||||
and enforces CSRF on state-changing methods (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH)
|
||||
2. @auth.on — returns metadata filter so each user only sees own threads
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import secrets
|
||||
|
||||
from langgraph_sdk import Auth
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.errors import TokenError
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.jwt import decode_token
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_local_provider
|
||||
|
||||
auth = Auth()
|
||||
|
||||
# Methods that require CSRF validation (state-changing per RFC 7231).
|
||||
_CSRF_METHODS = frozenset({"POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _check_csrf(request) -> None:
|
||||
"""Enforce Double Submit Cookie CSRF check for state-changing requests.
|
||||
|
||||
Mirrors Gateway's CSRFMiddleware logic so that LangGraph routes
|
||||
proxied directly by nginx have the same CSRF protection.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
method = getattr(request, "method", "") or ""
|
||||
if method.upper() not in _CSRF_METHODS:
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
cookie_token = request.cookies.get("csrf_token")
|
||||
header_token = request.headers.get("x-csrf-token")
|
||||
|
||||
if not cookie_token or not header_token:
|
||||
raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=403,
|
||||
detail="CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not secrets.compare_digest(cookie_token, header_token):
|
||||
raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=403,
|
||||
detail="CSRF token mismatch.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@auth.authenticate
|
||||
async def authenticate(request):
|
||||
"""Validate the session cookie, decode JWT, and check token_version.
|
||||
|
||||
Same validation chain as Gateway's get_current_user_from_request:
|
||||
cookie → decode JWT → DB lookup → token_version match
|
||||
Also enforces CSRF on state-changing methods.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# CSRF check before authentication so forged cross-site requests
|
||||
# are rejected early, even if the cookie carries a valid JWT.
|
||||
_check_csrf(request)
|
||||
|
||||
token = request.cookies.get("access_token")
|
||||
if not token:
|
||||
raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
detail="Not authenticated",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
payload = decode_token(token)
|
||||
if isinstance(payload, TokenError):
|
||||
raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
detail=f"Token error: {payload.value}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
user = await get_local_provider().get_user(payload.sub)
|
||||
if user is None:
|
||||
raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
detail="User not found",
|
||||
)
|
||||
if user.token_version != payload.ver:
|
||||
raise Auth.exceptions.HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=401,
|
||||
detail="Token revoked (password changed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return payload.sub
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@auth.on
|
||||
async def add_owner_filter(ctx: Auth.types.AuthContext, value: dict):
|
||||
"""Inject owner_id metadata on writes; filter by owner_id on reads.
|
||||
|
||||
Gateway stores thread ownership as ``metadata.owner_id``.
|
||||
This handler ensures LangGraph Server enforces the same isolation.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# On create/update: stamp owner_id into metadata
|
||||
metadata = value.setdefault("metadata", {})
|
||||
metadata["owner_id"] = ctx.user.identity
|
||||
|
||||
# Return filter dict — LangGraph applies it to search/read/delete
|
||||
return {"owner_id": ctx.user.identity}
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from urllib.parse import quote
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, PlainTextResponse, Response
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
|
||||
from app.gateway.path_utils import resolve_thread_virtual_path
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ def _extract_file_from_skill_archive(zip_path: Path, internal_path: str) -> byte
|
||||
summary="Get Artifact File",
|
||||
description="Retrieve an artifact file generated by the AI agent. Text and binary files can be viewed inline, while active web content is always downloaded.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def get_artifact(thread_id: str, path: str, request: Request, download: bool = False) -> Response:
|
||||
"""Get an artifact file by its path.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
|
||||
"""Authentication endpoints."""
|
||||
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import time
|
||||
from ipaddress import ip_address, ip_network
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
|
||||
from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordRequestForm
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr, Field, field_validator
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth import (
|
||||
UserResponse,
|
||||
create_access_token,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.config import get_auth_config
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.errors import AuthErrorCode, AuthErrorResponse
|
||||
from app.gateway.csrf_middleware import is_secure_request
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user_from_request, get_local_provider
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/auth", tags=["auth"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Request/Response Models ──────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class LoginResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Response model for login — token only lives in HttpOnly cookie."""
|
||||
|
||||
expires_in: int # seconds
|
||||
needs_setup: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Top common-password blocklist. Drawn from the public SecLists "10k worst
|
||||
# passwords" set, lowercased + length>=8 only (shorter ones already fail
|
||||
# the min_length check). Kept tight on purpose: this is the **lower bound**
|
||||
# defense, not a full HIBP / passlib check, and runs in-process per request.
|
||||
_COMMON_PASSWORDS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"password",
|
||||
"password1",
|
||||
"password12",
|
||||
"password123",
|
||||
"password1234",
|
||||
"12345678",
|
||||
"123456789",
|
||||
"1234567890",
|
||||
"qwerty12",
|
||||
"qwertyui",
|
||||
"qwerty123",
|
||||
"abc12345",
|
||||
"abcd1234",
|
||||
"iloveyou",
|
||||
"letmein1",
|
||||
"welcome1",
|
||||
"welcome123",
|
||||
"admin123",
|
||||
"administrator",
|
||||
"passw0rd",
|
||||
"p@ssw0rd",
|
||||
"monkey12",
|
||||
"trustno1",
|
||||
"sunshine",
|
||||
"princess",
|
||||
"football",
|
||||
"baseball",
|
||||
"superman",
|
||||
"batman123",
|
||||
"starwars",
|
||||
"dragon123",
|
||||
"master123",
|
||||
"shadow12",
|
||||
"michael1",
|
||||
"jennifer",
|
||||
"computer",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _password_is_common(password: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Case-insensitive blocklist check.
|
||||
|
||||
Lowercases the input so trivial mutations like ``Password`` /
|
||||
``PASSWORD`` are also rejected. Does not normalize digit substitutions
|
||||
(``p@ssw0rd`` is included as a literal entry instead) — keeping the
|
||||
rule cheap and predictable.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return password.lower() in _COMMON_PASSWORDS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_strong_password(value: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Pydantic field-validator body shared by Register + ChangePassword.
|
||||
|
||||
Constraint = function, not type-level mixin. The two request models
|
||||
have no "is-a" relationship; they only share the password-strength
|
||||
rule. Lifting it into a free function lets each model bind it via
|
||||
``@field_validator(field_name)`` without inheritance gymnastics.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if _password_is_common(value):
|
||||
raise ValueError("Password is too common; choose a stronger password.")
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class RegisterRequest(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Request model for user registration."""
|
||||
|
||||
email: EmailStr
|
||||
password: str = Field(..., min_length=8)
|
||||
|
||||
_strong_password = field_validator("password")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _validate_strong_password(v)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ChangePasswordRequest(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Request model for password change (also handles setup flow)."""
|
||||
|
||||
current_password: str
|
||||
new_password: str = Field(..., min_length=8)
|
||||
new_email: EmailStr | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
_strong_password = field_validator("new_password")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _validate_strong_password(v)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class MessageResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Generic message response."""
|
||||
|
||||
message: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _set_session_cookie(response: Response, token: str, request: Request) -> None:
|
||||
"""Set the access_token HttpOnly cookie on the response."""
|
||||
config = get_auth_config()
|
||||
is_https = is_secure_request(request)
|
||||
response.set_cookie(
|
||||
key="access_token",
|
||||
value=token,
|
||||
httponly=True,
|
||||
secure=is_https,
|
||||
samesite="lax",
|
||||
max_age=config.token_expiry_days * 24 * 3600 if is_https else None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Rate Limiting ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# In-process dict — not shared across workers. Sufficient for single-worker deployments.
|
||||
|
||||
_MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS = 5
|
||||
_LOCKOUT_SECONDS = 300 # 5 minutes
|
||||
|
||||
# ip → (fail_count, lock_until_timestamp)
|
||||
_login_attempts: dict[str, tuple[int, float]] = {}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _trusted_proxies() -> list:
|
||||
"""Parse ``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` env var into a list of ip_network objects.
|
||||
|
||||
Comma-separated CIDR or single-IP entries. Empty / unset = no proxy is
|
||||
trusted (direct mode). Invalid entries are skipped with a logger warning.
|
||||
Read live so env-var overrides take effect immediately and tests can
|
||||
``monkeypatch.setenv`` without poking a module-level cache.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw = os.getenv("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
nets = []
|
||||
for entry in raw.split(","):
|
||||
entry = entry.strip()
|
||||
if not entry:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
nets.append(ip_network(entry, strict=False))
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
logger.warning("AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ignoring invalid entry %r", entry)
|
||||
return nets
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
|
||||
"""Extract the real client IP for rate limiting.
|
||||
|
||||
Trust model:
|
||||
|
||||
- The TCP peer (``request.client.host``) is always the baseline. It is
|
||||
whatever the kernel reports as the connecting socket — unforgeable
|
||||
by the client itself.
|
||||
- ``X-Real-IP`` is **only** honored if the TCP peer is in the
|
||||
``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` allowlist (set via env var, comma-separated
|
||||
CIDR or single IPs). When set, the gateway is assumed to be behind a
|
||||
reverse proxy (nginx, Cloudflare, ALB, …) that overwrites
|
||||
``X-Real-IP`` with the original client address.
|
||||
- With no ``AUTH_TRUSTED_PROXIES`` set, ``X-Real-IP`` is silently
|
||||
ignored — closing the bypass where any client could rotate the
|
||||
header to dodge per-IP rate limits in dev / direct-gateway mode.
|
||||
|
||||
``X-Forwarded-For`` is intentionally NOT used because it is naturally
|
||||
client-controlled at the *first* hop and the trust chain is harder to
|
||||
audit per-request.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
peer_host = request.client.host if request.client else None
|
||||
|
||||
trusted = _trusted_proxies()
|
||||
if trusted and peer_host:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
peer_ip = ip_address(peer_host)
|
||||
if any(peer_ip in net for net in trusted):
|
||||
real_ip = request.headers.get("x-real-ip", "").strip()
|
||||
if real_ip:
|
||||
return real_ip
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
# peer_host wasn't a parseable IP (e.g. "unknown") — fall through
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
return peer_host or "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _check_rate_limit(ip: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Raise 429 if the IP is currently locked out."""
|
||||
record = _login_attempts.get(ip)
|
||||
if record is None:
|
||||
return
|
||||
fail_count, lock_until = record
|
||||
if fail_count >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS:
|
||||
if time.time() < lock_until:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=429,
|
||||
detail="Too many login attempts. Try again later.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
del _login_attempts[ip]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_MAX_TRACKED_IPS = 10000
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _record_login_failure(ip: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Record a failed login attempt for the given IP."""
|
||||
# Evict expired lockouts when dict grows too large
|
||||
if len(_login_attempts) >= _MAX_TRACKED_IPS:
|
||||
now = time.time()
|
||||
expired = [k for k, (c, t) in _login_attempts.items() if c >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS and now >= t]
|
||||
for k in expired:
|
||||
del _login_attempts[k]
|
||||
# If still too large, evict cheapest-to-lose half: below-threshold
|
||||
# IPs (lock_until=0.0) sort first, then earliest-expiring lockouts.
|
||||
if len(_login_attempts) >= _MAX_TRACKED_IPS:
|
||||
by_time = sorted(_login_attempts.items(), key=lambda kv: kv[1][1])
|
||||
for k, _ in by_time[: len(by_time) // 2]:
|
||||
del _login_attempts[k]
|
||||
|
||||
record = _login_attempts.get(ip)
|
||||
if record is None:
|
||||
_login_attempts[ip] = (1, 0.0)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
new_count = record[0] + 1
|
||||
lock_until = time.time() + _LOCKOUT_SECONDS if new_count >= _MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS else 0.0
|
||||
_login_attempts[ip] = (new_count, lock_until)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _record_login_success(ip: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Clear failure counter for the given IP on successful login."""
|
||||
_login_attempts.pop(ip, None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Endpoints ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/login/local", response_model=LoginResponse)
|
||||
async def login_local(
|
||||
request: Request,
|
||||
response: Response,
|
||||
form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends(),
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Local email/password login."""
|
||||
client_ip = _get_client_ip(request)
|
||||
_check_rate_limit(client_ip)
|
||||
|
||||
user = await get_local_provider().authenticate({"email": form_data.username, "password": form_data.password})
|
||||
|
||||
if user is None:
|
||||
_record_login_failure(client_ip)
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||||
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="Incorrect email or password").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_record_login_success(client_ip)
|
||||
token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
|
||||
_set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
|
||||
|
||||
return LoginResponse(
|
||||
expires_in=get_auth_config().token_expiry_days * 24 * 3600,
|
||||
needs_setup=user.needs_setup,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/register", response_model=UserResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
|
||||
async def register(request: Request, response: Response, body: RegisterRequest):
|
||||
"""Register a new user account (always 'user' role).
|
||||
|
||||
Admin is auto-created on first boot. This endpoint creates regular users.
|
||||
Auto-login by setting the session cookie.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
user = await get_local_provider().create_user(email=body.email, password=body.password, system_role="user")
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
|
||||
detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.EMAIL_ALREADY_EXISTS, message="Email already registered").model_dump(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
|
||||
_set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
|
||||
|
||||
return UserResponse(id=str(user.id), email=user.email, system_role=user.system_role)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/logout", response_model=MessageResponse)
|
||||
async def logout(request: Request, response: Response):
|
||||
"""Logout current user by clearing the cookie."""
|
||||
response.delete_cookie(key="access_token", secure=is_secure_request(request), samesite="lax")
|
||||
return MessageResponse(message="Successfully logged out")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/change-password", response_model=MessageResponse)
|
||||
async def change_password(request: Request, response: Response, body: ChangePasswordRequest):
|
||||
"""Change password for the currently authenticated user.
|
||||
|
||||
Also handles the first-boot setup flow:
|
||||
- If new_email is provided, updates email (checks uniqueness)
|
||||
- If user.needs_setup is True and new_email is given, clears needs_setup
|
||||
- Always increments token_version to invalidate old sessions
|
||||
- Re-issues session cookie with new token_version
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from app.gateway.auth.password import hash_password_async, verify_password_async
|
||||
|
||||
user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
|
||||
|
||||
if user.password_hash is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="OAuth users cannot change password").model_dump())
|
||||
|
||||
if not await verify_password_async(body.current_password, user.password_hash):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.INVALID_CREDENTIALS, message="Current password is incorrect").model_dump())
|
||||
|
||||
provider = get_local_provider()
|
||||
|
||||
# Update email if provided
|
||||
if body.new_email is not None:
|
||||
existing = await provider.get_user_by_email(body.new_email)
|
||||
if existing and str(existing.id) != str(user.id):
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=AuthErrorResponse(code=AuthErrorCode.EMAIL_ALREADY_EXISTS, message="Email already in use").model_dump())
|
||||
user.email = body.new_email
|
||||
|
||||
# Update password + bump version
|
||||
user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(body.new_password)
|
||||
user.token_version += 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Clear setup flag if this is the setup flow
|
||||
if user.needs_setup and body.new_email is not None:
|
||||
user.needs_setup = False
|
||||
|
||||
await provider.update_user(user)
|
||||
|
||||
# Re-issue cookie with new token_version
|
||||
token = create_access_token(str(user.id), token_version=user.token_version)
|
||||
_set_session_cookie(response, token, request)
|
||||
|
||||
return MessageResponse(message="Password changed successfully")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserResponse)
|
||||
async def get_me(request: Request):
|
||||
"""Get current authenticated user info."""
|
||||
user = await get_current_user_from_request(request)
|
||||
return UserResponse(id=str(user.id), email=user.email, system_role=user.system_role, needs_setup=user.needs_setup)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/setup-status")
|
||||
async def setup_status():
|
||||
"""Check if admin account exists. Always False after first boot."""
|
||||
user_count = await get_local_provider().count_users()
|
||||
return {"needs_setup": user_count == 0}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── OAuth Endpoints (Future/Placeholder) ─────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/oauth/{provider}")
|
||||
async def oauth_login(provider: str):
|
||||
"""Initiate OAuth login flow.
|
||||
|
||||
Redirects to the OAuth provider's authorization URL.
|
||||
Currently a placeholder - requires OAuth provider implementation.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if provider not in ["github", "google"]:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
|
||||
detail=f"Unsupported OAuth provider: {provider}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_501_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
detail="OAuth login not yet implemented",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/callback/{provider}")
|
||||
async def oauth_callback(provider: str, code: str, state: str):
|
||||
"""OAuth callback endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
Handles the OAuth provider's callback after user authorization.
|
||||
Currently a placeholder.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raise HTTPException(
|
||||
status_code=status.HTTP_501_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
|
||||
detail="OAuth callback not yet implemented",
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from typing import Any
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_current_user, get_feedback_repo, get_run_store
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ class FeedbackStatsResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback", response_model=FeedbackResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def create_feedback(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
run_id: str,
|
||||
@@ -85,6 +87,7 @@ async def create_feedback(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback", response_model=list[FeedbackResponse])
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def list_feedback(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
run_id: str,
|
||||
@@ -96,6 +99,7 @@ async def list_feedback(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback/stats", response_model=FeedbackStatsResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def feedback_stats(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
run_id: str,
|
||||
@@ -107,6 +111,7 @@ async def feedback_stats(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.delete("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/feedback/{feedback_id}")
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def delete_feedback(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
run_id: str,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
|
||||
from langchain_core.messages import HumanMessage, SystemMessage
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
|
||||
from deerflow.models import create_chat_model
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
@@ -98,12 +99,13 @@ def _format_conversation(messages: list[SuggestionMessage]) -> str:
|
||||
summary="Generate Follow-up Questions",
|
||||
description="Generate short follow-up questions a user might ask next, based on recent conversation context.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
async def generate_suggestions(thread_id: str, request: SuggestionsRequest) -> SuggestionsResponse:
|
||||
if not request.messages:
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def generate_suggestions(thread_id: str, body: SuggestionsRequest, request: Request) -> SuggestionsResponse:
|
||||
if not body.messages:
|
||||
return SuggestionsResponse(suggestions=[])
|
||||
|
||||
n = request.n
|
||||
conversation = _format_conversation(request.messages)
|
||||
n = body.n
|
||||
conversation = _format_conversation(body.messages)
|
||||
if not conversation:
|
||||
return SuggestionsResponse(suggestions=[])
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ async def generate_suggestions(thread_id: str, request: SuggestionsRequest) -> S
|
||||
user_content = f"Conversation Context:\n{conversation}\n\nGenerate {n} follow-up questions"
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
model = create_chat_model(name=request.model_name, thinking_enabled=False)
|
||||
model = create_chat_model(name=body.model_name, thinking_enabled=False)
|
||||
response = await model.ainvoke([SystemMessage(content=system_instruction), HumanMessage(content=user_content)])
|
||||
raw = _extract_response_text(response.content)
|
||||
suggestions = _parse_json_string_list(raw) or []
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Query, Request
|
||||
from fastapi.responses import Response, StreamingResponse
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_checkpointer, get_run_event_store, get_run_manager, get_run_store, get_stream_bridge
|
||||
from app.gateway.services import sse_consumer, start_run
|
||||
from deerflow.runtime import RunRecord, serialize_channel_values
|
||||
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ def _record_to_response(record: RunRecord) -> RunResponse:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs", response_model=RunResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "create", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def create_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -> RunResponse:
|
||||
"""Create a background run (returns immediately)."""
|
||||
record = await start_run(body, thread_id, request)
|
||||
@@ -100,6 +102,7 @@ async def create_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs/stream")
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "create", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def stream_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -> StreamingResponse:
|
||||
"""Create a run and stream events via SSE.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -127,6 +130,7 @@ async def stream_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs/wait", response_model=dict)
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "create", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def wait_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Create a run and block until it completes, returning the final state."""
|
||||
record = await start_run(body, thread_id, request)
|
||||
@@ -152,6 +156,7 @@ async def wait_run(thread_id: str, body: RunCreateRequest, request: Request) ->
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs", response_model=list[RunResponse])
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def list_runs(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> list[RunResponse]:
|
||||
"""List all runs for a thread."""
|
||||
run_mgr = get_run_manager(request)
|
||||
@@ -160,6 +165,7 @@ async def list_runs(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> list[RunResponse]:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}", response_model=RunResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def get_run(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> RunResponse:
|
||||
"""Get details of a specific run."""
|
||||
run_mgr = get_run_manager(request)
|
||||
@@ -170,6 +176,7 @@ async def get_run(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> RunResponse:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/cancel")
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "cancel", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def cancel_run(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
run_id: str,
|
||||
@@ -207,6 +214,7 @@ async def cancel_run(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/join")
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def join_run(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> StreamingResponse:
|
||||
"""Join an existing run's SSE stream."""
|
||||
bridge = get_stream_bridge(request)
|
||||
@@ -227,6 +235,7 @@ async def join_run(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> StreamingRe
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.api_route("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/stream", methods=["GET", "POST"], response_model=None)
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def stream_existing_run(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
run_id: str,
|
||||
@@ -274,6 +283,7 @@ async def stream_existing_run(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/messages")
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def list_thread_messages(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
request: Request,
|
||||
@@ -287,6 +297,7 @@ async def list_thread_messages(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/messages")
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def list_run_messages(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> list[dict]:
|
||||
"""Return displayable messages for a specific run."""
|
||||
event_store = get_run_event_store(request)
|
||||
@@ -294,6 +305,7 @@ async def list_run_messages(thread_id: str, run_id: str, request: Request) -> li
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/runs/{run_id}/events")
|
||||
@require_permission("runs", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def list_run_events(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
run_id: str,
|
||||
@@ -308,6 +320,7 @@ async def list_run_events(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/token-usage")
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def thread_token_usage(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Thread-level token usage aggregation."""
|
||||
run_store = get_run_store(request)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@ import uuid
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_checkpointer
|
||||
from app.gateway.utils import sanitize_log_param
|
||||
from deerflow.config.paths import Paths, get_paths
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +30,22 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/threads", tags=["threads"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Metadata keys that the server controls; clients are not allowed to set
|
||||
# them. Pydantic ``@field_validator("metadata")`` strips them on every
|
||||
# inbound model below so a malicious client cannot reflect a forged
|
||||
# owner identity through the API surface. Defense-in-depth — the
|
||||
# row-level invariant is still ``threads_meta.owner_id`` populated from
|
||||
# the auth contextvar; this list closes the metadata-blob echo gap.
|
||||
_SERVER_RESERVED_METADATA_KEYS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"owner_id", "user_id"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _strip_reserved_metadata(metadata: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Return ``metadata`` with server-controlled keys removed."""
|
||||
if not metadata:
|
||||
return metadata or {}
|
||||
return {k: v for k, v in metadata.items() if k not in _SERVER_RESERVED_METADATA_KEYS}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Response / request models
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@@ -60,6 +77,8 @@ class ThreadCreateRequest(BaseModel):
|
||||
assistant_id: str | None = Field(default=None, description="Associate thread with an assistant")
|
||||
metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Initial metadata")
|
||||
|
||||
_strip_reserved = field_validator("metadata")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _strip_reserved_metadata(v)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ThreadSearchRequest(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Request body for searching threads."""
|
||||
@@ -88,6 +107,8 @@ class ThreadPatchRequest(BaseModel):
|
||||
|
||||
metadata: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict, description="Metadata to merge")
|
||||
|
||||
_strip_reserved = field_validator("metadata")(classmethod(lambda cls, v: _strip_reserved_metadata(v)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ThreadStateUpdateRequest(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""Request body for updating thread state (human-in-the-loop resume)."""
|
||||
@@ -165,6 +186,7 @@ def _derive_thread_status(checkpoint_tuple) -> str:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.delete("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadDeleteResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def delete_thread_data(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadDeleteResponse:
|
||||
"""Delete local persisted filesystem data for a thread.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -211,6 +233,8 @@ async def create_thread(body: ThreadCreateRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadRe
|
||||
thread_meta_repo = get_thread_meta_repo(request)
|
||||
thread_id = body.thread_id or str(uuid.uuid4())
|
||||
now = time.time()
|
||||
# ``body.metadata`` is already stripped of server-reserved keys by
|
||||
# ``ThreadCreateRequest._strip_reserved`` — see the model definition.
|
||||
|
||||
# Idempotency: return existing record when already present
|
||||
existing_record = await thread_meta_repo.get(thread_id)
|
||||
@@ -293,6 +317,7 @@ async def search_threads(body: ThreadSearchRequest, request: Request) -> list[Th
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.patch("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def patch_thread(thread_id: str, body: ThreadPatchRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:
|
||||
"""Merge metadata into a thread record."""
|
||||
from app.gateway.deps import get_thread_meta_repo
|
||||
@@ -302,6 +327,7 @@ async def patch_thread(thread_id: str, body: ThreadPatchRequest, request: Reques
|
||||
if record is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Thread {thread_id} not found")
|
||||
|
||||
# ``body.metadata`` already stripped by ``ThreadPatchRequest._strip_reserved``.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
await thread_meta_repo.update_metadata(thread_id, body.metadata)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
@@ -320,6 +346,7 @@ async def patch_thread(thread_id: str, body: ThreadPatchRequest, request: Reques
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}", response_model=ThreadResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:
|
||||
"""Get thread info.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -376,6 +403,7 @@ async def get_thread(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadResponse:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/{thread_id}/state", response_model=ThreadStateResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def get_thread_state(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadStateResponse:
|
||||
"""Get the latest state snapshot for a thread.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -425,6 +453,7 @@ async def get_thread_state(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> ThreadStateRespo
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/{thread_id}/state", response_model=ThreadStateResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def update_thread_state(thread_id: str, body: ThreadStateUpdateRequest, request: Request) -> ThreadStateResponse:
|
||||
"""Update thread state (e.g. for human-in-the-loop resume or title rename).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -514,6 +543,7 @@ async def update_thread_state(thread_id: str, body: ThreadStateUpdateRequest, re
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("/{thread_id}/history", response_model=list[HistoryEntry])
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def get_thread_history(thread_id: str, body: ThreadHistoryRequest, request: Request) -> list[HistoryEntry]:
|
||||
"""Get checkpoint history for a thread.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@ import logging
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import stat
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, File, HTTPException, UploadFile
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, File, HTTPException, Request, UploadFile
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel
|
||||
|
||||
from app.gateway.authz import require_permission
|
||||
from deerflow.config.paths import get_paths
|
||||
from deerflow.sandbox.sandbox_provider import get_sandbox_provider
|
||||
from deerflow.uploads.manager import (
|
||||
@@ -54,8 +55,10 @@ def _make_file_sandbox_writable(file_path: os.PathLike[str] | str) -> None:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("", response_model=UploadResponse)
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "write", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def upload_files(
|
||||
thread_id: str,
|
||||
request: Request,
|
||||
files: list[UploadFile] = File(...),
|
||||
) -> UploadResponse:
|
||||
"""Upload multiple files to a thread's uploads directory."""
|
||||
@@ -133,7 +136,8 @@ async def upload_files(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/list", response_model=dict)
|
||||
async def list_uploaded_files(thread_id: str) -> dict:
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "read", owner_check=True)
|
||||
async def list_uploaded_files(thread_id: str, request: Request) -> dict:
|
||||
"""List all files in a thread's uploads directory."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
uploads_dir = get_uploads_dir(thread_id)
|
||||
@@ -151,7 +155,8 @@ async def list_uploaded_files(thread_id: str) -> dict:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.delete("/{filename}")
|
||||
async def delete_uploaded_file(thread_id: str, filename: str) -> dict:
|
||||
@require_permission("threads", "delete", owner_check=True, require_existing=True)
|
||||
async def delete_uploaded_file(thread_id: str, filename: str, request: Request) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Delete a file from a thread's uploads directory."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
uploads_dir = get_uploads_dir(thread_id)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user