Files
deer-flow/backend/tests/test_csrf_middleware.py
T
DanielWalnut aa015462a7 feat(im): Add user-owned IM channel connections (#3487)
* Add user-owned IM channel connections

* Fix dev startup and channel connect popup

* Use async channel connect flow

* Harden dev service daemon startup

* Support local IM channel connections

* Align IM connections with local channels

* Fix safe user id digest algorithm

* Address Copilot IM channel feedback

* Address IM channel review comments

* Support all integrated IM channel connections

* Format additional channel connection tests

* Keep unavailable channel connect buttons clickable

* Fix IM channel provider icons

* Add runtime setup for enabled IM channels

* Guard global shortcut key handling

* Keep configured IM channels editable

* Avoid password autofill for channel secrets

* Make channel threads visible to connection owners

* Persist IM runtime config locally

* Allow disconnecting runtime IM channels

* Route no-auth channel sessions to local user

* Use default user for auth-disabled local mode

* Show IM channel source on threads

* Prefill IM channel runtime config

* Reflect IM channel runtime health

* Ignore Feishu message read events

* Ignore Feishu non-content message events

* Let setup wizard enable IM channels

* Fix frontend formatting after merge

* Stabilize backend tests without local config

* Isolate channel runtime config tests

* Address channel connection review comments

* Use sha256 user buckets with legacy migration

* Ensure runtime IM channels are ready after restart

* Persist disconnected IM channel state

* Address channel connection review comments

* Address channel connection review findings

Frontend connect flow:
- Open the runtime-config dialog only when a provider still needs
  credentials; configured providers go straight to the connect flow, so
  the binding-code/deep-link path is reachable from the UI again.
- After saving credentials, continue into the connect flow when a user
  binding is still required (multi-user mode) instead of stopping at a
  "Connected" toast.
- Extract shared provider-state helpers to core/channels/provider-state
  and add unit + e2e coverage for the direct-connect and
  configure-then-connect paths.

Provider status semantics:
- Report connection_status from the user's newest connection row;
  with no binding it is not_connected, except in auth-disabled local
  mode where a configured running channel is effectively connected.

Concurrency and event-loop correctness:
- Offload ChannelRuntimeConfigStore construction and writes, channel
  service construction, and Slack connection replies to threads; add a
  tests/blocking_io/ anchor for the runtime-config handlers.
- Consume binding codes with a conditional UPDATE so a code can only be
  used once under concurrent workers; retry upsert_connection as an
  update when a concurrent insert wins the unique constraint.
- Serialize ensure_channel_ready per channel so concurrent provider
  polls cannot double-start a channel worker.

Config and migration hardening:
- Stop mutating the get_app_config()-cached Telegram provider config;
  the runtime store now owns the UI-entered bot username.
- Register channel_connections in STARTUP_ONLY_FIELDS with the
  standardized startup-only Field description.
- Match the legacy unsafe-id bucket by recomputing its exact SHA-1 name
  so another user's same-prefix bucket can never be migrated.
- Remove the unused Telegram process_webhook_update path and document
  src/core/channels in the frontend docs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address PR review comments on authz scoping and channel runtime

Security (review feedback from ShenAC-SAC):
- Scope internal-token callers to the connection owner carried in
  X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id instead of bypassing owner checks outright,
  in both require_permission(owner_check=True) and the stateless run
  endpoints. Internal callers keep access to their own and
  shared/legacy threads, and may claim a default-owned channel thread
  for its real owner, but a leaked internal token no longer grants
  cross-user thread access.
- Require admin privileges for POST/DELETE /api/channels/{provider}/
  runtime-config: runtime credentials and channel workers are
  instance-wide shared state (same model as the MCP config API).
  Read-only provider listing stays available to all users.

Performance (review feedback from willem-bd):
- Skip the redundant thread channel-metadata PATCH after the first
  successful backfill per thread.
- Reuse the per-connection Slack WebClient until its token changes
  instead of constructing one per outbound message.
- Reconcile channel readiness for all providers concurrently in
  GET /api/channels/providers.

Also resolve the code-quality unused-import flag in the blocking-io
anchor by pre-importing the channel service via importlib.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix prettier formatting in provider-state test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Reconcile UI runtime channel config with config reload on restart

Main now reloads a channel's config.yaml entry on restart_channel()
(#3514, issue #3497). Adapt the user-owned connection flow to coexist:

- configure_channel() restarts with reload_config=False — the caller
  just supplied the authoritative config (browser-entered credentials
  that are never written to config.yaml), so a file reload must not
  clobber it with the stale on-disk entry.
- _load_channel_config() re-applies the UI runtime-store overlay used
  at startup, so an operator-triggered restart keeps browser-entered
  credentials for channels without a config.yaml entry and does not
  resurrect a channel disconnected from the UI.
- Offload the reload's disk IO (config.yaml + runtime store) with
  asyncio.to_thread, matching the blocking-IO policy on this branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-12 15:24:58 +08:00

248 lines
7.4 KiB
Python

"""Tests for CSRF middleware."""
from fastapi import FastAPI
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from app.gateway.csrf_middleware import CSRFMiddleware
def _make_app() -> FastAPI:
app = FastAPI()
app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
@app.post("/api/v1/auth/login/local")
async def login_local():
return {"ok": True}
@app.post("/api/v1/auth/register")
async def register():
return {"ok": True}
@app.post("/api/threads/abc/runs/stream")
async def protected_mutation():
return {"ok": True}
return app
def test_auth_post_rejects_cross_origin_browser_request():
"""CSRF-exempt auth routes must not accept hostile browser origins.
Login/register endpoints intentionally skip the double-submit token because
first-time callers do not have a token yet. They still set an auth session,
so a hostile cross-site form POST must be rejected to avoid login CSRF /
session fixation.
"""
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
def test_auth_post_allows_same_origin_browser_request():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
def test_auth_post_rejects_malformed_origin_with_path():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example/path"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token") is None
def test_auth_post_rejects_malformed_origin_with_invalid_port():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example:bad"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token") is None
def test_auth_post_allows_same_origin_default_port_equivalence():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example:443"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
def test_auth_post_allows_forwarded_same_origin():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={
"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https",
"X-Forwarded-Host": "deerflow.example, internal:8000",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
def test_auth_post_allows_forwarded_same_origin_with_non_default_port():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={
"Origin": "http://localhost:2026",
"X-Forwarded-Proto": "http",
"X-Forwarded-Host": "localhost:2026",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
def test_auth_post_allows_rfc_forwarded_same_origin():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://internal:8000")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={
"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
"Forwarded": "proto=https;host=deerflow.example",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
assert "secure" in response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
def test_auth_post_allows_explicit_configured_origin(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://app.example")
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://api.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
headers={"Origin": "https://app.example"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
def test_auth_post_does_not_treat_wildcard_cors_as_allowed_origin(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGINS", "*")
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://api.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Cross-site auth request denied."
def test_auth_post_sets_strict_samesite_csrf_cookie():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/login/local",
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
set_cookie = response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
assert "csrf_token=" in set_cookie
assert "samesite=strict" in set_cookie
assert "secure" in set_cookie
def test_auth_post_without_origin_still_allows_non_browser_clients():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post("/api/v1/auth/login/local")
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.cookies.get("csrf_token")
def test_non_auth_mutation_still_requires_double_submit_token():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header."
def test_non_auth_mutation_allows_valid_double_submit_token():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
client.cookies.set("csrf_token", "known-token")
response = client.post(
"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
headers={
"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
"X-CSRF-Token": "known-token",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 200
def test_non_auth_mutation_rejects_mismatched_double_submit_token():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
client.cookies.set("csrf_token", "cookie-token")
response = client.post(
"/api/threads/abc/runs/stream",
headers={
"Origin": "https://deerflow.example",
"X-CSRF-Token": "header-token",
},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token mismatch."
def test_channel_posts_require_double_submit_csrf():
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="https://deerflow.example")
response = client.post(
"/api/channels/slack/connect",
headers={"Origin": "https://deerflow.example"},
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert response.json()["detail"] == "CSRF token missing. Include X-CSRF-Token header."